Browsing FGV EPGE - Ensaios Econômicos by Subject "Leilões"

Now showing items 1-8 of 8

    • Empirical analysis of scoring auctions for oil and gas leases 

      Sant'Anna, Marcelo Castello Branco
      2017-10
      I study a scoring auctions implemented in Brazil to sell oil exploration rights. Differently from most sales of this kind, bidders had to submit a multi-dimensional bid that included a bonus and an exploratory program. A ...

    • First-price auction symmetric equilibria with a general distribution 

      Monteiro, P. K.
      2006-05-01
      In this paper I obtain the mixed strategy symmetric equilibria of the first-price auction for any distribution. The equilibrium is unique. The solution turns out to be a combination of absolutely continuous distributions ...

    • First-Price auction symmetric equlibria with a general distribution 

      Monteiro, P. K.
      2004-09-01
      In this paper I obtain the mixed strategy symmetric equilibria of the first-price auction for any distribution. The equilibrium is unique. The solution turns out to be a combination of absolutely continuous distributions ...

    • Hybrid Auctions I: Theory 

      Menezes, Flavio Marques; Dutra, Joísa Campanher
      2001-05-01
      In this paper we examine the properties of a hybrid auction that combines a sealed bid and an ascending auction. In this auction, each bidder submits a sealed bid. Once the highest bid is known, the bidder who submitted ...

    • Hybrid Auctions II: Experimental Evidence 

      Menezes, Flavio Marques; Dutra, Joísa Campanher
      2001-05-01
      In this paper we report the results of an experiment designed to examine the properties of a hybrid auction - a Dutch-Vickrey auction, that combines a sealed bid …rst-price auction with a sealed bid second-price auction. ...

    • Pure strategy equilibria of multidimensional and non-monotonic auctions 

      Moreira, Humberto Ataíde; Araújo, Aloísio Pessoa de; Castro Filho, Luciano I. de
      2004-11-01
      We give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of symmetric equilibrium without ties in interdependent values auctions, with multidimensional independent types and no monotonic assumptions. In this case, ...

    • The set of equilibria of first-price auctions 

      Monteiro, P. K.
      2004-03-01
      In this note I specify the class of functions that are equilibria of symmetric first-price auctions.

    • Why do bidders drop out from a sequential auction 

      Menezes, Flavio Marques; Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard
      2000-01-26
      In actual sequential auctions, 1) bidders typically incur a cost in continuing from one sale to the next, and 2) bidders decide whether or not to continue. To investigate the question 'why do bidders drop out,' we define ...