Itens para a visualização no momento 1-18 of 18

    • A coordination approach to the essentiality of money 

      Araujo, Luis Fernando Oliveira de; Guimarães, Bernardo de Vasconcellos
      2015-03-16
      The essentiality of money is commonly justi ed on e¢ ciency grounds. In this paper, we propose an alternative view on the essentiality of money. We consider an economy with llimited monitoring where agents have to coordinate ...
    • Coordination in the use of money 

      Guimarães, Bernardo de Vasconcellos; Araujo, Luis Fernando Oliveira de
      2013-08-02
      Fundamental models of money, while explicit about the frictions that render money essential, are silent on how agents actually coordinate in its use. This paper studies this coordination problem, providing an endogenous ...
    • The effect of options on coordination 

      Guimarães, Bernardo de Vasconcellos; Araujo, Luis Fernando Oliveira de
      2013-08-02
      This paper studies how constraints on the timing of actions affect equilibrium in intertemporal coordination problems. The model exhibits a unique symmetric equilibrium in cut-o¤ strategies. The risk-dominant action of the ...
    • Informal wages in an economy with active labor courts 

      Araujo, Luis Fernando Oliveira de; Ponczek, Vladimir Pinheiro
      2012-09-12
      In most developing countries, job regulations and the justice branch interfere on several aspects of labor contracts. Inspired by this fact, we build a model that explores the role of labor courts in the determination of ...
    • Information learning and the stability of fiat money 

      Araujo, Luis Fernando Oliveira de; Camargo, Bráz Ministério de
      2004-08
      We analyze the stability of monetary regimes in a decentralized economy where fiat money is endogenously created, information about its value is imperfect, and agents only learn from their personal trading experiences. We ...
    • Institutional quality and capital taxation 

      Araujo, Luis Fernando Oliveira de; Arvate, Paulo Roberto
      2016-02
      We describe the preferred taxation regime in a small economy with uncertain institutional quality. We obtain that a preferential taxation regime in which taxes can be matched to the mobility of the tax base may be worse ...
    • Institutions and export dynamics 

      Araujo, Luis Fernando Oliveira de; Mion, Giordano; Ornelas, Emanuel
      2016
      We study how contract enforcement and export experience shape firm export dynamics in an environment with incomplete information. We show that exporters start with higher volumes and sell for longer periods in countries ...
    • Intertemporal coordination with delay options 

      Araujo, Luis Fernando Oliveira de; Guimarães, Bernardo
      2015-05
      This paper studies equilibrium selection in intertemporal coordination problems with delay options. The risk-dominant action of the underlying one-shot game is selected when frictions are arbitrarily small. Larger frictions ...
    • Knowledge sharing and the dynamics of social capital 

      Araujo, Luis Fernando Oliveira de; Minetti, Raoul
      2011-12
      Mutual aid often entails the sharing of knowledge. We investigate how, in turn, knowledge sharing affects the long-run dynamics of mutual aid. In our economy, agents with specific knowledge are 'held up' by their principals. ...
    • Limited memory and the essentiality of money 

      Araujo, Luis Fernando Oliveira de; Camargo, Bráz Ministério de
      2010-06-25
      This paper investigates the relationship between memory and the essentiality of money. We consider a random matching economy with a large finite population in which commitment is not possible and memory is limited in the ...
    • Limited monitoring and the essentiality of money 

      Araujo, Luis Fernando Oliveira de; Camargo, Bráz Ministério de
      2015-05
      Monetary theory emphasizes that imperfect monitoring is necessary for money to be essential, that is, for money to achieve socially desirable allocations. Little is known about how limited monitoring must be if money is ...
    • Markets and relationships in a learning economy 

      Araujo, Luis Fernando Oliveira de; Minetti, Raoul
      2010-07
      It is generally agreed that within long-term relationships agents learn the characteristics of their market partners better than through spot transactions. In contrast, little is known on how relationship-based and ...
    • Monetary equilibrium with decentralized trade and learning 

      Araujo, Luis Fernando Oliveira de; Camargo, Bráz Ministério de
      2010-06-25
      This paper analyzes the stability of monetary regimes in an economy where fiat money is endogenously created by the government, information about its value is imperfect, and learning is decentralized. We show that monetary ...
    • Money versus memory 

      Araujo, Luis Fernando Oliveira de; Camargo, Bráz Ministério de
      2010-06-25
      A well–established fact in monetary theory is that a key ingredient for the essentiality of money is its role as a form of memory. In this paper we study a notion of memory that includes information about an agent’s past ...
    • On the essentiality of banks 

      Araujo, Luis Fernando Oliveira de; Minetti, Raoul
      2011-08
      We compare allocations sustained by credit with allocations sustained by bank notes (inside money) in a search model with decentralized trade and limited monitoring. We demonstrate that there exists a credit arrangement ...
    • On the origins of monetary exchange 

      Araujo, Luis Fernando Oliveira de; Bignon, Vincent; Breton, Régis; Camargo, Bráz Ministério de
      2017-05-30
    • Social norms and money 

      Araujo, Luis Fernando Oliveira de
      2000-07-06
      In an economy where there is no double coincidence of wants and without recordkeeping of past transactions, money is usually seen as the only mechanism that can support exchange. In this paper, we show that, as long as the ...
    • Trust-based trade 

      Ornelas, Emanuel; Araujo, Luis Fernando Oliveira de
      2005-07-01
      There is substantially more trade within national borders than across borders. An important explanation for this fact is the weak enforcement of international contracts. We develop a model in which agents build reputations ...