



Race and Collective Self-Esteem: An Experimental Approach to the Puzzle of Political Representation in Brazil

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”Nothing interesting happens in the
comfort zone”

Unknown author


GIOVANI ROCHA BATISTA SANTOS

**"RACE AND COLLECTIVE SELF-ESTEEM: AN EXPERIMENTAL
APPROACH TO THE PUZZLE OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN
BRAZIL"**

Dissertação apresentada ao Curso de Mestrado em Administração da Escola Brasileira de Administração Pública e de Empresas para obtenção do grau de Mestre(a) em Administração.

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
ASSINATURA DOS MEMBROS DA BANCA EXAMINADORA

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Daniela Campello da Costa Ribeiro
Orientador (a)

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Rafael Guilherme Burstein Goldszmidt

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Carlos Antonio Costa Ribeiro', is written over a horizontal line.

Carlos Antonio Costa Ribeiro

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1 Introduction

The combination of open list proportional representation, high-magnitude legislative districts, candidate-centered campaigns, low costs for candidates' entry and a highly fragmented party system depicted in Brazil provides the perfect setting for electoral campaigns that are *very inclusive* and *competitive* (Nicolau, 2006). This conjunction of factors should also, at least in theoretical terms, lead to a boost in proportional representation that would contribute to a more solid reflection of several social and ideological cleavages of the population amongst representatives in local, state and national legislature (Bueno and Dunning, 2014). However, Brazil's recent democratic history has rendered a pattern in which a considerable ethnic majority does not come at translating itself into numerical superiority among elected politicians, remaining underrepresented (Johnson III and Heringer, 2015). In particular, as of the latest election for federal deputies in 2014, while 50.9% of the population declared themselves as *pretos* (blacks) or *pardos* (browns), only 20.3% of the Federal Parliament corresponded to that group. How could such discrepancy in terms of racial political representation in Brazil be explained?

Literature on the Brazilian political representation of race and identity-based voting shows that several barriers exist on the *supply side* of elections, such as the access to campaign resources (Bueno and Dunning, 2014), the level of politicization of blacks and a possible lack of a cohesive identity (Twine, 2000; Bailey and Telles, 2006) or even the ability of the *movimento negro* to raise a strong cohesive black constituency (Burdick, 1998). Yet, the answers proposed in this article are embedded within the realms of the *demand side* of the puzzle, namely on the way voters, mainly nonwhite voters, make their electoral choice. In this sense, instead of exploring the institutional obstacles that impede Congress to mirror or closely represent the population in descriptive terms, I focus on the voter's preference by shifting the scope of analysis towards the importance of race in the voting decision-making process. In addition, I advance this analysis by exploring in an experimental setting how race, candidate-preference and political support for affirmative

action policies interact and are influenced by the effect of a key latent variable long used within Psychology and Social Identity Theory (SIT): the level of collective self-esteem (CSE).

As posited in SIT literature, CSE comprises a combination of (i) the degree to which the individual sees the self as a member of a social group (how much do I belong to group A?); (ii) values a certain social identity (how much do I value being a member of group A?); and (iii) sees the social identity as important to the self-concept (how much does my belongingness to group A define who I am?) (Crocker and Luhtanen, 1990; Luhtanen and Crocker, 1992; Crocker et al., 1994). I argue that, as a result of the historical construction of race in Brazil, three main effects were triggered in the mindset of nonwhite voters: not only (i) did they play into the “racial democracy” paradigm and denied the existence of racial discrimination, believing Brazil is comparatively a racial paradise (Freyre, 1933; Andrews, 1996; Twine, 1998); but (ii) they are also less likely to self-classify under the label of a common *negro* identity (Bailey and Telles, 2006); and (iii) less likely to portray a positive stereotypical image of darker-skinned individuals, consequently rating more favorably lighter-skinned candidates (Oliveira, 1999). I, therefore, thoroughly treat each of these effects separately and show why I believe they translate into varying levels of *collective self-esteem*¹.

The subtle link that connects all parts of my framework lies in the belief that, from the perspective of the voter, descriptive representation has relevance in itself. In fact, in a setting of *low information rationality*, as brought in Popkin (1991), relying in physical cues

¹The official Brazilian census has five main color (or racial) categories: white (*branco*), black (*preto*), yellow (*amarelo*), brown (*pardo*) and indigenous (*indígena*). The Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE) also counts those individuals who do not declare a color or race. Nevertheless, in this paper, I will use the terms black, African Brazilian, nonwhite and Afro-Brazilian interchangeably to designate Brazilians of African ancestry, including people whom popular discourse might call “*morenos*,” “*mulattos*,” or other terms indicating mixed racial and ethnic background. Therefore, following the recent literature of racial relations in Brazil, I will combine both the *pretos* and *pardos* categories in all of my analyses. This simplification is attributed to the fact that these groups do not much differ socioeconomically (i.e. income, level of education and life expectancy), with the practical differentiation stemming mostly from the complex development of racial relations in Brazil (Andrews, 1996; Santos, 2001; Bueno and Dunning, 2014; Johnson III and Heringer, 2015).

to determine one's preference might actually be the optimal choice. That is, in electoral campaigns with a high inflow of information, especially in elections for local legislative representatives in which a voter might be confronted with over 700 candidates to choose from (Nicolau, 2006), trying to determine a candidate's competency and legislative record could be an overwhelmingly challenging task. Therefore, being unable to closely track and interpret all the intricacies of politics in the legislative arena, specially in a large ballot system with many candidates, voters most likely use demographic characteristics about their candidates as a "shortcut" to estimate their policy stands, giving special weight to descriptive forms of representation, a result that has actually been recently corroborated by Aguilar et al. (2015).

In order to perform this analysis, this article aims at verifying how a candidate's race relates to her ideological and political stands by answering the following specific questions:

- a) Does race matter to voters when they go about selecting their candidates?
- b) Is there evidence of an identity-based voting behavior in such a way that nonwhite voters weigh nonwhite and white candidates differently? If this evidence exists, do nonwhite voters tend to prefer white or nonwhite candidates?
- c) What is the relationship between the preference for descriptive representation (based on a candidate's physical attributes) and the preference for substantive representation (based on the content of the policies supported by a candidate)?
- d) How does a voter's level of CSE moderate the relationship between her own race and that of a candidate?
- e) How does a voter's level of CSE moderate the relationship between the preference for descriptive and substantive representation?

In order to answer these questions, this paper is divided into six sections, including this introductory passage. In section 2, I build my theoretical argumentation by exploring

the underrepresentation of black individuals, particularly in descriptive terms, discuss the literature on determinants of such underrepresentation and give a glimpse of how racial relations have evolved in Brazil and how this evolution might have impacted the mindset of the black voter. In section 3, I present my hypotheses and dwell into the concept of Collective Self-Esteem, explaining in more detail how it relates to my theory of underrepresentation. In section 4, I justify the decision to run a Conjoint Analysis and present my research design, followed by the results achieved with this methodological strategy in Section 5. Finally, section 6 brings my conclusion and paves the way for future developments on the topic of experimental analysis of racial political representation in Brazil.

2 A Theory of Political Racial Representation in Brazil

2.1 Conceptualizing and Measuring *UnderRepresentation*

A thorough analysis of the puzzle of racial political representation in Brazil should have its starting point on the very basic understanding of what it means to be "politically represented". In that sense, a modern approach to political representation is commonly attributed to theorist Hanna Pitkin's seminal work "The Concept of Representation" (Pitkin, 1967). Holding that citizens can be represented in elected government in different ways, Pitkin establishes two main types of representatives; (i) those who belong to the same social and demographic group as that of their constituents (*descriptive* representation) and (ii) those who aim at promoting solutions to provide for their constituents' specific political needs (*substantive* representation). With that framework in mind, it is possible to characterize the Brazilian political scenario as one that has consistently portrayed an underrepresentation of black individuals particularly in *descriptive* terms.

Whereas black individuals in Brazil represent nearly 51% of the population as of 2010 census, 2014 election results show that, once again, the Legislature does not reflect Brazil's ethnic-racial composition; based on each representative's self-declaration, no Native Indian was elected to the *Câmara dos Deputados* while only 20.3% of the candidates declared themselves as black. The Brazilian democracy possesses a set of institutions – such as proportional representation with open lists in elections to local, state and national legislatures, - that should, at least theoretically, promote both inclusiveness, candidate-centered campaigns and diversity of political depiction (Bueno and Dunning, 2014). Yet, these institutions interestingly contrast with the puzzling whiteness of Brazilian politicians and cast a doubt over Brazil's alleged – and notably controversial – definition as a "racial democracy" (Andrews, 1996; Telles, 2004).

