Now showing items 21-33 of 33

    • The land assembly problem revisited 

      Menezes, Flavio Marques; Pitchford, Rohan
      2001-06-01
      As in the standard land assembly problem, a developer wants to buy two adjacent blocks of land belonging to two di¤erent owners. The value of the two blocks of land to the developer is greater than the sum of the individual ...
    • The microeconomics of corruption: the classical approach 

      Menezes, Flavio Marques
      2000-11-01
    • Porque favorecer firmas nacionais? 

      Menezes, Flavio Marques; Monteiro, P. K.
      2000-04-06
      In this paper we offer a rationale for the existence of preferences for domestic…rms in government procurement. When the domestic…rm’s probability of completion of a government contract is larger than the foreign …rms ...
    • Price regulation and the incentives to pursue energy efficiency by minimizing network losses 

      Dutra, Joísa Campanher; Menezes, Flavio Marques; Zheng, Xuemei
      2016
      This paper examines the incentives embedded in different regulatory regimes for investment by utilities in energy efficiency programs that aim to reduce network losses. In our model, a monopolist chooses whether to undertake ...
    • Private provision of discrete public goods with incomplete information 

      Menezes, Flavio Marques; Monteiro, P. K.; Temimi, Akram
      2001-07
      We analyze the private provision of discrete public good games with incomplete information and continuous contributions. To use the terminology of [Admati and Perry, Review of Economic Studies 58 (1991) 259], we consider ...
    • Reforma previdenciária: em busca de incentivos para atrair o trabalhador autônomo 

      Dart, Samantha T.; Neri, Marcelo Côrtes; Menezes, Flavio Marques
      2002-11-01
      Este artigo busca modelar que incentivos são capazes de influenciar a decisão do trabalhador autônomo de participar ou não do sistema público de Previdência (INSS) utilizando um arcabouço de Teoria de Contratos (modelo de ...
    • The role of R&D technology in asymmetric research joint ventures 

      Dakhlia, Sami; Menezes, Flavio Marques; Temimi, Akram
      2006
      We characterize asymmetric equilibria in two-stage process innovation games and show that they are prevalent in the different models of R&D technology considered in the literature. Indeed, cooperation in R&D may be accompanied ...
    • Sequential auctions with continuation costs 

      Menezes, Flavio Marques
      1993-08-30
      In actual sequential auctions, 1) bidders typically incur a cost in continuing from one sale to the next, and 2) bidders decide whether or not to continue. To investigate the question 'when do bidders drop out,' we define ...
    • A simple analysis of the U.S. emission permits auctions 

      Kline, Jeffrey J.; Menezes, Flavio Marques
      1999-01
      We examine a stylized version of EPA auctions when agents know the list of values of sellers and buyers. Sellers and buyers behave strategically. We show that there are two types of equilibria: inefficient equilibria where ...
    • Strategic behavior in repeated trials of vickrey auctions 

      Menezes, Flavio Marques; Monteiro, P. K.
      2000-02-01
    • Sustainable clubs under variable participation 

      Menezes, Flavio Marques; Silva, Emilson Caputo Delfino
      1999-11-02
      In this paper we examine a two-period static club economy where individuals of distinct types decide whether or not to subscribe to clubs at each period. We show that neither facility sizes nor consumption group sizes are ...
    • Synergies and price trends in sequential auctions 

      Menezes, Flavio Marques; Monteiro, P. K.
      1999-10-01
      In this paper we consider sequential auctions where an individual’s value for a bundle of objects is either greater than the sum of the values for the objects separately (positive synergy) or less than the sum (negative ...
    • Why do bidders drop out from a sequential auction 

      Menezes, Flavio Marques; Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard
      2000-01-26
      In actual sequential auctions, 1) bidders typically incur a cost in continuing from one sale to the next, and 2) bidders decide whether or not to continue. To investigate the question 'why do bidders drop out,' we define ...