Listagem FGV EPGE - Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças por Assunto "Teoria dos jogos"
Itens para a visualização no momento 1-20 of 26
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Uma barreira à entrada não tão inocente
2012-05-16In oligopoly theories based on Nash Equilibrium and related concepts, free entry is associated with the coexistence of more than one rm. On the other hand, in the monopoly literature some reasons are identi ed as possible ... -
The Bayesian Foundations of solution concepts of games
1987We transform a non co-operati ve game into a -Bayesian decision problem for each player where the uncertainty faced by a player is the strategy choices of the other players, the pr iors of other players on the choice of ... -
A comment on 'Rational learning lead to nash equilibrium' by professors Ehud Kalai and Ehud Lehrer
1995-02Kalai and Lebrer (93a, b) have recently show that for the case of infinitely repeated games, a coordination assumption on beliefs and optimal strategies ensures convergence to Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we show that ... -
Common knowledge
1988 -
O conjunto dos equilíbrios dos leilões de primeiro preço
2004-05-06In this note I specify the class of functions that are equilibria of symmetric first-price auctions. -
Existence of nash equilibrium in competitive nonlinear pricing games with adverse selection
2003-10-09We show that for a large class of competitive nonlinear pricing games with adverse selection, the property of better-reply security is naturally satisfied - thus, resolving via a result due to Reny (1999) the issue of ... -
Um experimento para o modelo do holdout do vendedor
2008-09-18Essa dissertação apresenta uma análise experimental do modelo de holdout apresentado em Menezes e Pitchford (2004), no qual o aumento na complementeri- dade entre os bens dos vendedores implica maior probabilidade de ... -
Inattention in individual expectations
2016This paper investigates the expectations formation process of economic agents about infl ation rate. Using the Market Expectations System of Central Bank of Brazil, we perceive that agents do not update their forecasts ... -
Uma investigação experimental de modelos de preferências sociais
2004Esta dissertação foi desenvolvida da seguinte forma: No item I - Introdução, se mostra como foi constatado que os indivíduos, em experimentos, não se comportavam como simples maximizadores de quantidades, e são citadas as ... -
Mobility, information, and bequest : the other side of the equal division puzzle
2005-07-21There is substantial empirical evidence that parental bequests to their children are typically equal in the US – a regularity inconsistent with the predictions of standard optimizing bequest models. The prior explanation ... -
Um modelo de leilões com conteúdo local: análise e modelagem dos leilões de concessão de blocos exploratórios de petróleo e gás promovidos pela ANP no Brasil
2014-05-29Brazil’s oil auctions use an equation to form a score that defines the winner. Each company or consortium interested in the oil block must bid in three attributes: Signature Bonus (BA), Minimum Exploration Program (PEM) ... -
On the contamination of confidence
2009-11-30Contaminação da confiança é um caso especial de incerteza Knightiana ou ambiguidade na qual o tomador de decisões está diante de não apenas uma única distribuição de probabilidades, mas sim de um conjunto de distribuições ... -
On the Impossibility of an Exact Imperfect Monitoring Folk Theorem
2007-06-29It is shown that, for almost every two-player game with imperfect monitoring, the conclusions of the classical folk theorem are false. So, even though these games admit a well-known approximate folk theorem, an exact folk ... -
On the impossibility of prisoner's dilemmas in adversarial preference games
2002-05-29Why don't agents cooperate when they both stand to gain? This question ranks among the most fundamental in the social sciences. Explanations abound. Among the most compelling are various configurations of the prisonerís ... -
On the limits of cheap talk for public good provision
2008-09-18This article studies a model where, as a consequence of private information, agents do not have incentive to invest in a desired joint project, or a public good, when they are unable to have prior discussion with their ...
