Entre ideias e instituições: considerações sobre Mangabeira Unger e a 'situação constitucional' do Brasil

Abstract

Roberto Mangabeira Unger’s ultimate project for the legal sphere aims at re-orienting legal analysis towards what he labels institutional imagina- tion. Institutional imagination requires identifiying and exploring alterna- tive institutional futures that are already implicit in the ambiguities and contradictions of our current institutions and collective aspirations. In his paper 'A constituição do experimentalismo democratic', Unger seeks to justify the need to re-orient as institutional imagination the core features of our “constitutional situation”. My goal in this brief comment is twofold. First, I try to contextualize Unger’s approach to the Brazilian 'constitutio- nal situation' — defending a method of legal analysis and applying this method to a set of core features and problems of Brazilian constitutional law — in the broader context of his ideas about law. Second, using stan- dards extracted from a reconstruction of Unger’s own method, I try to raise some perplexities regarding the specific suggestions of institutional reform presented in the text. More specifically, I point to the difficulties of recon- ciling, with Unger’s preferred method for legal analysis, the proposal of allowing either the president or Congress to call for immediate elections,for both branches of government, in case of a deadlock. My broader goal is to contribute to make explicit some central aspects of the ungerian method of reasoning, while also raising possible problems with its operation in specific instances of institutional re-design.

A proposta maior de Roberto Mangabeira Unger no campo do direito consiste em reorientar o pensamento jurídico rumo ao que chama de imaginação institucional: um processo de identificação e exploração de futuros institucionais alternativos implícitos nas ambiguidades e contradições de nossas instituições e aspirações coletivas. No texto 'A constituição do experimentalismo democrático', apresenta razões para justificar a necessidade de reorientarmos, sob a forma de imaginação institucional, o pensamento sobre o direito constitucional no Brasil e sugere aplicações desse tipo de raciocínio a alguns aspectos centrais de nossa 'situação constitucional'. Neste comentário ao texto de Unger, procuro (a) inserir essa dúplice abordagem da situação constitucional do Brasil -- defesa de um método de pensamento e aplicação desse método a alguns temas e estruturas do direito constitucional brasileiro -- na perspectiva mais ampla do pensamento ungeriano sobre o direito; (b) levantar, a partir de critérios extraídos do método que Unger propõe, algumas perplexidades quanto às propostas de reforma via imaginação institucional esboçadas no texto. Mais especificamente, discuto algumas dificuldades em se compatibilizar, com o próprio procedimento de análise proposto por Unger, sua proposta de se resolver impasses entre o presidente e o Congresso com a convocação de eleições antecipadas para ambos os poderes. A meta é contribuir para explicitar algumas características centrais do método de pensamento ungeriano e ilustrar sua operação, ao mesmo tempo que aponto possíveis dificuldades em sua aplicação em casos específicos de redesenho institucional.Roberto Mangabeira Unger's ultimate project for the legal sphere aims at re-orienting legal analysis towards what he labels institutional imagination. Institutional imagination requires identifiying and exploring alternative institutional futures that are already implicit in the ambiguities and contradictions of our current institutions and collective aspirations. In his paper 'A constituição do experimentalismo democratic', Unger seeks to justify the need to re-orient as institutional imagination the core features of our 'constitutional situation'. My goal in this brief comment is twofold. First, I try to contextualize Unger's approach to the Brazilian 'constitutional situation' -- defending a method of legal analysis and applying this method to a set of core features and problems of Brazilian constitutional law -- in the broader context of his ideas about law. Second, using standards extracted from a reconstruction of Unger's own method, I try to raise some perplexities regarding the specific suggestions of institutional reform presented in the text. More specifically, I point to the difficulties of reconciling, with Unger's preferred method for legal analysis, the proposal of allowing either the president or Congress to call for immediate elections, for both branches of government, in case of a deadlock. My broader goal is to contribute to make explicit some central aspects of the ungerian method of reasoning, while also raising possible problems with its operation in specific instances of institutional re-design.