Browsing by Author "Tumennasan, Norovsambuu"

Now showing items 1-3 of 3

    • Centralized allocation in multiple markets 

      Monte, Daniel; Tumennasan, Norovsambuu
      2013-04-16
      We study the problem of centralized allocation of indivisible objects in multiple markets. We show that the set of allocation rules that are group strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient are sequential dictatorships. Therefore, ...

    • The day care assignment: a dynamic matching problem 

      Kennes, John; Monte, Daniel; Tumennasan, Norovsambuu
      2014
      We study the problem of centralized allocation of children to public day care centers, illustrated by the case of Denmark. Our framework applies to problems of dynamic matching in which there is entry and exit of agents ...

    • Matching with quorums 

      Monte, Daniel; Tumennasan, Norovsambuu
      2013
      In the problem of allocating workers to different projects, where each project needs a minimum number of workers assigned to it, the serial dictatorship mechanism is neither strategy proof nor Pareto efficient. We therefore ...