| dc.contributor.author | Klemperer, Paul | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2014-11-19T10:38:41Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2014-11-19T10:38:41Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2001-07-31 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10438/12494 | |
| dc.description.abstract | The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy preventing collusive, predatory, and entry-deterring behaviour. Ascending and uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable to these problems, and the Anglo-Dutch auction a hybrid of the sealed-bid and ascending auctions may often perform better. Effective anti-trust policy is also critical. However, everything depends on the details of the context; the circum- stances of the recent U.K. mobile-phone license auction made an ascending format ideal, but this author (and others) correctly predicted the same for- mat would fail in the Netherlands and elsewhere. Auction design is not one size Þts all . We also discuss the 3G spectrum auctions in Germany, Italy, Austria and Switzerland, and football TV-rights, TV franchise and other radiospectrum auctions, electricity markets, and takeover battles. | eng |
| dc.language.iso | eng | |
| dc.publisher | Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV | por |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Seminários de pesquisa econômica da EPGE | por |
| dc.rights | Todo cuidado foi dispensado para respeitar os direitos autorais deste trabalho. Entretanto, caso esta obra aqui depositada seja protegida por direitos autorais externos a esta instituição, contamos com a compreensão do autor e solicitamos que o mesmo faça contato através do Fale Conosco para que possamos tomar as providências cabíveis | por |
| dc.title | What really matters in auction design | eng |
| dc.type | Working Paper | eng |
| dc.subject.area | Economia | por |
| dc.contributor.unidadefgv | Escolas::EPGE | por |
| dc.subject.bibliodata | Leilões | por |
| dc.contributor.affiliation | FGV | |