The descriptive underrepresentation of black individuals in Brazil can be expanded not only spatially across different states of Brazil, but also throughout different Legislatures in the recent Brazilian democratic experience. In order to better illustrate this fact, I developed a *Descriptive Representation Index* (DRI) that gives us a better understanding of the level of racial representation in Brazil and advances measures previously proposed in the early literature of minority political representation (Darden, 1984; Taebel, 1978). The DRI can be calculated using the following formula:


$$DRI_i = \frac{PP_i - PD_i}{PP_i} \quad (1)$$

where PP_i corresponds to the proportion of black individuals in a given state i and PD_i is the proportion of black federal deputies in state i (number of Afro-Brazilian federal deputies in state i divided by the overall number of deputies elected by state i). The values of DRI range from -1 to 1, where negative numbers would mean *descriptive overrepresentation*, positive values would denote *descriptive underrepresentation* and 0 could be understood as *perfect descriptive representation*, in a sense that the proportion of black individuals in a given state is exactly the same as the proportion of black representatives elected in that state. In particular, this DRI was developed in such a way that, when we take positive values as a percentage, they can be interpreted as *the proportion of individuals in a given state that are **not** being descriptively represented*. For example, if the DRI of state A equals 75%, that means that 75% of the black individuals in state A are *not* being descriptively represented. Additionally, it is noteworthy that this index does not lead to issues of function discontinuity as the proportion of Afro-Brazilians in any given state is always different from 0.

The index was calculated crossing data from Brazilian censuses of 1991, 2000 and 2010 provided by IBGE (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics), the database of Afro-Brazilian deputies in each state from the 48th to the 54th Brazilian legislatures

provided in Johnson III and Heringer (2015) and, finally, considering the number of federal deputies elected in each state. In this exploration, I only analyze the figures for legislatures posterior to the change in the number of representatives per state established in Lei Complementar 78/1993 which still determines the number of federal seats for each Brazilian state. As the positive values depicted in Figure 1 bellow show, the descriptive underrepresentation of black individuals in Congress has been a strong feature of the Brazilian political scenario. The percentage of the black population that was not being descriptively represented reached over 93% in the 50th Legislature and, despite the fact that it has consistently been decreasing throughout legislatures, it has never nearly approached the level of "perfect descriptive representation".

Figure 1: Descriptive Representation Index in Brazil per Legislature



If we look into the results of DRI in each state of Brazil, the pattern of underrepresentation continues to be consistent. The graphical representations using 2014 election results for all states and regions are brought in **Appendix 1**. Considering 2014 election results, Figure 2 bellow shows the racial political scenario for the North region of Brazil,

where the highest proportion of black individuals is found according to the latest census. The proportion of black individuals in each state of this region consistently exceeds the proportion of black federal deputies elected in that state. Moreover, as data from 2014 elections was the first to bring the racial profile of both elected and non-elected candidates, it was possible to calculate the DRI for both groups. As results show, the level of underrepresentation of black individuals tends to be lower among non-elected candidates vis-à-vis elected ones, except for the state of Amapá. This result corroborates findings from Bueno and Dunning (2014) showing that the racial distribution of candidates among election losers is nearly indistinguishable from that distribution in the whole population, which restricts the overrepresentation of whites specifically to elected officials and not to non-elected candidates. Interestingly, there is a descriptive overrepresentation of black non-elected candidates in a few states of Brazil such as Acre, Pernambuco and Rio de Janeiro, but such overrepresentation is nonexistent among elected officials (please, refer to **Appendix 1** for more details).




Figure 2: Descriptive Representation of Afro-Brazilians in North Region in 2014

2.2 Why descriptive representation (also) matters

The scenario of underrepresentation is not limited to Brazil’s lower house; there have been only 11 black representatives in the Senate since 1983; only 3% of all ministers appointed in since 1985 and one single Afro-Brazilian judge, Mr. Joaquim Barbosa Gomes, in the Supreme Court out of the 25 justices in the recent democratic history (Johnson III and Heringer, 2015). In sum, the descriptive political underrepresentation of Afro-Brazilians has been persistent throughout time which basically means that a considerable ethnic majority does not translate itself into numerical superiority among elected politicians, remaining descriptively underrepresented.

Nevertheless, to what extent does *descriptive* representation actually matters? Based solely on Pitkin’s political representation framework (Pitkin, 1967), the answer is contentious and unsettled. Increasing the number of blacks in the Legislature might enhance their *descriptive* representation, but still embracing little regard to the proposition of policies that would specifically promote benefits to that group - that is, boost their *substantive* representation. So, why would it be relevant to explore the causes for the lack of descriptive representation without a clear analysis of how substantive this form of representation has been? In other words, what difference does it make to simply increment the number of representatives of a certain group without necessarily guaranteeing this group’s *substantive* representation?

The literature shows that in the US, from the perspective of the black voter, the matter of racial representation goes beyond being purely represented in substantive terms; black citizens turn out to feel that they are better represented by candidates who physically look like them (Tate, 2001). Matching the racial profile of US Congress members to their constituents’ ratings, the author found that voters rely heavily on political party and certain demographic factors, such as race, to make inferences about the legislator’s performance, with blacks expressing greater levels of satisfaction when their representative

is black, even when other features of the legislators are controlled for. Similarly, the agenda-setting behavior of legislators also channels the degree to which lawmakers have been able to translate descriptive into substantive representation. With an analysis within the American states of Mississippi, Maryland and Georgia, Adams (2007) shows that African American legislators were found to be significantly more likely than their white counterparts to introduce health care, children's issues and minority interest legislation.

More importantly, descriptive representation also strengthens the substantive representation of interests by improving the quality of deliberation and by generating goods that are attached to substantive representation, especially by triggering a meaning of "ability to rule" to groups which had that ability deeply quarreled historically (Mansbridge, 1999). That is, from a broader perspective, pure descriptive representation can also reinforce in the society the idea that individuals of a specific social or racial background can occupy certain positions, reaching a more wide-ranging ideal of democratic representation. Therefore, the link between the substantive and descriptive forms of representation can be considerably robust.

Particularly in Brazil, substantive representation has been strongly related to the number of black representatives elected. According to Johnson III and Heringer (2015), the strongest advocates of black people's rights that involved social and educational reforms in Brazil, such as affirmative action policies, have actually been black political leaders. To the authors, it was with the presence of black officials in the 1980s, such as Senator Abdias do Nascimento and Paulo Paim, that the lack of opportunity for social and political mobility experienced by Afro-Brazilians was first brought up as an important matter within Congress. More recently, the attention to and implementation of policies such as university *quotas* to candidates of African descent would not have been possible if it were not for the strengthening of black representation in the political arena.

Therefore, the existence of black descriptive representation in Brazil, even within the

constant status of underrepresentation, has been associated to political and social gains enjoyed by the Afro-Brazilian population and, as the level of representation increased, more social reforms gained momentum and were achieved. In other words, as time progresses, it is quite reasonable to expect that the descriptive composition of political branches highly influences the pluralistic fight for rights of specific cleavages. Beyond its intrinsic importance for the reasons discussed above, descriptive representation matters in Brazil exactly for its potential to be extensively translated into substantive representation in the political arena.

2.3 But Why Underrepresented?

The way Brazilians think about race has suffered a paradigm shift since the early 2000s (Bailey, 2009). It was at this moment that the state modified the way it engenders the race-centered debate and race-targeted policies, specially with the creation of the Secretariat for Policies to Promote Racial Equality (SEPPIR). Nearly simultaneously, the Brazilian *negro* movement gained significant visibility and legitimacy resulting largely from its participation in the 2001 United Nations World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance. These developments brought up a deeper discussion in society of the disparities drawn under racial lines, generated movements leading to the institutionalization of affirmative action for nonwhites in various social spheres throughout the country and the inclusion of African history-based curricula in the basic public education system (Johnson III and Heringer, 2015). Despite these undeniable gains for the black cause, the advancement was not reflected in terms of political representation and the puzzle still remained: blacks continue to be descriptively underrepresented in Brazilian politics even though they correspond to a majoritarian portion of the population. What are the obstacles that impede this group from transforming its recent social gains into actual descriptive representation in the political arena?

