Browsing by Author "Monte, Daniel"
Now showing items 1-9 of 9
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Bounded memory and permanent reputations
2013-10A recent result in repeated incomplete information games is that after an arbitrarily long history, any equilibrium of the continuation game must be an equilibrium of the complete information game. This result implies that ... -
Centralized allocation in multiple markets
2013-04-16We study the problem of centralized allocation of indivisible objects in multiple markets. We show that the set of allocation rules that are group strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient are sequential dictatorships. Therefore, ... -
Competition in cascades
2017Hydroelectric generation is the main source of energy production in many countries. When firms operate in the same river, or in cascades, the output of an upstream firm is the input of its downstream rival. We build a ... -
The day care assignment: a dynamic matching problem
2014We study the problem of centralized allocation of children to public day care centers, illustrated by the case of Denmark. Our framework applies to problems of dynamic matching in which there is entry and exit of agents ... -
Incentive constraints in games with bounded memory
2014-02In this paper I analyze a repeated coordination game between a bounded memory player and a fully rational player. A bounded memory player is a player who is subject to imperfect recall, but, conditional on this constraint, ... -
Learning with bounded memory in games
2014-09We study learning with bounded memory in zero-sum repeated games with one-sided incomplete information. The uninformed player has only a fixed number of memory states available. His strategy is to choose a transition rule ... -
Matching with quorums
2013In the problem of allocating workers to different projects, where each project needs a minimum number of workers assigned to it, the serial dictatorship mechanism is neither strategy proof nor Pareto efficient. We therefore ... -
Reputation with one-sided monitoring: ignorance as a commitment device
2016-07I analyie a repeated two-sided incomplete information game with two long-run players in which only one of them can observe the history of the game. Using standard reputation arguments, I prove that if players are sufficiently ... -
The value of (bounded) memory in a changing world
2014-05This paper explores the value of memory in decision making in dynamic environments. We examine the decision problem faced by an agent with bounded memory who receives a sequence of signals from a partially observable Markov ...
