Browsing by Author "Page Junior, Frank H."
Now showing items 1-9 of 9
-
Catalog competition and Nash equilibrium in nonlinear pricing games
Monteiro, Paulo Klinger; Page Junior, Frank H.
2008-03We model strategic competition in a market with asymmetric information as a noncooperative game in which each seller competes for a buyer of unknown type by offering the buyer a catalog of products and prices. We call this ... -
Endogenous mechanisms and nash equilibrium in competitive contracting games
Monteiro, Paulo Klinger; Page Junior, Frank H.
2009-09-20We model strategic competition in a market with asymmetric information as a noncooperative game in which each firm competes for the business of a buyer of unknown type by offering the buyer a catalog of products and prices. ... -
Exclusão e multidimensionalidade de tipos em leilões ótimos
Svaiter, Benar Fux; Monteiro, P. K.; Page Junior, Frank H.
2006-09-01Em um modelo de leil˜oes com valores privados independentes demonstramos que se os tipos s˜ao multidimensionais ent˜ao no leil˜ao ´otimo h´a exclus˜ao de tipos. -
Inconsequential arbitrage
Page Junior, Frank H.; Wooders, Myrna H.; Monteiro, P. K.
2000-12We introduce the concept of inconsequential arbitrage and, in the context of a model allowing short-sales and half-lines in indifference surfaces, prove that inconsequential arbitrage is sufficient for existence of ... -
Increasing cones, recession cones and global cones
Monteiro, P. K.; Page Junior, Frank H.; Wooders, Myrna Holtz
2000In this paper, we discuss and compare various cones used in the economics literature to analyze arbitrage in general equilibrium models with short selling. Our main result is that under certain conditions on an economic ... -
Optimal auctions with multidimensional types and the desirability of exclusion
Page Junior, Frank H.; Monteiro, P. K.; Svaiter, Benar Fux
2004-03-01Within the context of a single-unit, independent private values auction model, we show that if bidder types are multidimensional, then under the optimal auction exclusion of some bidder types will occur. A second contribution ... -
Resultados uniformemente seguros e equilíbrio de Nash em jogos compactos
Monteiro, P. K.; Page Junior, Frank H.
2006-09-01Nós introduzimos uma condição, resultados uniformemente seguros, para jogos compactos e resultados ('payoffs') limitados e mensur´aveis nas estrat´egias. Demonstramos que se um jogo compacto tem resultados uniformemente ... -
Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing
Page Junior, Frank H.; Monteiro, P. K.
2002-03-01We make three contributions to the theory of contracting under asymmetric information. First, we establish a competitive analog to the revelation principIe which we call the implementation principIe. This principIe provides ... -
Uniform payoff security and Nash equilibrium in compact games
Monteiro, P. K.; Page Junior, Frank H.
2007We introduce a condition, uniform payoff security, for games with compact Hausdorff strategy spaces and payoffs bounded and measurable in players' strategies. We show that if any such compact game G is uniformly payoff ...