Asymmetries in the access to campaign resources, for example, extensively explored by Bueno and Dunning (2014), although relevant, fail to properly consider the *demand* side of the puzzle. The authors show that white candidates are indeed richer than nonwhite candidates by substantive margins; the difference of mean assets between whites and nonwhites is around 690,000 thousand Brazilian reais. As election winners are richer than losers by about 650,000 reais, the authors suggest that resource differentials matter by emphasizing that personal assets could be strongly linked to electoral outcomes. Albeit relevant as an empirical evidence, this study overlooks the impact of race-based preferences among voters. The authors showcase that voters are more likely to be influenced by *social* factors attributed to the candidates – such as the class to which candidates belong - than

race itself. This finding is in strong accordance to the idea that the Brazilian society is not organized in such rigid social manner as to race become a strong a cleavage, since it did not provoke conflicts, violence or some disruption to the polity – specially when compared to countries like the United States or South Africa. However, I argue that race does play a role in the behavior of Brazilian voters, but in a way that not only favors white candidates, but also intensifies the impact of campaign resources asymmetries. That is, factors both on the demand and on the supply side of the puzzle play a role in shaping the political depiction of race in Brazil, but assuring an equal footing on the supply side would not guarantee the reduction of underrepresentation of blacks. That would occur exactly because a fair portion of the conundrum stems from the way voters select their candidates; by reneging a race-based preference that tends to thwart the chances of African Brazilian candidates.

Also, although theoretically plausible, the inexistence of a significant level of politicization of blacks cannot be listed as a sufficient cause for the political underrepresentation of blacks. In fact, the recent social gains enjoyed by the Afro-Brazilian population were made possible exactly due to their capacity to articulate politically. The emergence of black social movements in Brazil dates back to the 30s with the *Frente Negra Brasileira* or even earlier with the protagonism of Zumbi dos Palmares and the *quilombola* movement for the end of slavery in Brazil (Pereira, 2012). In the late 70s, they gained momentum with the creation of the *Movimento Negro Unificado* (MNU or Unified Black Movement), still existent nowadays, and several other organizations composing the contemporaneous black movement. All of these organizations were essential in the fight against racism and for better living conditions to the black population. More broadly, these organizations were deeply involved in the transition from dictatorship to democracy in the 80s and in the development of a new idea of citizenship to the society as whole (Cardoso, 1994; Dagnino, 1994). In other words, the political articulation of black groups was in the heart of the new Democratic era in Brazil, making it hard to make the case that poor black politicization is the main explanation for the underrepresentation.

Finally, some authors point that the mere existence of a *movimento negro* was not enough to enhance black descriptive representation since they were unable to properly mobilize a constituency (Burdick, 1998; Bailey, 2009). According to this line of thinking, black activists were mostly middle-class black individuals whose demands differed considerably from the needs of the mass of poor working-class nonwhites. This led to a disconnect between the movement and their constituency, as most of the challenges and causes remained defined along *social* and *class-based* factors, rather than *racial* lines (Andrews, 2000). Also, this same literature emphasizes that black activists were not capable of neutralizing the effects of the denial of racial discrimination amongst black individuals, which served as an obstacle for Afro-Brazilians to buy a “stratification belief” and mobilize towards a movement that exactly tried to equalize the effects of such discriminating realities (Twine, 2000). I argue that these explanations go both ways; one or the other is feasible. Have black leaders faced deep obstacles to build a strong black constituency or is their constituency less likely to value the consideration of race as a relevant cleavage to which they could be attached? As I show in this article, a weak sense of a common racial or ethnic identity nonwhites possess might be at the core of this puzzle because it shapes their electoral preference when they cast their ballots.

In fact, it is hard to suggest that race did not influence the way Brazilians behave given the country’s long-established slavery history which led to a scenario of socioeconomic inequality clearly depicted today (Andrews, 1996). The vast majority of Brazil’s rulers in the twentieth century have been white or relatively white-skinned male who were wealthy and came from privileged sectors of the society while the majority of the poor and marginalized have been black or of a darker complexion (Johnson III, 1998). The impact of this political reality on voting behavior warrants further empirical investigation and theoretical reflection, especially when it comes to exploring how three centuries of black enslavement defined the black voter’s mindset. In that sense, building a theory of racial political representation in Brazil necessarily engenders how the very construction of a racial ideal was established in the country. In particular, I shall emphasize my

answer to the puzzle of political representation exactly on the process of a strong sense of racial identification – or lack of thereof, in this case – and how the process of *embranquecimento* (whitening) led black Brazilians to ambiguously define racial divisions, specially in the existence of a strong mixed-racial paradigm. Also, I will explore how the self-conceptualization of race in Brazil was strongly based on the misleading belief in a “racial democracy” and can be, in combination to the lack of a cohesive racial identification, translated into varying levels of *collective self-esteem* (CSE) amongst black voters, influencing the way they evaluate candidates who look like them.

2.4 The Development of Race in Brazil

There is a stereotype of who can be intelligent and competent, who can have power. In Brazil, it is rich, white men who represent the face of power.

Benedita da Silva, Afro-Brazilian Senator³

The stereotypical image of competence and intelligence to which former Brazilian senator Benedita da Silva refers did not emerge in the Brazilian society by chance; it was the result of a complex historical development of racial relations in Brazil. One of the clearest depictions of the development of the ideal of race in Brazil dates back to 1895. "*Ham's Redemption*", show in Figure 3 by Brazilian-Spanish painter Modesto Brocos, was named as an allusion to the Biblical story of the curse by Noah on his son, Ham, and all his descendants, as reported in the book of Genesis. In order to punish Ham for mocking his nakedness and drunkenness, Noah prophesied that Ham would be "the last of the slaves among his brothers." It was the popular belief that Ham's descendants would be the dark-skinned people from certain regions of Africa, in addition to the tribes which inhabited Palestine before the Hebrews, that contributed to the existence of the long-standing ideological and religious argument used by merchants to validate the African slave trade in the Americas during the colonial period and throughout the Iberian Empire. Ham's sin would thus be the founding event of an unchanging situation and the just divine punishment of a whole people (Bosi, 1992).

According to Schwarcz (2013), the picture sketched by Brocos evokes the connection between the ideological justification to slavery based on the biblical passage of Ham's curse and the development of race in Brazil, portraying three generations of the same family. The dark black-skinned grandmother on the left has her mulatta daughter seated next to her, which implies that she had a relationship with a white man, making her daughter

³Citation extracted from Johnson III (1998)




Figure 3: *Ham's Redemption*, M. Brocos (1895)

progressively lighter-skinned. On the far right, next to the mulatta daughter, is the white Portuguese immigrant and their consequently straight-haired white son on his mother's arms. The painting shows that within three generations, the blackness of the family has been completely vanished, the reason why the grandmother has her hands in the air, as if thanking God for the "miracle" of removing the black "stain" from her family. The image is also a clear depiction of the *branqueamento*, the progressive whitening of Brazil's population through interracial marriage and miscegenation, a phenomenon that is pivotal to understand the current stands of race in the country.

As markedly posited by Skidmore (1976), prior to the abolition of slavery, race posed no significant dilemma for the country; the members of the agrarian noble elite believed enslaved Africans constituted the "right race" for rural or urban work. The question, however, settled with the possibility of these men not only gaining freedom, but consti-

tuting the nascent Brazilian nation possessing the status of citizenship in the late 1800s. Rapidly upon the end of slavery, the strategic response of the state was to fund the European immigration, forbidding, even legally, the entry of Africans and Asians in the country to meet the shortage of labor in agriculture after the abolition; this strategy having the uttermost goal of making the Brazilian population less dark (sch; Santos, 2001). This measure would not only fix many of the pessimistic predictions resulting from the several racial Darwinist theories of the inferiority of the black race, but it would also bring miscegenation to the pinnacle of the Brazilian societal development, “whitening” the population and bringing Brazil, in a close future, to the higher level of *país miscigenado* (Schwarcz, 2013). In that sense, being a “mulatto” and reneging the black heritage was a way to increase one’s social status and gain access to the Brazilian national elite, as it happened to memorable Afro-Brazilians such as José do Patrocínio and André Rebouças (Skidmore, 1976). Ultimately, it was this process of *embranquecimento*, with its resulting miscegenation, that turned the distinction between black and white among Brazilians so much fuzzier, making the identification along racial lines as less obvious than in countries like the United States. I will soon turn back to this issue because it is central in my argumentation that because Brazilian voters tend to underrate the status of blackness due to the mindset triggered by the process of whitening, they are, on average, less likely to choose Afro-Brazilian candidates when casting their votes and, particularly, black voters tend to devalue a descriptive form of political representation.

