| dc.contributor.author | Monte, Daniel | |
| dc.contributor.author | Tumennasan, Norovsambuu | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-10-25T18:23:55Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2018-10-25T18:23:55Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2013 | |
| dc.identifier | https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84876446650&doi=10.1016%2fj.econlet.2013.03.007&partnerID=40&md5=e84aed9b754db0299532b68d64fc378c | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0165-1765 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10438/25403 | |
| dc.description.abstract | In the problem of allocating workers to different projects, where each project needs a minimum number of workers assigned to it, the serial dictatorship mechanism is neither strategy proof nor Pareto efficient. We therefore propose a strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient mechanism. © 2013. | eng |
| dc.language.iso | eng | |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Economics Letters | |
| dc.source | Scopus | |
| dc.subject | Efficiency | eng |
| dc.subject | Matching | eng |
| dc.subject | Serial Dictatorship | eng |
| dc.title | Matching with quorums | eng |
| dc.type | Article (Journal/Review) | eng |
| dc.contributor.unidadefgv | Escolas::EESP | por |
| dc.subject.bibliodata | Trabalhadores - Projetos | por |
| dc.contributor.affiliation | FGV | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.007 | |
| dc.rights.accessRights | restrictedAccess | eng |
| dc.identifier.scopus | 2-s2.0-84876446650 | |
