Now showing items 1-3 of 3

    • Bargained haircuts and debt policy implications 

      Araújo, Aloísio Pessoa de; Leon, Márcia Saraiva; Santos, Rafael Chaves
      2017-12
      We extend the Cole and Kehoe model (J Int Econ 41:309-330, 1996) by adding a Rubinstein bargaining game between creditors and debtor country to determine the share of debt repayment in a sovereign debt crisis. Ex-post, the ...
    • Inflation targeting with imperfect information 

      Araújo, Aloísio Pessoa de; Berriel, Tiago Couto; Santos, Rafael Chaves
      2016-02
      In a global games setup with imperfect commitment technology, we show that low targetsthe ones close to the optimal inflation under perfect commitmentare unattainable, leading to a trade-off between low and credible targets. ...
    • Welfare analysis of currency regimes with defaultable debts 

      Araújo, Aloísio Pessoa de; Leon, Márcia Saraiva; Santos, Rafael Chaves
      2013
      We modify the Cole and Kehoe model by including domestic debt. According to the original model, a speculative attack on a high debt level issued abroad triggers external debt default. Here, it is possible to inflate away ...