It is important to understand that so impacting was the process of whitening to the Brazilian subconscious perception of race that it was also reflected by the literature and the fictional characters that dwelt in it. A passage in Mário de Andrade’s *Macunaíma*, written in 1928 and described as the hero of the Brazilian people, portrays an interesting metamorphosis suffered by the main character still in the first chapter of the book. At the beginning of the book, the hero who had been born “jet black as a son of the fear of the night” showers in the enchanted water left within the footstep of the gigantic Indian mythological figure of Sumé. After leaving the water, Macunaíma had transformed into

"a beautiful blond and blue-eyed prince", what urged his brothers, Jiguê and Manaape, to rapidly jump into the water as to experience the same "miracle". The brothers also metamorphosed upon diving into the giant's footstep, but did not get to the same outcome; Manaape, who dove first, rubbed himself as much as he could, spilling the "black dirty water" left by Macunaíma everywhere, but could only achieve to come out "the color of new brass". Jiguê, who did not have enough water left to wash his whole body after his brother spilt it, continued to be black as a son of the fictional indigenous tribe of "Tapanhumas", but yellow in the palm of his hands and the sole of his feet after cleaning them in the remaining holy water (Andrade, 1988). The tale of three brothers is certainly a reference to the three peoples that were the foundation of the Brazilian people; the European, the Native Indian and the African, respectively. However, when combined with the process of whitening and the racial Darwinist theories that inhabited the beginning of the post-slavery era in Brazil, make up for a classic portrayal grounding the conception of race in Brazil and how, subtly, refraining from a black identity somewhat had a positive connotation (sch; Martins, 2006; Schwarcz, 2013).

Hence, the comprehension of whitening and its consequences to the mindset of the African-descendant population is pivotal to both understand the dynamics of racial relations in Brazil and, as my theory posits, the way black voters align themselves under racial lines. On a historical perspective, the development of race in Brazil was different because the country not only received the greatest portion of the African population turned into slaves in the Americas (3.6 million people or a third of all Africans brought compulsorily as commodities), but it was also the last country to abolish slavery in the world (Santos, 2001). More importantly, contrary to countries such as the United States, where the end of slavery stemmed from a long process of internal battles, the abolition of slavery was formally seen here as a gift from the governing Monarchy, and not a popular victory. This fact helped craft an environment in which the establishment of racial ideologies or the creation of segregationist categories based on race, as occurred in South Africa's *apartheid* or in the United States' *Jim Crow Laws*, were overshadowed by the belief in the existence

of a racial democracy, corollary to the representation of a *benign slavery* (Andrews, 1996; Marx, 1998; Telles, 2004). The result of this historical construction of race is that not only (i) do Afro-Brazilians play into the “racial democracy” paradigm and deny the existence of racial discrimination, believing that Brazil is comparatively a racial paradise where racism cannot exist since everyone is a product of racial intermixing (Freyre, 1933; Andrews, 1996; Twine, 1998); but (ii) are they also less likely to self-classify under the label of a common *negro* identity (Bailey and Telles, 2006); and (iii) less likely to portray a positive stereotypical image of individuals with a darker complexion (Oliveira, 1999). Each of these results needs to be treated separately because, together, they build upon the very basis of this proposed theory; the idea that we can translate these three effects into a preference for lighter-skinned candidates and varying levels of *collective self-esteem*.

First and foremost, the fact that the Brazilian society, most significantly nonwhites, do not admit the existence of a racial stratification introduces an obstacle to the construction of a cohesive black consciousness (Hasenbalg and Huntington, 1982; Twine, 1998). So pervasive was the impact of a common view of Brazil as a racial democracy that miscegenation incited the idea that here individuals of all colors could harmonically live side by side on an equal footing (Andrews, 1996). Bailey (2009) posits that the explanation for the construction of a social idea of stratification could either have individualist origins, when the victims are blamed for exactly victimizing themselves and lacking the motivation to change their disadvantaged status, or structuralist ones, when there is a belief that racial inequality stems from the existence of a system of racial discrimination (pp. 08). In that sense, it was exactly the fact that the “Brazilian society does not recognize racism, whether by attitude or system, as being responsible for the racial inequalities in the country” (Guimarães, 2001) which led the individualist account to prevail, generating very little incentives for antiracist mobilization. These results are particularly strengthened when there is a strong misleading belief that not only race fails to explain the inequalities of the country, but that these inequalities are drawn under social lines. In other words, the so characteristic common belief that racial discrimination is nonexistent led race not

to emerge as a consistent political pivot among nonwhites in general, engendering inaction under racial lines (Andrews, 2000).

Second, the development of racial relations in Brazil was markedly characterized by a difficult self-classification of the nonwhite population under racial categories. A recent census survey had an open-ended question that asked Brazilians to self-identify racially and showed that over 130 different terms were mentioned, which corroborates the complexity of color/racial alignment in Brazil (Schwarcz, 2013). In fact, the very idea of a *color* identification over the designation of *race*, as reflected in the current census categories, translates the fact that the concept of race in Brazil constitutes one of the challenges in the analysis of the way blackness is intertwined with politics and, consequently, how voters regard the importance of race. Indeed, the fact that the majority of Afro-Brazilians refuse to acknowledge their blackness (Burdick, 1998) or cannot clearly relate to a cohesive black identity (Bailey and Telles, 2006) represents a challenge for the evaluation of black candidates exactly because with lower levels of group membership, nonwhite voters are less likely to seek descriptive forms of representation as a way to equalize racial inequalities. Therefore, even if Afro-Brazilians happen to believe that racial inequalities exist and stem from a system of structural racial discrimination – contradicting the prediction described in the previous paragraph, - it is reasonable to assume that they might face an additional challenge to look for descriptive representation precisely because not all Afro-Brazilians necessarily identify with one single Afro-Brazilian identity. Thus, this secondary building block is central to my theory because so fuzzy might the self-identification under racial lines be that it not only leads to varying levels of CSE, but it also tends to dissociate the effect of a voter's race over a candidate's racial attributes.

Finally and more importantly, the fact that a negative stereotyping associated with the darker end of the color spectrum is embedded in the Brazilian culture represents the final building block of my theory. Belonging to the darker end of the skin color continuum means being consistently associated with ineptness and leads Afro-Brazilians

to be mistakenly stereotyped as passive, irrational and dependent (Oliveira, 1999). The so culturally attached Brazilian *novelas*, for example, have portrayed in the past 20 years over 90% of its characters as whites and, usually when black characters were included, they were commonly associated with the stereotypical view of slavery, poverty, violence and sexual connotation (Araújo, 2000; Campos et al., 2015). Particularly in an environment where media showcases clear physical stereotypes of beauty, competence and capacity and dissociate them from nonwhites (Schwarcz, 2013), it is reasonable to believe that nonwhites are less likely to envision their counterparts as more capable and suitable for leading positions, even when they have very little substantive leeway to reach that conclusion. Therefore, combined with the denial of a racist structure and a blurry means of self-identification under racial lines, the negative stereotyping attached to a darker complexion complements the way nonwhite voters value their blackness and that of the candidates who resembled their racial characteristics, all of which I try to translate into my hypotheses in Section 3.

3 Hypotheses and the Role of Collective Self-Esteem

3.1 Race and Voter's Electoral Choice

The theory I propose in this study evaluates how a candidate's and a voter's races are interconnected and associated with the voter's ultimate electoral choice. In that sense, the first three hypotheses I present posit the relationship between one's race and the impact of a candidate's race on that person's vote. My very first hypothesis attests that, as a result of the development of race in Brazil and the consequences of the process of "embranquecimento" to the Brazilian mindset, darker-skinned candidates, *ceteris paribus*, are more likely to be negatively rated by the electorate when compared to their white-skinned counterparts. That is:

Hypothesis 1 (H1): *A candidate's race influences the electoral choice of a voter in such a way that voters tend to prefer white candidates to nonwhite ones.*

Additionally, due to the fact that, on average, Afro-Brazilians tend to deny the existence of a racial stratification and have difficulties aligning under racial lines, their own race is very unlikely to moderate the effect the racial profile of a candidate has on her chances of being voted for. If stated in terms of (Pitkin, 1967) framework, Hypothesis 2 unfolds the idea that nonwhite voters are not likely to consider *descriptive representation* when they go about choosing their candidates.

