Listagem FGV EPGE - Ensaios Econômicos por autor "Menezes, Flavio Marques"

Itens para a visualização no momento 1-16 of 16

    • An auction theoretical approach to fiscal wars 

      Menezes, Flavio Marques
      2000-12-01
      I examine a situation where a firm has to choose to locate a new factory in one of several jurisdictions and it depends on the private information held by each jurisdiction. Jurisdiction compete for the location of the new ...

    • Chasing patents 

      Menezes, Flavio Marques; Pitchford, Rohan
      2001-03-01
      We examine the problem faced by a company that wishes to purchase patents in the hands of two di¤erent patent owners. Complementarity of these patents in the production process of the company is a prime e¢ciency reason for ...

    • Corruption and the choice of auction format 

      Menezes, Flavio Marques; Monteiro, Paulo Klinger
      2000-02-18

    • Discrete public goods with incomplete information 

      Monteiro, Paulo Klinger; Temimi, Akram; Menezes, Flavio Marques
      1999-10-07

    • Duplication of R&D and industry concentration 

      Temimi, Akram; Dakhlia, Sami; Menezes, Flavio Marques
      2001-09-30
      The purpose of the literature on Research Joint Ventures (RJV), pioneered by DíAspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien, Muller, and Zang (1992), has been to combine the best of two worlds: to appropriately deal with R&D ...

    • The economics of auctions chapter 3: the independent private values model 

      Menezes, Flavio Marques; Monteiro, Paulo Klinger
      2000-08-01

    • Endogenous transactions costs in multi-seller model 

      Menezes, Flavio Marques; Pitchford, Rohan
      2001-07-01
      vVe examine the problem of a buyer who wishes to purehase and eombine ti. objeets owned by n individual owners to realize a higher V'illue. The owners are able to delay their entry into the sale proeess: They ean either ...

    • Hybrid Auctions I: Theory 

      Menezes, Flavio Marques; Dutra, Joísa Campanher
      2001-05-01
      In this paper we examine the properties of a hybrid auction that combines a sealed bid and an ascending auction. In this auction, each bidder submits a sealed bid. Once the highest bid is known, the bidder who submitted ...

    • Hybrid Auctions II: Experimental Evidence 

      Menezes, Flavio Marques; Dutra, Joísa Campanher
      2001-05-01
      In this paper we report the results of an experiment designed to examine the properties of a hybrid auction - a Dutch-Vickrey auction, that combines a sealed bid …rst-price auction with a sealed bid second-price auction. ...

    • The land assembly problem revisited 

      Menezes, Flavio Marques; Pitchford, Rohan
      2001-06-01
      As in the standard land assembly problem, a developer wants to buy two adjacent blocks of land belonging to two di¤erent owners. The value of the two blocks of land to the developer is greater than the sum of the individual ...

    • The microeconomics of corruption: the classical approach 

      Menezes, Flavio Marques
      2000-11-01

    • Porque favorecer firmas nacionais? 

      Menezes, Flavio Marques; Monteiro, P. K.
      2000-04-06
      In this paper we offer a rationale for the existence of preferences for domestic…rms in government procurement. When the domestic…rm’s probability of completion of a government contract is larger than the foreign …rms ...

    • Reforma previdenciária: em busca de incentivos para atrair o trabalhador autônomo 

      Dart, Samantha T.; Neri, Marcelo Côrtes; Menezes, Flavio Marques
      2002-11-01
      Este artigo busca modelar que incentivos são capazes de influenciar a decisão do trabalhador autônomo de participar ou não do sistema público de Previdência (INSS) utilizando um arcabouço de Teoria de Contratos (modelo de ...

    • Strategic behavior in repeated trials of vickrey auctions 

      Menezes, Flavio Marques; Monteiro, P. K.
      2000-02-01

    • Synergies and price trends in sequential auctions 

      Menezes, Flavio Marques; Monteiro, P. K.
      1999-10-01
      In this paper we consider sequential auctions where an individual’s value for a bundle of objects is either greater than the sum of the values for the objects separately (positive synergy) or less than the sum (negative ...

    • Why do bidders drop out from a sequential auction 

      Menezes, Flavio Marques; Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard
      2000-01-26
      In actual sequential auctions, 1) bidders typically incur a cost in continuing from one sale to the next, and 2) bidders decide whether or not to continue. To investigate the question 'why do bidders drop out,' we define ...