Auctions with synergies and asymmetric buyers

dc.contributor.author	Menezes, Flavio Marques
dc.contributor.author	Monteiro, Paulo Klinger
dc.date.accessioned	2018-05-10T13:35:33Z
dc.date.available	2018-05-10T13:35:33Z
dc.date.issued	2004-11
dc.identifier	http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2004.04.017
dc.identifier.issn	0938-2259 / 1432-0479
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10438/23054
dc.description	Conteúdo online de acesso restrito pelo editor	por
dc.description.abstract	In this paper we consider sequential auctions with synergies where one player wants two objects and the remaining players want one object each. We show that expected prices may not necessarily decrease as predicted by Branco [Econ. Lett. 54 (1997) 159]. Indeed we show that expected prices can actually increase. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V All rights reserved.	eng
dc.format.extent	p. 287-294
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.publisher	Elsevier Science Sa	eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Economics letters	eng
dc.source	Web of Science
dc.subject	Synergies	eng
dc.subject	Asymmetric sequential auctions	eng
dc.title	Auctions with synergies and asymmetric buyers	eng
dc.type	Article (Journal/Review)	eng
dc.subject.area	Economia	por
dc.subject.bibliodata	Leilões	por
dc.contributor.affiliation	FGV
dc.identifier.doi	10.1016/j.econlet.2004.04.017
dc.rights.accessRights	restrictedAccess	eng
dc.identifier.WoS	000224339000022