Hypothesis 2 (H2): *A voter's race does not moderate the relationship between a candidate's race and that voter's electoral choice.*

In the next hypothesis, I aim at understanding whether Afro-Brazilian voters tend to prefer descriptive and substantive representative over one another. In other words, are

nonwhite voters more likely to opt for a candidate who simply mirrors their racial identity or a candidate who has a political agenda that includes benefits directed at the group they belong to? In order to test this idea, I use a candidate's support for affirmative action as a proxy for capturing substantive representation as it follows:

Hypothesis 3 (H3): *Nonwhite voters tend to value descriptive and substantive representation in such a way that the relative weight of substantive representation (support for affirmative action policies) is greater than the relative weight of descriptive representation (candidate's race).*

3.2 The Role of Collective Self-Esteem

In the next set of hypotheses, I suppose that the disconnect of race from the voter's decision-making is better understood when one multidimensional construct is added to my framework: the concept of *Collective Self-Esteem* (CSE). CSE was first posited by Luhtanen and Crocker (1992) and is strongly related to an individual's *social identity* - or *collective identity*. This collective identity derives from one's knowledge of their membership in a social group bonded to the value and significance attached to that membership (Crocker and Luhtanen, 1990). In the context of an Afro-Brazilian individual, one's social identity regards both how much one believes they belong to the group of individuals of African descent and what that sense of belongingness means to them. Noticeably, this social identity is in strong contrast to this same individual's *personal identity*, which Social Identity Theory (SIT) defines as the self-evaluation of that individual's own skills, abilities or attributes such as intelligence or charisma, regardless of the group (or groups) this individual belongs to (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel and Turner, 2004). This distinction is very important because when we explore CSE, we are particularly interested not in one's individual characteristics, but actually on the characteristics of one's group, which may characterize oneself as an individual or not. That being said, an Afro-Brazilian could be able to enlist all of the main features that compose their own personal identity (i.e. humor, attractiveness, competence, extroversion or empathy), still with no connection to a set of characteristics that could be attached to their being black.

As such, when we discuss *collective* self-esteem, we define it as (i) the degree to which the individual sees the self as a member of the social group (how much do I belong to group A?); (ii) values that social identity (how much do I value being a member of group A?); and (iii) sees the social identity as relevant to the self-concept (how much does my belongingness to group A define who I am?). A good way to exemplify the idea of this concept is by looking at a study in the US in which they evaluated how African-American students' racial identity was related to their levels of self-esteem (Rowley et al., 1998).

There was a general belief conceived in the early personal self-esteem literature that African-American individuals chronically suffered from low levels of self-esteem because several negative stereotypes were historically associated to their racial identity. Interestingly, this preconceived rationale was contrasted by the fact that, using the early measures of personal identity, African Americans actually reported high levels of self-esteem, debuting the general belief. So, where was the answer to this puzzle? What the authors showed was that the key lied exactly on African-Americans' strong racial identity. It was found that because of racial segregation in the United States, the majority of African Americans developed such a strong attachment to their racial identity that they mostly compared themselves not with members of a broader society, but actually with other African Americans. In other words, racial identification moderates one's self-evaluation, but this effect is considerably dependent on how much race defines who they are and what subjective meaning one attaches to it both publicly and privately. Hence, the answer to the puzzle was not just in the realms of *personal* self-esteem (how much and African American individually regards their self-perception), but deeply rooted in the concept of *collective* self-esteem (how much belonging to the group of African American shapes their self-perception).

Thus, CSE is a perfect theoretical fit to the puzzle of political representation in Brazil. The idea that because Afro-Brazilians compose the majority of the population, they should be able to translate that numerical representation in an environment of a highly inclusive and competitive elections assumes that (i) they strongly feel like they belong to this racial group to the point their racial identity defines much of their personal identities; (ii) they positively value that racial identity privately and; (iii) they believe others also positively evaluate that identity and (iv) they believe they are good representatives of the overall African Brazilian community. The case, however, might actually be that, as a result of the development of racial relations in Brazil, Afro-Brazilians might experience precisely the opposite end of these assumptions. Therefore, in order to fully understand the connection I propose between CSE and the puzzle of racial political representation,

I draw hypotheses for the enhancing effect of each CSE construct and show how these hypotheses are in parallel with the results stemming from the development of racial relations in Brazil. The constructs of CSE are presented bellow and the full description of each of the four items of the constructs is brought in **Appendix 2**.

- 1) *Public Collective Self-Esteem* (PublicCSE) corresponds to how individuals believe others evaluate their own group. For my specific context, this subscale would measure how black voters suppose other people tend to assess the general black identification. One of the items of this subscale is “Overall, my racial/ethnic group is considered good by others”.
- 2) *Private Collective Self-Esteem* (PrivateCSE) corresponds to how individuals privately evaluate their social group or groups. In my specific case, this subscale relates to how black voters themselves rate the general idea of being black. One of the items of this subscale is “I often regret that I belong to my racial/ethnic group” (reverse coded).
- 3) *Importance to Identity* (ImportanceToID) corresponds to the role of group membership to self-concept, that is, how much of one’s personal identity is influenced by their collective group identification. In the context of this study, this subscale would appraise how much of the “black identity” influences the nonwhite voter’s own personal identification, that is, how much being of African heritage defines who they are. One of the items of this subscale is “Overall, my race/ethnicity has very little to do with how I feel about myself” (reverse coded).
- 4) *Membership CSE* (MembershipCSE) which corresponds to the individuals’ sense of how well they function as members of their social groups. In the context of this study, this subscale connects how a nonwhite voter evaluates herself in comparison to other nonwhite voters. One of the items of subscale is ”I am a cooperative participant in the activities of my racial/ethnic group”.

As Crocker et al. (1994) show, these subscales are not necessarily correlated with each

other, which makes it possible to evaluate their linkages with a candidate's attributes separately. Hence, the next set of hypotheses explore the connection among descriptive representation, substantive representation and CSE. Particularly, group of Hypotheses 4 hinges on this connection as follows:

Hypothesis 4a (H4a): *PrivateCSE positively moderates the relative importance of a candidate's race over a nonwhite voter's electoral choice. That is, a nonwhite voter's level of PrivateCSE positively influences their preference for Descriptive Representation.*

Hypothesis 4b (H4b): *PublicCSE positively moderates the relative importance of a candidate's race over a nonwhite voter's electoral choice. That is, a nonwhite voter's level of PublicCSE positively influences their preference for Descriptive Representation.*

Hypothesis 4c (H4c): *ImportanceToID positively moderates the relative importance of a candidate's race over a nonwhite voter's electoral choice. That is, a nonwhite voter's level of ImportanceToID positively influences their preference for Descriptive Representation.*

Hypothesis 4d (H4d): *MembershipCSE positively moderates the relative importance of a candidate's race over a nonwhite voter's electoral choice. That is, a nonwhite voter's level of MembershipCSE positively influences their preference for Descriptive Representation.*

Similarly, the next set of hypotheses also try to uncover how CSE interacts with the puzzle of the political representation of race in Brazil, but with particular focus on its connection with Substantive Representation.

Hypothesis 5a (H5a): *PrivateCSE positively moderates the relative importance of a candidate's support for affirmative action over a nonwhite voter's electoral choice.*

That is, a nonwhite voter's level of PrivateCSE positively influences their preference for Substantive Representation.


Hypothesis 5b (H5b): *PublicCSE positively moderates the relative importance of a candidate's support for affirmative action over a nonwhite voter's electoral choice. That is, a nonwhite voter's level of PublicCSE positively influences their preference for Substantive Representation.*

Hypothesis 5c (H5c): *ImportanceToID positively moderates the relative importance of a candidate's support for affirmative action over a nonwhite voter's electoral choice. That is, a nonwhite voter's level of ImportanceToID positively influences their preference for Substantive Representation.*

Hypothesis 5d (H5d): *MembershipCSE positively moderates the relative importance of a candidate's support for affirmative action over a nonwhite voter's electoral choice. That is, a nonwhite voter's level of MembershipCSE positively influences their preference for Substantive Representation.*

A summary of all hypotheses is brought in the Figure 4 bellow.

Figure 4: Schematic Summary of all hypotheses



4 Methodology

4.1 Conjoint Analysis and Experimental Design

As a widely employed marketing research method to elicit consumer's preference (Raghavarao et al., 2010; Rao et al., 2014), Conjoint Analysis (CA) has just recently been introduced in Political Science research (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014; Hainmueller et al., 2014; Aguilar et al., 2015; Franchino and Zucchini, 2015). CA is perfect methodological approach to test my hypotheses as it allows me to (i) mimic the choice-based situation voters experience at the ballot; (ii) give the respondent an opportunity to select candidates by comparing different attributes simultaneously; (iii) avoid social desirability issues by forcing respondents to face a trade-off between different attributes of a candidate. A summary of the survey structure follows in Table 1.

