| dc.contributor.author | Guimaraes, Bernardo | |
| dc.contributor.author | Sheedy, Kevin D. | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-07-05T19:45:15Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2021-07-05T19:45:15Z | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10438/30808 | |
| dc.description | This paper presents a theory of institutional specialization in which some countries uphold
the rule of law while others choose extractive institutions, even when countries are ex-ante identical.
The driving force of specialization is that for incumbents in each country, the first steps to
the rule of law have the greatest cost. Good institutions require sharing power and rents, but in
places where power is already shared broadly, each power base or branch of government supporting
the institutions is individually less important and thus receives lower rents. Countries with
diametrically opposed institutions have a symbiotic relationship in the world equilibrium. The
transition from sail to steam-powered vessels in 19th-century trade provides suggestive evidence
supporting the theory. | por |
| dc.language.iso | eng | |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Textos para Discussão / Working Paper Series;TD 545 | |
| dc.subject | rule of law | por |
| dc.subject | power sharing | por |
| dc.subject | international trade | por |
| dc.subject | extractive institutions | por |
| dc.subject | resource curse | por |
| dc.subject | political economy | por |
| dc.title | Institutional Specialization | por |
| dc.type | Working Paper | eng |
| dc.contributor.unidadefgv | Escolas::EESP | por |
