https://hdl.handle.net/10438/19715 2021-12-02T04:11:45Z https://hdl.handle.net/10438/20154 Vertical transfers and the appropriation of resources by the bureaucracy: the case of Brazilian state governments Moura Neto, João Silva; Marconi, Nelson; Palombo, Paulo Eduardo Moledo; Arvate, Paulo Roberto The Brazilian grant system was built by the federal government aiming to reduce economic and social inequalities in the federation, by transferring income from rich states to poor states. However, due to the lack of control and mechanisms for assessing the use of this public resource, these transfers may be appropriated by the bureaucracy as wage increases, for example. In order to observe this appropriation, we use the wage differential between the public and private sector in the states as a proxy, which is calculated using the technique developed by Oaxaca (1973). We do not use the ratio between wage expenses and total current expenses as proxy, because the results of this measure show no significant differences between rich and poor states. Our initial estimation was made with yearly panel data from 1995 to 2004, using the least squares dummy variables method (LSDV).; O sistema de transferências estruturado pelo governo federal visa reduzir as disparidades econômicas e sociais na federação através da transferência de renda dos estados mais ricos para os mais pobres. Entretanto, dada a ausência de controles e mecanismos que permitam a identificação do uso destes recursos públicos, estas transferências podem ser apropriadas pela burocracia na forma de aumentos salariais, por exemplo. Com o intuito de analisar esta apropriação, adotamos os diferenciais de salário entre o setor público e privado nos estados como uma proxy, os quais foram calculados usando a técnica desenvolvida por Oaxaca (1973). Nós não adotamos a relação entre gastos com pessoal e despesas correntes porque os resultados deste cálculo não indicaram diferenças significativas entre estados pobres e ricos. Nossa estimativa inicial foi feita a partir de dados de painel anuais, para o período entre 1995 e 2004, usando o método de mínimos quadrados com variáveis dummy. 2006-01-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10438/20149 Distribuição regional do crédito bancário e convergência no crescimento estadual brasileiro Alexandre, Michel; Biderman, Ciro; Lima, Gilberto Tadeu The aim of this paper is to analyze the convergence in the growth rates among Brazilian States in the period 1988-2001. In addition to the traditional variables used in the studies about convergence, Brazilian States credit indicators were included, which is the very innovation of this study. The results show that, in general, credit increases the speed of convergence, although some kinds of directed credit generate the inverse effect. This suggests that credit has a positive impact in the growth of Brazilian States. Furthermore, the credit variable that was more effective in the convergence analysis is loans and bonds discounted in relation to the State income. As it turns out, this variable is likely to be a suitable proxy for the level of financial development of a State.; O objetivo deste trabalho é analisar a convergência no crescimento entre os Estados brasileiros de 1988-2001. Além das variáveis tradicionalmente utilizadas em trabalhos de convergência, foram incluídos indicadores de oferta de crédito nos Estados, o que se constituiu na inovação deste artigo. Os resultados mostram que, em geral, o crédito aumenta a velocidade de convergência, ainda que alguns tipos de crédito direcionado gerem o efeito inverso. Isso sugere que alguns tipos de crédito tem um impacto positivo sobre o crescimento estadual. Em particular, a variável de crédito que se mostrou mais relevante na análise de convergência foi a proporção dos empréstimos e títulos descontados em relação à renda Estadual. Assim, esta variável pode vir a ser uma proxy adequada para o grau de desenvolvimento financeiro de um Estado. 2004-01-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10438/19949 Oligarquia e processos de oligarquização: um problema institucional das organizações Couto, Cláudio Gonçalves O termo “oligarquia” perdeu boa parte de sua utilidade analítica na ciência política em virtude de seu uso pouco rigoroso, tornando-se mais um adjetivo de aplicação subjetivamente orientada do que um conceito instrumentalizável para a pesquisa empírica e a reflexão teórica. Este trabalho visa contribuir para a fixação de um conceito de oligarquia dotado não só de clareza terminológica, mas também – e até por isto mesmo – de serventia para a pesquisa empírica. Para tanto, propõe-se a elaboração de um modelo institucional de análise que permita identificar e explicar processos de oligarquização de organizações particulares da vida social e política, compreendendo sua lógica institucional de modo a entender como a vida coletiva organizada freqüentemente passa a operar de um modo destoante dos princípios de legitimação válidos para determinadas coletividades, capturadas por oligarquias. 2010-08-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10438/19947 The predatory or virtuous choices governors make: the roles of checks and balances and political competition Alston, Lee J.; Melo, Marcus André B. C. de; Mueller, Bernardo Pinheiro Machado; Pereira Filho, Carlos Eduardo Ferreira States usually differ markedly in terms of public goods provision and corruption. Why are some state governments able to provide adequate health and education services, but others tend to specialize in the provision of private goods such as public sector jobs and targeted transfers to specific clienteles? Why are some states better capable of promoting economic development while others allow stagnation? Why is corruption more prevalent in some states than in others? Why are some states more efficient in the provision of publicly-provided goods and service than others? Exploring the idea that political institutions are important determinants of the policies implemented in states, we propose a model of the policymaking process and then test its implications with state-level data for the period 1999 to 2006 in Brazil. The focus of the empirical tests is on the impact of political competition and checks & balances on the characteristics of the policies that emerge in the states. Political competition has important virtuous effects on the choices made by governors and other political actors by determining how long they expect to be in power, what they can do while in power, and at what costs. We develop an index of checks & balances for Brazilian states and test the interaction of checks & balances with political competition. We found that the impact of political competition varies with the degree of checks & balances. 