Now showing items 1-6 of 6

    • Intrahousehold inequality and the joint taxation of household earnings 

      Alves, Cassiano Breno Machado; Costa, Carlos Eugênio da; Moreira, Humberto Ataíde
      We study the optimal design of nonlinear labor income tax for multiperson households. Each household consists of two workers with different productivity levels and unequal access to the family’s economic resources. We show ...
    • Mechanism design and the collective approach to household behavior 

      Costa, Carlos Eugênio da; Lima, Lucas Alves Estevam de
      Do the Revelation and Taxation Principles hold for multi-person householDo the Revelation and Taxation Principles hold for multi-person households? We provide a positive answer to the former and a negative to the latter ...
    • Optimal taxation with gradual learning of types 

      Costa, Carlos Eugênio da
      2003-10-03
      An important feature of life-cycle models is the presence of uncertainty regarding one’s labor income. Yet this issue, long recognized in different areas, has not received enough attention in the optimal taxation literature. ...
    • Public expenditures taxation and welfare measurement 

      Ferreira, Pedro Cavalcanti
      1994-05
      this article addresses the welfare and macroeconomics effects of fiscal policy in a frarnework where govemment chooses tax rates and the distribution of revenues between consumption and investment. We construct and simulate ...
    • Taxation of couples: a mirrleesian approach for non-unitary households 

      Costa, Carlos Eugênio da; Lima, Lucas Alves Estevam de
      2016-07-02
      Optimal tax theory in the Mirrlees’ (1971) tradition implicitly relies on the assumption that all agents are single or that couples may be treated as individuals, despite accumulating evidence against this view of household ...
    • Yet another reason to tax goods 

      Costa, Carlos Eugênio da
      2005-07-01
      The optimal taxation of goods, labor and capital income is considered in a two period model where: i) private information changes through time; ii) savings are not observed, and; iii) savings a§ect preferences conditional ...