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A note on auctions with compulsory partnership

dc.contributor.authorMonteiro, P. K.
dc.contributor.authorAraújo, Aloísio Pessoa de
dc.contributor.authorSouza, Clara Costellini de
dc.contributor.authorDamé, Otávio Menezes
dc.date.accessioned2018-04-06T13:18:55Z
dc.date.available2018-04-06T13:18:55Z
dc.date.issued2016-12-01
dc.identifier.citationRevista Brasileira de Economia. Fundação Getúlio Vargas, v. 70, n. 4, p. 481-486, 2016.
dc.identifier.issn0034-7140
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10438/21708
dc.description.abstractWe study a symmetric, profit share, common value auction with a twist: One (fixed) Bidder, if not winning the auction, has to enter a partnership with the winner, sharing both expenses and revenue at rate (say) 0 < λ < 1. We show that it doesn't have an equilibrium in pure-strategies.eng
dc.description.abstractNós estudamos um leilão de valor comum, simétrico com uma mudança: Um determinado licitante, se não vencer o leilão, deve entrar numa parceria com o vencedor, dividindo tanto receitas quanto despesas a uma taxa pré-determinada. Demonstramos que não há equilíbrio em estratégias puraspor
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherFundação Getúlio Vargas
dc.relation.ispartofseriesRevista Brasileira de Economia
dc.sourceSciELO
dc.subjectPre-Salt auctioneng
dc.subjectProduction shareeng
dc.subjectEquilibrium existenceeng
dc.titleA note on auctions with compulsory partnershipeng
dc.typeArticle (Journal/Review)eng
dc.subject.areaEconomiapor
dc.subject.bibliodataPetróleo em terras submersaspor
dc.subject.bibliodataLeilõespor
dc.contributor.affiliationFundação Getúlio Vargas - FGV
dc.identifier.doi10.5935/0034-7140.20160025
dc.rights.accessRightsopenAccesseng
dc.identifier.fileS0034-71402016000400481.pdf
dc.identifier.scieloS0034-71402016000400481


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