2008-01-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10438/19944 Spatial distribution of local economic performance: empirical analysis of employment, income and poverty in Brazilian municipalities Biderman, Ciro; Igliori, Danilo C. Local economies within a country differ substantially in their economic performance and such differences might persist over long periods of time. Increasing concern with regional disparities and poverty levels have prompted a growing interest in understanding factors giving some places better conditions for enhancing performance and overcoming development challenges. In particular, researchers and policy makers have been trying to investigate the potential roles of public policy at local level. Here, the key question relates to the capability of local governments in significantly impacting their realities despite their historic, economic, social and geographical constraints. The central aim of this paper is to empirically investigate the factors influencing local development across Brazilian municipalities, emphasizing the role of local public policy. To do that we adopt spatial econometric models inspired by growth theory and by some recent development of spatial economics. Our results contribute to the identification of determinants of local economic development measured by three variables, namely employment change, income per capita change and the change in the population below the poverty line. From the empirical estimates evidence is provided regarding the factors suggested by the recent literature on growth, development and spatial economics. 2007-01-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10438/19942 An archipelago of excellence?: autonomous capacity among Brazilian state agencies Bersch, Katherine Schlosser; Praça, Sérgio; Taylor, Matthew M. Drawing on the Brazilian case, this paper develops a new measure of state capacity for evaluating the performance of specific bureaucratic agencies within national states. The measure, which is made possible by the rising availability of online information about government personnel, permits a nuanced evaluation of influential theoretical questions regarding developmental capacity, state autonomy, and the politicization of state bureaucracies. We first set out a basic definition of state capacity, distinguishing it from other related concepts and definitions in the social science literature. We then present an objective new measure, the State Capacity Index (SCI), which evaluates state agencies on three axes: career strength, agency career specialization, and politicization. We conclude with some preliminary tests of the measure‘s utility in analyzing agency level capacity in Brazil, with specific reference to the literature on corruption and accountability. 2012-02-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10438/19938 Do political budget cycles differ in Latin American democracies? Barberia, Lorena Guadalupe; Avelino Filho, George We test for political budget cycles in a panel of eighteen Latin American democracies from 1973 to 2008. Recent studies have argued that the pattern of deficit cycles in a large cross-section of countries is driven by the experience of ‘‘new democracies.” As a large share of the countries that underwent democratization during this period are in Latin America, we seek to verify if these patterns are robust using an updated data set on fiscal expenditures, democratization and elections. Our results suggest that there are important differences when objective judgment and observational criteria of democracy and democratic transitions are employed in comparison to measures that rely on vague and arbitrary operational rules. Furthermore, we show that the deficit cycle in transitional Latin American democracies appears to be driven by lower election-year revenue collection rather than an increase in public expenditures. 2010-01-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10438/19935 Opportunistic political cycles and social spending: an examination of transition and consolidated democracies in Latin America Barberia, Lorena Guadalupe; Avelino Filho, George In this paper, we show that education, health and social security expenditures did not increase during elections. Based on a panel of fifteen Latin American democracies from 1973 to 2000, we show that there are important increases in social spending in the inaugural year of a new presidential administration. We argue that social policy is used by Latin American democracies as an instrument to reward voters after winners enter office and not as a tool to manipulate outcomes before elections as commonly argued in the literature. 2009-01-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10438/19934 Social spending and elections: an examination of Latin American third wave democracies, 1980-2008 Barberia, Lorena Guadalupe; Avelino Filho, George During the period in which Latin America underwent the most lasting and widespread wave of democratization, we test whether governments targeted increases in social spending to coincide with presidential elections in a panel of eighteen Latin American democracies from 1980 to 2008. Results confirm that governments increase health and social security expenditures during elections and that democracies that were most apt to channel increases in social spending to coincide with elections were those in the transition stage of democratization. 2011-08-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10438/19932 Accountability behind closed doors?: legislator power and voting procedures Buttò, Michele; Pereira Filho, Carlos Eduardo Ferreira; Taylor, Matthew M. Accountability is important as a means of punishing wrongdoers, improving public confidence in the political system, and deterring potential lawbreakers. But to what extent is the likelihood of accountability an outcome of group interactions and institutional rules? Is the likelihood of accountability within a legislature contingent on the power of legislators or on the publicity given to scandal? Do voting rules that encourage secrecy help to compensate for power differences between legislators or instead lead to backroom dealings that hurt accountability? The paper proceeds in three parts. In the first, we present a basic game theoretic model of congressional efforts to punish dirty peers in a prototypical lower house of a bicameral Congress. In the second, we test some of our basic findings using data from recent scandals and subsequent efforts to ensure accountability in the Brazilian lower house of Congress, the Câmara dos Deputados. In the third, we use an agent-based model to explore some of the theoretical implications of these empirical findings for the smooth functioning of accountability processes in Brazil and beyond. 2010-01-01T00:00:00Z