Listagem FGV EPGE - Ensaios Econômicos por autor "Monteiro, P. K."
Itens para a visualização no momento 1-20 of 23
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Equilibria in security markets with a continuum of agents
Monteiro, P. K.; Araújo, Aloísio Pessoa de; Martins-da-Rocha, Victor Filipe
2003-11-01We prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium for exchange economies with a measure space of agents and for which the commodity space is ` p, 1 < p < +∞. A vector x = (xn) in ` p may be interpreted as a security which ... -
Equilibrium theory with asymmetric information and infinitely many states
Hervés-Beloso, Carlos; Martins-da-Rocha, Victor Filipe; Monteiro, P. K.
2008-02-28Radner (1968) proved the existence of a competitive equilibrium for differential information economies with finitely many states. We extend this result to economies with infinitely many states of nature. -
Exclusão e multidimensionalidade de tipos em leilões ótimos
Svaiter, Benar Fux; Monteiro, P. K.; Page Junior, Frank H.
2006-09-01Em um modelo de leil˜oes com valores privados independentes demonstramos que se os tipos s˜ao multidimensionais ent˜ao no leil˜ao ´otimo h´a exclus˜ao de tipos. -
First-price auction symmetric equilibria with a general distribution
Monteiro, P. K.
2006-05-01In this paper I obtain the mixed strategy symmetric equilibria of the first-price auction for any distribution. The equilibrium is unique. The solution turns out to be a combination of absolutely continuous distributions ... -
First-Price auction symmetric equlibria with a general distribution
Monteiro, P. K.
2004-09-01In this paper I obtain the mixed strategy symmetric equilibria of the first-price auction for any distribution. The equilibrium is unique. The solution turns out to be a combination of absolutely continuous distributions ... -
Full surplus extraction with dominant strategies
Monteiro, P. K.
2000-06-01In this note I consider the fuI! surplus extraction in an auction with private but possibly correlated values. I show that fuI! extraction in the continuum of types case is not possible in general. Neither is approximate ... -
Inflation and income inequality: a shopping-time aproach: (Forthcoming, Journal of Development Economics)
Cysne, Rubens Penha; Maldonado, Wilfredo Fernando Leiva; Monteiro, P. K.
2004-09-01Our work is based on a simpliÖed heterogenous-agent shoppingtime economy in which economic agents present distinct productivities in the production of the consumption good, and di§erentiated access to transacting assets. ... -
Introdução a integração estocástica
Monteiro, P. K.
1994-06 -
Introdução à integração estocástica (Revisado em Julho de 1999)
Monteiro, P. K.
1999-08-01A integração estocástica é a ferramenta básica para o estudo do apreçamento de ativos derivados1 nos modelos de finanças de tempo contínuo. A fórmula de Black e Scholes é o exemplo mais conhecido. Os movimentos de preços ... -
A note on convergence of Peck-Shell and Green-Lin mechanisms in the Diamond-Dybvig model
Cavalcanti, Ricardo de Oliveira; Bertolai, Jefferson Donizeti Pereira; Monteiro, P. K.
2011-07-27We study the effects of population size in the Peck-Shell analysis of bank runs. We find that a contract featuring equal-treatment for almost all depositors of the same type approximates the optimum. Because the approximation ... -
On the differentiability of the consumer demand function
Monteiro, P. K.; Pascoa, Mario Rui; Werlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa
1993-05For strictly quasi concave differentiable utility functions, demand is shown to be differentiable almost everywhere if marginal utilities are pointwise Lipschitzian. For concave utility functions, demand is differentiable ... -
On uniqueness of equilibrium in the Kyle Model
Mc Lennan, Andrew; Monteiro, P. K.; Tourky, Rabee
2014-12-27A longstanding unresolved question is whether the one-period Kyle Model of an informed trader and a noisily informed market maker has an equilibrium that is different from the closed-form solution derived by Kyle (1985). ... -
Optimal auction with a general distribution: virtual valuation without densities
Svaiter, Benar Fux; Monteiro, P. K.
2008-11-25We characterize the optimal auction in an independent private values framework for a completely general distribution of valuations. We do this introducing a new concept: the generalized virtual valuation. To show the wider ... -
Optimal auctions in a general model of identical goods
Monteiro, P. K.
1999-10-01In this paper I study optimal auctions of identical goods. There is synergy in the number of goods and independent bidder’s signals. -
Optimal auctions with multidimensional types and the desirability of exclusion
Page Junior, Frank H.; Monteiro, P. K.; Svaiter, Benar Fux
2004-03-01Within the context of a single-unit, independent private values auction model, we show that if bidder types are multidimensional, then under the optimal auction exclusion of some bidder types will occur. A second contribution ... -
Porque favorecer firmas nacionais?
Menezes, Flavio Marques; Monteiro, P. K.
2000-04-06In this paper we offer a rationale for the existence of preferences for domestic…rms in government procurement. When the domestic…rm’s probability of completion of a government contract is larger than the foreign …rms ... -
Resultados uniformemente seguros e equilíbrio de Nash em jogos compactos
Monteiro, P. K.; Page Junior, Frank H.
2006-09-01Nós introduzimos uma condição, resultados uniformemente seguros, para jogos compactos e resultados ('payoffs') limitados e mensur´aveis nas estrat´egias. Demonstramos que se um jogo compacto tem resultados uniformemente ... -
The set of equilibria of first-price auctions
Monteiro, P. K.
2004-03-01In this note I specify the class of functions that are equilibria of symmetric first-price auctions. -
Strategic behavior in repeated trials of vickrey auctions
Menezes, Flavio Marques; Monteiro, P. K.
2000-02-01 -
Synergies and price trends in sequential auctions
Menezes, Flavio Marques; Monteiro, P. K.
1999-10-01In this paper we consider sequential auctions where an individual’s value for a bundle of objects is either greater than the sum of the values for the objects separately (positive synergy) or less than the sum (negative ...





