Table 1: Survey Experiment Structure

Block	Block Name	Content
Block 1	Introduction	Brief introduction to the survey experiment.
Block 2	Consent	Consent statement to confirm the participant’s willingness to take part in the survey. Participants who agreed to the conditions of the experiment were forwarded to Block 3 and those who did not agree were automatically directed to Block 8.
Block 3	Socioeconomic Background	Basic information on the respondent’s socioeconomic background such as gender, age, marital status, income, schooling and race.
Block 4	Conjoint Analysis	Instructions to the CA exercise and choice-based task in which respondents were presented with four different pairs of candidates of which order was randomized.
Block 5	Racial Collective Self-Esteem Scale	In this section, respondents who identified under a nonwhite racial category in Block 3 were asked to respond the 16-item Racial Collective Self-Esteem scale designed in Luhtanen, R., & Crocker, J. (1992).
Block 6	Manipulation Check - Race	Respondents were presented with four of the eight candidate pictures and were asked to classify these candidates along ethnoracial categories as defined by IBGE.
Block 7	Disclaimer	<p>All respondents were presented with the following disclaimer:</p> <p>Important Disclaimer:</p> <p><i>It is worth noting that the ideas shown in this study DO NOT reflect in absolutely any way the true positions of the candidates shown in the photos. The positions brought were elaborated with PURELY ACADEMIC PURPOSES without any intention to communicate information other than that which refers to the more limited contribution to academic research carried out here. The photos of candidates were removed from the public database of the Superior Electoral Court (TSE), and their names were replaced with fictitious names in order to protect their images and respect their privacy.</i></p>
Block 8	Ending	Ending of the survey and ”thank you for your participation” message.

After a brief introduction and the consent form, respondents were asked to provide basic socioeconomic information and engaged in a Choice-based CA task. In this task, I put respondents in the position of voters, asking them to make decisions between a pair of candidates. In each of the four pairs presented, I showed a screen with profiles of two candidates and asked them two different questions. In the first question, I asked respondents to identify which of the two candidates they would rather choose to be their representative and the outcome was coded as the binary dependent variable (DV) *CandidateChoice*, which equals 1 if the candidate is selected and 0 otherwise. The advantage of this question is that it forces a trade-off situation as candidates vary in a set of attributes and respondents are limited to weight attributes which they find more important when voting for a candidate. Requiring a decision also neutralizes overall attitudes about a possible dissatisfaction with politics as respondents cannot nullify their vote or vote blank.


Additionally, when facing each pair of candidates, I also asked respondents to rate the candidates shown on a 7-point scale, generating a continuous dependent variable coded as *CandidateRating* which allows me to assess the voter's preference with more variation than when using the binary DV. An example of this choice-based task as displayed to respondents is brought in Figure 5

As a result, each respondent evaluated four comparisons between pairs of candidates, each displayed on a new screen, of which order was randomly assigned and totaled eight candidate profiles. Each candidate profile presented five attributes that were randomized in a fractional factorial design that was symmetric and fully orthogonal in the main effects. There are several advantages associated with orthogonal designs as they (i) are parsimonious, (ii) are fit to my case where interactions between attributes can be neglected and (iii) enable estimation of all main effects of the attributes in my conjoint study (Rao et al., 2014).

Figure 5: Choice-Based Conjoint Analysis Task

Qual dos dois candidatos abaixo você escolheria para te representar?

CANDIDATO 1




Marcelo Barbosa Siqueira é corretor de imóveis.

Condena a expansão de políticas de ação afirmativa.

Não apoia o programa "Mais Médicos".

Apoia a expansão dos programa Bolsa Família.

CANDIDATO 2



Julio Neves dos Santos é médico.

Condena a expansão de políticas de ação afirmativa.

Apoia a expansão do programa "Mais Médicos".

Apoia a expansão dos programa Bolsa Família.

Como você avaliaria o **Candidato 1** em uma escala de 1 (definitivamente NÃO VOTARIA) a 7 (definitivamente VOTARIA)?

☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7

Como você avaliaria o **Candidato 2** em uma escala de 1 (definitivamente NÃO votaria) a 7 (definitivamente votaria)?

☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7

The attributes displayed include each candidate's *race* (manipulated through the pictures), *level of education* (manipulated through their profession), *support for Affirmative Action*, *support for Bolsa Família* and *support for Mais Médicos*. These attributes were chosen to approximate the very limited amount of information voters usually have in Brazil when selecting their candidates for Legislative positions. Notice that the attributes *Support for Bolsa Família* and *Support for Mais Médicos* are not specifically included to my theoretical framework, but were used as a methodological approach to mitigate the chances of hypothesis guessing. Also, as low levels of party affiliation, relatively weak influence of parties on voting for legislative positions and skewed party alignment towards a few

partisan labels strongly mark the Brazilian political arena (Mainwaring, 1991; Samuels, 2006; Braga and Pimentel Jr, 2011), I decided to omit the candidate’s party as I believed it would be more likely to harm my results (by introducing an attribute that gives very little weight to my theory, but could capture all the effects) than complement them.

Each of the attributes can take on up to two values which were randomly assigned such that the two candidates’ profiles vary within and across the binary comparisons. A posteriori, each attribute was coded in binary effects-coded independent variables that could either take on the value of 1 (White, College Degree, Support Affirmative Action, Support Bolsa Familia and Support Mais Médicos) or -1 (Nonwhite, No College Education, No Support for Affirmative Action, no Support for Bolsa Familia and No Support for Mais Médicos). A more thorough account on the process of picture selection is carried out on section 4.3. The overall attributes and values are brought in Table 2.

Table 2: Attributes for Candidate Profiles in Conjoint Experiment

Attributes	Values
Race	White
	Nonwhite
Education	No College Education
	College Degree
Affirmative Action	I am against the expansion of Affirmative Action policies.
	I support the expansion of Affirmative Action policies.
Bolsa Familia	I support the reduction of the Bolsa Familia program.
	I support the expansion of the Bolsa Familia program.
Mais Médicos	I do not support the Mais Médicos program.
	I support the Mais Médicos program.

As suggested by (Hainmueller et al., 2014), CA offers several advantages when compared to previous observational and experimental approaches as it allows for (i) the identification of the effect of the candidate attribute on their probability of being selected by a voter, (ii) a simultaneous examination of the attributes’ relative importance as we are able to compare the magnitude of the relevance of each different attribute and (iii) the interaction between a candidate’s and the voter’s characteristics, which is particularly suited for the hypotheses I posited.

4.2 Sample

In order to carry out my analysis, I conducted an online survey experiment from September to October 2016 on Facebook, as it is a simple cost-effective tool for online recruitment (Samuels and Zucco, 2013). Respondents were asked to participate in an academic study about political behavior. A total of 448 adults began responding the survey, out of which 214 actually agreed to participate, completed it and were, thus, considered in my sample. Respondent characteristics are summarized in Table 3. Nearly half of the participants were female (52.8%) and nonwhite (49.5%), which closely represents those proportions in the Brazilian population. Most respondents also had at least a high school degree (76.4%), earned an income of over 2 minimum wages (50.5%) and liked to discuss politics (94.8%). In addition, the proportion of participants who supported affirmative action policies was nearly the same among white (87.8%) and nonwhite participants (87.6%).

4.3 Manipulation of Race

Two additional tests were conducted, both of which had the goal of ensuring the proper manipulation of race on the pictures used in the CA exercise. The procedural account of each test is brought the upcoming subsections bellow.

4.3.1 Drawing a Homogeneous Pool of Candidate Pictures

In the first test, I specifically aimed at drawing a pool of candidate pictures that were homogeneous on several aspects, but differed only on race, as schematized in Figure 6. When considering the photos in the CA, I wanted to ensure respondents were led to unconsciously account solely for each candidate's race and the subsequent dimensions


Table 3: Summary Statistics

	Sample
Race	
Yellow	0.9%
White	50.5%
Indigenous	1.9%
Brown	24.5%
Black	22.2%
Age in Years	
Average	26
Education	
Primary	0,9%
Primary $\leq x < HighSchool$	22.6%
High School $\leq x < Undergraduate$	50.0%
Undergraduate $\leq x$	26.4%
Income*	
1 MW	19,8%
1 MW $\leq x < 2MW$	29.7%
2 MW $\leq x < 5MW$	23.6%
5 MW $\leq x < 10MW$	17.9%
10 MW $\leq x$	9.0%
Political Interest	
I don't like to discuss politics.	5.2%
I like to discuss politics a little.	19.3%
I like to discuss politics.	43.4%
I like to discuss politics a lot.	32.1%

* 1 MW = Minimum Wage = R\$ 880.00

the literature says are bonded to it (i.e. competence or intelligence), and not to other dimensions or traits that, as posed in the Political Science literature (Olivola and Todorov, 2010; Gerber et al., 2011), might be inferred by candidate pictures, influence a voter's electoral choice and do not theoretically connect to one's race (i.e. age, emotional stability or extroversion). In other words, the idea of this pre-test was assuring Path B in Figure 6 was blocked in the design, which would lead candidates to be comparable under those dimensions, differing uniquely by their race.

