Listagem por autor "Monteiro, P. K."
Itens para a visualização no momento 41-47 of 47
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Strategic behavior in repeated trials of vickrey auctions
Menezes, Flavio Marques; Monteiro, P. K.
2000-02-01 -
Strictly monotonic preferences on continuum of goods commodity spaces
Herves-Beloso, C.; Monteiro, P. K.
2010-09-20We consider a set K of differentiated commodities. A preference relation on the set of consumption plans is strictly monotonic whenever to consume more of at least one commodity is more preferred. It is an easy task to ... -
Synergies and price trends in sequential auctions
Menezes, Flavio Marques; Monteiro, P. K.
1999-10-01In this paper we consider sequential auctions where an individual’s value for a bundle of objects is either greater than the sum of the values for the objects separately (positive synergy) or less than the sum (negative ... -
Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing
Page Junior, Frank H.; Monteiro, P. K.
2002-03-01We make three contributions to the theory of contracting under asymmetric information. First, we establish a competitive analog to the revelation principIe which we call the implementation principIe. This principIe provides ... -
Unbounded exchange economies with satiation: how far can we go?
Martins-da-Rocha, Victor Filipe; Monteiro, P. K.
2008-02-01We unify and generalize the existence results in Werner (1987), Dana, Le Van and Magnien (1999), Allouch, Le Van and Page (2006) and Allouch and Le Van (2008). We also show that, in terms of weakening the set of assumptions, ... -
Uniform payoff security and Nash equilibrium in compact games
Monteiro, P. K.; Page Junior, Frank H.
2007We introduce a condition, uniform payoff security, for games with compact Hausdorff strategy spaces and payoffs bounded and measurable in players' strategies. We show that if any such compact game G is uniformly payoff ... -
We sold a million units: the role of advertising past-sales
Moraga-González, José Luis; Monteiro, P. K.
1999-07-01In a market where past-sales embed information about consumers’ tastes (quality), we analyze the seller’s incentives to invest in a costly advertising campaign to report them under two informational assumptions. In the ...







