Browsing FGV EPGE - Seminários de Pesquisa Econômica by Subject "Leilões"
Now showing items 1-9 of 9
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Affiliation, equilibrium existence and the revenue ranking of auctions
2007-03-01We consider private value auctions where bidders’ types are dependent, a case usually treated by assuming affiliation. We show that affiliation is a restrictive assumption in three senses: topological, measure-theoretic ... -
All-pay auctions with endogenous asymmetries
2004-03-18We study N-bidders, asymmetric all-pay auctions under incomplete information. First, we solve for the equilibrium of a parametric model. Each bidder’s valuation is independently drawn from an uniform [0, αi] where the ... -
Asymmetric auctions and risk aversion within independent private values
2007We study tournaments with many ex-ante asymmetric (heterogeneous) contestants as an independent-private-values all-pay auction. The asymmetry is either with respect to the distribution of valuations for the prize or the ... -
Auctions with options for re-auction
2003-01-23We examine the role of seller bidding and reserve prices in an infinitely repeated independent-private-value (IPV) ascending-price auction. The seller has a single object that she values at zero. At the end of any auction ... -
O conjunto dos equilíbrios dos leilões de primeiro preço
2004-05-06In this note I specify the class of functions that are equilibria of symmetric first-price auctions. -
Representando o vendedor e a sociedade: mecanismos com dois critérios para leilões combinatórios com demandas unitárias
2005-06-16This work focuses on obtaining truthful mechanisms that aim at maximizing both the revenue and the economic efficiency (social welfare) for the unitdemand combinatorial auction problem (UDCAP), in which a set of k items ... -
Sequential auctions with continuation costs
1993-08-30In actual sequential auctions, 1) bidders typically incur a cost in continuing from one sale to the next, and 2) bidders decide whether or not to continue. To investigate the question 'when do bidders drop out,' we define ... -
What really matters in auction design
2001-07-31The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy preventing collusive, predatory, and entry-deterring behaviour. Ascending and uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable ...
