Listagem por autor "Gottlieb, Daniel"

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    • Banning information as a redistributive device 

      Gottlieb, Daniel; Maestri, Lucas Jóver
      2004-07-01
      In this paper we analyze the optimality of allowing firms to observe signals of workers’ characteristics in an optimal taxation framework. We show that it is always optimal to prohibit signals that disclose information ...

    • Experimentation and project selection: screening and learning 

      Gomes, Renato; Gottlieb, Daniel; Maestri, Lucas Jóver
      2016-03
      Firms must strike a delicate balance between the exploitation of well-known business models and the exploration of risky, untested approaches. In this paper, we study financial contracting between an investor and a firm ...

    • A model of mixed signals with applications to countersignaling an the GED 

      Gottlieb, Daniel; Moreira, Humberto Ataíde; Araújo, Aloísio Pessoa de
      2004-07-01
      We develop a job-market signaling model where signals may convey two pieces of information. This model is employed to study the GED exam and countersignaling (signals non-monotonic in ability). A result of the model is ...

    • A model of mixed signals with applications to countersignalling 

      Araújo, Aloísio Pessoa de; Gottlieb, Daniel; Moreira, Humberto Ataíde
      2007
      We develop a job-market signalling model where signals convey two pieces of information. This model is employed to study countersignalling (signals nonmonotonic in ability) and the GED exam. A result of the model is that ...

    • Should educational policies be regressive? 

      Gottlieb, Daniel; Moreira, Humberto Ataíde
      2003-10-19
      In this paper, we show that when the government is able to transfer wealth between generations, regressive policies are no longer optimal. The optimal educational policy can be decentralized through appropriate Pigouvian ...

    • Two Essays on the economics of Education 

      Gottlieb, Daniel
      2004-04-29
      We develop a job-market signaling model where signals may convey two pieces of information. This model is employed to study the GED exam and countersignaling (signals non-monotonic in ability). A result of the model is ...