Now showing items 1-5 of 5

    • Banning information as a redistributive device 

      Gottlieb, Daniel; Maestri, Lucas Jóver
      2004-07-01
      In this paper we analyze the optimality of allowing firms to observe signals of workers’ characteristics in an optimal taxation framework. We show that it is always optimal to prohibit signals that disclose information ...
    • The interaction between unemployment insurance and human capital policies 

      Costa, Carlos Eugênio da; Maestri, Lucas Jóver
      2005-07-01
    • Optimal Mirrleesian taxation in non-competitive labor markets 

      Costa, Carlos Eugênio da; Maestri, Lucas Jóver
      2015-12
      We study optimal labor income taxation in non-competitive labor markets. Firms offer screening contracts to workers who have private information about their productivity. A planner endowed with a Paretian social welfare ...
    • Redistribution with labor market frictions 

      Costa, Carlos Eugênio da; Maestri, Lucas Jóver; Santos, Marcelo Rodrigues dos
      How should search frictions in the labor market affect distributive policies? Can we assess current real-world policies? After building a framework for answering these questions we show that any constrained efficient ...
    • The risk-properties of human capital and the design of government policies 

      Costa, Carlos Eugênio da; Maestri, Lucas Jóver
      2004-07-01
      Whether human capital increases or decreases wage uncertainty is an open question from an empirical standpoint. Yet, most policy prescriptions regarding human capital formation are based on models that impose riskiness on ...