Browsing Produção Intelectual em Bases Externas by Subject "Leilões"

Now showing items 1-6 of 6

    • Auctions of identical objects with single-unit demands: a survey 

      Menezes, Flavio Marques
      1998-11-02
      The theory of auctions of a single object generalizes to a situation where identical objects are sold either sequentially or simultaneously but individuals can only buy one object. In this context, I will present a survey ...

    • Auctions with endogenous participation 

      Menezes, Flavio Marques; Monteiro, P. K.
      2000
      We study endogenous-participation auctions where bidders only know the number of potential participants. After seeing their values for the object, potential participants decide whether or not to enter the auction. They may ...

    • Auctions with synergies and asymmetric buyers 

      Menezes, Flavio Marques; Monteiro, Paulo Klinger
      2004-11
      In this paper we consider sequential auctions with synergies where one player wants two objects and the remaining players want one object each. We show that expected prices may not necessarily decrease as predicted by ...

    • First-price auctions without affiliation 

      Monteiro, P. K.; Moreira, Humberto Ataíde
      2006
      We give conditions for equilibrium existence in private value, symmetric, first-price auctions without affiliation assumptions. © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    • Hybrid auctions 

      Dutra, Joísa Campanher; Menezes, Flavio Marques
      2002-11
      In this paper we analyze a hybrid auction that combines a first-price and a Vickrey auction. We show that this auction may generate more expected revenue than a standard first-price auction. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. ...

    • A note on auctions with compulsory partnership 

      Monteiro, P. K.; Araújo, Aloísio Pessoa de; Souza, Clara Costellini de; Damé, Otávio Menezes
      2016-12-01
      We study a symmetric, profit share, common value auction with a twist: One (fixed) Bidder, if not winning the auction, has to enter a partnership with the winner, sharing both expenses and revenue at rate (say) 0 < λ < 1. ...