First-Price auction symmetric equlibria with a general distribution

dc.contributor.author	Monteiro, P. K.
dc.date.accessioned	2008-05-13T15:24:27Z
dc.date.available	2008-05-13T15:24:27Z
dc.date.issued	2004-09-01
dc.identifier.issn	0104-8910
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10438/455
dc.description.abstract	In this paper I obtain the mixed strategy symmetric equilibria of the first-price auction for any distribution. The equilibrium is unique. The solution turns out to be a combination of absolutely continuous distributions case and the discrete distributions case.	eng
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.publisher	Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV	por
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Ensaios Econômicos;568	por
dc.title	First-Price auction symmetric equlibria with a general distribution	eng
dc.type	Working Paper	eng
dc.subject.area	Economia	por
dc.contributor.unidadefgv	Escolas::EPGE	por
dc.subject.bibliodata	Economia	por
dc.subject.bibliodata	Leilões	por
dc.contributor.affiliation	FGV