Now showing items 1-6 of 6

    • Borrowing in excess of natural ability to repay 

      Martins-da-Rocha, Victor Filipe; Vailakis, Yiannis
      2017-01
      The paper aims at improving our understanding of self-enforcing debt in competitive dynamic economies with lack of commitment when default induces a permanent loss of access to international credit markets. We show, by ...
    • Constrained efficiency without commitment 

      Martins-da-Rocha, Victor Filipe; Vailakis, Yiannis
      2015-12
      We consider an infinite horizon economy where agents share income risks by trading a complete set of contingent claims but cannot commit to their promises. Allocations are restricted to be self-enforcing relative to autarchic ...
    • Financial markets with endogenous transaction costs 

      Martins-da-Rocha, Victor Filipe; Vailakis, Yiannis
      2010-10
      The paper proposes an alternative general equilibrium formulation of financial asset economies with transaction costs. Transaction costs emerge endogenously at equilibrium and reflect agents' decisions of intermediating ...
    • Fixed point for local contractions: applications to recursive utility 

      Martins-da-Rocha, Victor Filipe; Vailakis, Yiannis
      2013-03
      The paper shows how fixed-point results for local contractions apply to the study of the existence and uniqueness of recursive utility functions defined on subsets of + and being continuous for a specific topology. Two ...
    • Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes: a counterexample 

      Martins-da-Rocha, Victor Filipe; Vailakis, Yiannis
      2012-05
      Pascoa and Seghir (2009) presented two examples to show that in the presence of utility penalties for default, collateral requirements do not always eliminate the occurrence of Ponzi schemes and equilibria may fail to ...
    • On the sovereign debt paradox 

      Martins-da-Rocha, Victor Filipe; Vailakis, Yiannis
      2017-12
      Bulow and Rogoff (Am Econ Rev 79(1):43-50, 1989) show that lending to small countries cannot be supported merely on the country's 'reputation for repayment' if exclusion from future credit markets is the only consequence ...