The origins of judicial deference to executive interpretation
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12660/rda.v280.2021.84492Palavras-chave:
Direito administrativo — Suprema Corte — deferência judicial — escolhas administrativas — doutrina ChevonResumo
Judicial deference to executive statutory interpretation — a doctrine now commonly associated with the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron v. Natural Council — is one of the central principles in modern American public law. Despite its significance, however, the doctrine’s origins and development are poorly understood. The Court in Chevron claimed that the roots of judicial deference stem from statutory interpretation cases dating to the early nineteenth century. Others, by contrast, have sought to locate Chevron’s doctrinal roots in judicial review’s origins in the writ of mandamus. According to the standard narrative, courts in the pre-Chevron era followed a multifactor and ad hoc approach to issues of judicial deference; there was little theory that explained the body of cases; and the holdings and reasoning of the cases were often contradictory and difficult to rationalize.
Downloads
Publicado
Como Citar
Edição
Seção
Licença

Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.