Figure 6: Pretest - Experimental Manipulation of Race



Using the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) database, pictures of candidates who ran for federal deputies in 2014 in the states of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Bahia and Ceará were selected. In order to narrow down this pool, I used the following criteria to draw photos from TSE database: (i) candidates who declared themselves as white or nonwhite (brown or black), (ii) aged between 40-45 years-old, (iii) non-bald, (iv) who were smiling and (v) were not wearing glasses or formal clothing (ties and/suits). As a result, a total of 16 photos were selected, 8 of white and 8 of nonwhite candidates, and used on a separate survey exercise.


In a between-subjects design, 144 respondents were randomly shown 5 out of the 8 photos of candidates who either declared themselves as white or nonwhite. For each photo, they were asked to state their perception of the candidate's age and rate these

individuals on a 7-point likert scale under their perceptions of the variables shown in Figure 6. In one-way ANOVA tests, I found that on average, white (w) and nonwhite (b) candidates indeed differed in terms of respondents' perception of age ($\beta_w = 55.43$, $\beta_b = 52.90$; $p \leq 0.05$), extroversion ($\beta_w = 4.23$, $\beta_b = 5.01$; $p \leq 0.05$), organization ($\beta_w = 4.48$, $\beta_b = 4.74$; $p \leq 0.05$), creativity ($\beta_w = 3.89$, $\beta_b = 4.50$; $p \leq 0.05$) and emotional stability ($\beta_w = 4.30$, $\beta_b = 4.90$; $p \leq 0.05$). Nevertheless, among the 120 possible pairs, I attested in post-hoc comparisons by running a Bonferroni test that 25 pairs were of candidates who were statistically comparable in terms of all dimensions, out of which 4 were selected to be used in the experiment. All the photos contained in the final sample are shown in **Appendix 3**.

4.3.2 Checking the Manipulation of Race

After building the final sample of 8 candidate photos and the CA task, Block 5 in the main survey experiment checked whether the respondents' perception of each candidate's race was in accordance with their own self-declared racial profile. Each respondent classified a total of four pictures under the race categories as defined by IBGE. Figure 7 summarizes the results and shows participants' perception of race aboundly matched the values set forth in the manipulation.

Figure 7: Manipulation Check - Perception of Race



4.4 CSE Exploratory Factor Analysis

As for the measurement of Collective Self-Esteem, I was particularly interested on the way race is interconnected with the notion of CSE, and, therefore used the race-specific version of CSE scale (CSES-R) (Crocker et al., 1994). Since the original scale was designed and validated in English, I carried out a back-translating procedure in which the original version was translated to Portuguese, translated back to English, and then compared the resulting English version to the original one. All of these steps were performed by different individuals and very minor divergences were found between the original and back-translated versions. It is noteworthy that only respondents which self-declared as nonwhite faced the 16-point CSE scale.

For theoretical reasons and due to the fact that the CSES-R was not validated in Portuguese, I performed an Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) to determine the factor structure of the 16-item translated scale using principal axis factoring and a minimum cutoff of 0.40 for a factor loading, all steps given after inverting the scale of reverse-coded items. As a result, I removed one item from all four factors, but PublicCSE, either for issues of insufficient loading or cross-loading on multiple factors. Hence, I retained 13 items, grouped into my four statistically reliable dimensions (Cronbach's alphas greater than 0.70): 4 items for Public CSE ($\alpha = 0.84$), 3 items for Private CSE ($\alpha = 0.71$), 3 items for Importance to Identity ($\alpha = 0.76$) and 3 items for Membership CSE ($\alpha = 0.77$). Subsequently, the four variables were predicted using the model stemmed by each factor and row means by individual were calculated in order to be plugged into my models as to test the impact of each dimension in my analysis.

5 Results

I ran two different models in order to test my hypotheses; a logistic regression when the binary *CandidateChoice* variable was a DV and an OLS regression when the DV was the *CandidateRanking* variable, all of which had their errors clustered in the respondent identification. As mentioned in the Methodology section, all IVs were represented by a set of effects-coded variables which could either take on the value of -1 or 1. As a result of the design, it is worth reinforcing that, within these models, the intercept (constant term) is bound to represent the grand mean from which each of the IV estimates characterize deviations - or partworths, as posed in the CA terminology.

Tables 4 and 5 bellow bring the testing for hypotheses 1, 2 and 3.

Table 4: Logistic Regressions - Testing Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3

	<i>Candidate Choice</i>		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
CandidateWhite	0.122* (0.0481)	0.122* (0.0481)	0.102 (0.0854)
AffirmativeAction	0.885*** (0.0862)	0.885*** (0.0862)	0.999*** (0.138)
MaisMedicos	0.876*** (0.0872)	0.877*** (0.0872)	1.148*** (0.138)
BolsaFamilia	0.753*** (0.0840)	0.753*** (0.0840)	0.877*** (0.129)
CandidateEducation	0.989*** (0.0854)	0.989*** (0.0855)	1.231*** (0.129)
RespondentWhite		0.00358 (0.00431)	
RespondentWhite X CandidateWhite		0.0457 (0.0496)	
Constant	0.00960 (0.00518)	0.00957 (0.00520)	0.0198 (0.0157)
N	1696	1696	840
pseudo R^2	0.395	0.395	0.507

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 5: OLS - Testing Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3

	<i>Candidate Ranking</i>		
	Model 4	Model 5	Model6
CandidateWhite	-0.136*** (0.0328)	-0.136*** (0.0327)	-0.179*** (0.0477)
AffirmativeAction	0.703*** (0.0429)	0.703*** (0.0430)	0.774*** (0.0601)
MaisMedicos	0.453*** (0.0391)	0.453*** (0.0391)	0.524*** (0.0657)
BolsaFamilia	0.493*** (0.0470)	0.493*** (0.0470)	0.560*** (0.0657)
CandidateEducation	0.226*** (0.0287)	0.226*** (0.0287)	0.290*** (0.0438)
RespondentWhite		-0.0576 (0.0534)	
RespondentWhite X CandidateWhite		0.0426 (0.0327)	
Constant	3.478*** (0.0535)	3.478*** (0.0534)	3.536*** (0.0819)
N	1696	1696	840
R^2	0.292	0.293	0.342


Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

As shown in Model 1 (Table 4), H1 was supported ($\beta = 0.122, SE = 0.048$) and a

candidate's race (*CandidateWhite* = 1 if white candidate, 0 c.c.) significantly influences the electoral choice of a voter by rewarding white candidates. Interestingly, Model 4 (Table 5) partially supports H1, for in this model the effect of race tended to reward nonwhite candidates ($\beta = -0.136, SE = 0.032$). The reason for this discrepancy possibly lies on the fact that, even though both white and nonwhite voters tend to better rate the candidates they select in comparison to the ones they do not, nonwhite voters are more likely to over-reward nonwhite candidates when they are chosen, as depicted in Figure 8. In other words, when nonwhite voters prefer a nonwhite candidate, they tend to rate this candidate proportionally higher than when they choose a white candidate. Indeed, in a three-way ANOVA where *CandidateChoice* was a DV, the triple interaction effect among *CandidateChoice*, a candidate's race, a voter's race was significant ($F(1, 1688) = 80.78, p = 0.000$). As it can be seen, the rating gap between selected and non-selected candidates is great for nonwhite candidates and slightly more acute for nonwhite voters.

Figure 8: Three-way Interaction - Candidate's Race, Voter's Race and Candidate Choice



Models 2 (Table 4) and 5 (Table 5) test the interaction between *RespondentWhite* and a respondent's race (*RespondentWhite* = 1 if white respondent, 0 c.c.). As it can be seen, this interaction was not significant in either of the models, which corroborates H2. It is important to reinforce that not only is there not an interaction between one's race and that of a candidate, but also a person's race does not have a significant main effect on one's electoral choice. In other words, there isn't enough statistical evidence to connect one's racial profile and their electoral choice, debuting the idea that descriptive representation plays a role when nonwhite voters go about making their electoral choice.

In order to test H3, I subsampled the observations by considering nonwhite voters specifically. The estimates of this strategy, as brought in Model 3 (Table 4) and Model 6 (Table 5), show that indeed the coefficient for *AffirmativeAction* is greater than the coefficient for *CandidateWhite*, which is suggestive of a stronger preference for substantive representation. In a one-sided t test for difference in coefficients, I attested that $\beta_{\text{AffirmativeAction}}$ is indeed significantly greater than $\beta_{\text{CandidateWhite}}$ ($F(1, 104) = 71.97$, $p = 0.000$). Also, the relative weight of a *CandidateWhite* was found to be negative and significant in Model 6 ($\beta = -0.179$, $SE = 0.048$), but non-significant in Model 3 ($\beta = 0.102$, $SE = 0.085$). Again, these results might have been driven by the unbalance on the way nonwhite voters tend to reward preferred nonwhite candidates by overly rating them.

Tables 6 and 7 are displayed bellow and bring the estimates for testing hypotheses H4a, H4b, H4c and H4d. As it can be verified, none of the interactions between *CandidateWhite* and the four dimensions of CSE were significant. In other words, Collective Self-Esteem does not influence the relative importance of a candidate's race on nonwhite voters' electoral choice, which contradicts the suppositions put forward in the set of hypotheses H4. This result in itself is in accordance to the results previously found in the sense that there is not enough statistical evidence to bridge one's race to one's preference for descriptive representation, even in the face of the effect of this person's Collective

Self-Esteem on their ultimate electoral choice.

Table 6: Logistic Regressions - Testing Hypotheses 4a, 4b, 4c and 4d

	<i>Candidate Choice</i>			
	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
CandidateWhite	0.138 (0.217)	-1.107 (0.654)	-0.0346 (0.363)	-0.375 (0.295)
PublicCSE	-0.00192 (0.0117)			
CandidateWhite X PublicCSE	-0.0100 (0.0599)			
PrivateCSE		0.0388 (0.0241)		
CandidateWhite X PrivateCSE		0.200 (0.105)		
ImportanceToID			0.00521 (0.0128)	
CandidateWhite X ImportanceToID			0.0271 (0.0615)	
MembershipCSE				0.0191 (0.0147)
CandidateWhite X MembershipCSE				0.0985 (0.0561)
<i>N</i>	840	840	840	840
pseudo R^2	0.507	0.510	0.507	0.508

Constant and remaining candidate variables omitted and significant at 1%

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Finally, the testing of Hypotheses H5a, H5b, H5c and H5d is presented in tables 8 and 9 below. Firstly, Models 16 and 20 show that the moderating effect of PrivateCSE on the relative importance of *AffirmativeAction* is not significant, debuting H5b and confirming that there is no statistical evidence to believe that the way a nonwhite voter privately regards their race influences their preference for substantive representation. Diametrically, Model 15 ($\beta = -0.170$, $SE = 0.080$) and Model 19 ($\beta = -0.117$, $SE = 0.038$) depict that not only is the moderation of PublicCSE on the relative importance of *AffirmativeAction*

Table 7: OLS - Testing Hypotheses 4a, 4b, 4c and 4d

	<i>Candidate Ranking</i>			
	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14
CandidateWhite	-0.282* (0.135)	-0.263 (0.238)	-0.0655 (0.145)	-0.136 (0.176)
PublicCSE	0.0785 (0.0539)			
CandidateWhite X PublicCSE	0.0287 (0.0296)			
PrivateCSE		0.149 (0.0863)		
CandidateWhite X PrivateCSE		0.0140 (0.0413)		
ImportanceToID			0.0000870 (0.0617)	
CandidateWhite X ImportanceToID			-0.0224 (0.0299)	
MembershipCSE				0.0131 (0.0610)
CandidateWhite X MembershipCSE				-0.00884 (0.0390)
<i>N</i>	840	840	840	840
<i>R</i> ²	0.346	0.347	0.342	0.342

Constant and remaining candidate variables omitted and significant at 1%

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

significant, but it also is negative, contradicting H5b. Keeping in mind that the higher the level of PublicCSE, the better one believes others evaluate individuals who belong their ethnic group, a rich interpretation stems from this result. In the light of this statistical evidence, we can say that the worse an Afro-Brazilian believes other people evaluate their race, the more likely they are to regard a candidate's support for affirmative action as an important factor when selecting a candidate. Despite debuting my original hypothesis, I believe this result is particularly interesting because it corroborates the notion that one of the main arguments to defend the existence of affirmative action policies is its aspect as a social reparation mechanism. Upon believing that their race is undervalued by others, a nonwhite voter might seek mechanisms that at least socially compensate for this overall negative image attached to their racial identification. Hence, when a candidate supports a policy that benefits Afro-Brazilians, this nonwhite voter low in PublicCSE tends to relatively reward this candidate's stand on affirmative action more.

Additionally, the significant and positive interaction between *AffirmativeAction* and *ImportanceToID* brought in Model 17 ($\beta = 0.314$, $SE = 0.087$) and Model 21 ($\beta = 0.174$, $SE = 0.037$) supports H5c and adds the idea that the more relevant race is to a black person's self-concept, the more likely they are to relatively over-regard a candidate's support for affirmative Action. This result is also compelling because it suggests that, as nonwhite voters are more racially conscious and consider their race as a relevant feature of their own self-definition, they tend to more positively weight substantive representation relative to other candidate attributes, possibly by envisioning in that candidate a clearer support for something that so strongly relates to their identity.

Conclusively, the moderating role of *MembershipCSE* on the connection between a candidate's support for affirmative action and their chances of being selected by a voter was non-significant in the logistic regression in Model 18 ($\beta = 0.202$, $SE = 0.120$) and significant in the OLS regression in Model 22 ($\beta = 0.147$, $SE = 0.047$). Recall that the higher one's *MembershipCSE*, the better they believe they perform in comparison to other

Table 8: Logistic Regressions - Testing Hypotheses 5a, 5b, 5c and 5d

	<i>Candidate Choice</i>			
	Model 15	Model 16	Model 17	Model 18
AffirmativeAction	1.623*** (0.305)	0.150 (0.966)	-0.536 (0.492)	0.0357 (0.600)
PublicCSE	0.00644 (0.00598)			
AffirmativeAction X PublicCSE	-0.170* (0.0801)			
PrivateCSE		-0.00497 (0.00594)		
AffirmativeAction X PrivateCSE		0.141 (0.157)		
ImportanceToID			-0.0101 (0.00878)	
AffirmativeAction X ImportanceToID			0.314** (0.0971)	
MembershipCSE				-0.00730 (0.00641)
AffirmativeAction X MembershipCSE				0.202 (0.120)
<i>N</i>	840	840	840	840
pseudo R^2	0.512	0.509	0.526	0.513

Constant and remaining candidate variables omitted and significant at 1%

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 9: OLS - Testing Hypotheses 5a, 5b, 5c and 5d

	<i>Candidate Ranking</i>			
	Model 19	Model 20	Model 21	Model 22
AffirmativeAction	1.193*** (0.129)	0.322 (0.384)	-0.108 (0.211)	0.0597 (0.249)
PublicCSE	0.0785 (0.0539)			
AffirmativeAction X PublicCSE	-0.117** (0.0388)			
PrivateCSE		0.149 (0.0863)		
AffirmativeAction X PrivateCSE		0.0745 (0.0613)		
ImportanceToID			0.0000870 (0.0617)	
AffirmativeAction X ImportanceToID			0.174*** (0.0370)	
MembershipCSE				0.0131 (0.0610)
AffirmativeAction X MembershipCSE				0.147** (0.0471)
<i>N</i>	840	840	840	840
<i>R</i> ²	0.354	0.349	0.363	0.353

Constant and remaining candidate variables omitted and significant at 1%

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

individuals of their same descent. In light of that definition, the positive and significant result found only in Model 22 could derive from the unbalance on nonwhite voters' rating of nonwhite candidates and could be interpreted as it follows; the more one believes they perform in comparison to other individuals of their same racial background, the more they tend to relative weight substantive representation. This result could be driven by the fact that those who score high in MembershipCSE envision their chance of relatively enjoying more of the benefits directed to their own ingroup, which leads them to compensate candidates who actually support policies aimed at providing these specific benefits. This result, however, is certainly debatable since it was not found in both statistical models run. In any case, the conjoint testing of the set of hypotheses H5 vis-a-vis hypotheses H4 makes it evident that CSE is consistently more likely to influence a nonwhite voter's preference for substantive representation than for descriptive representation.

6 Conclusion

What accounts for the tenacious racial discrepancies in political representation in Brazil? In this paper, by trying to explore the reasons for such unbalance in representation, I argue that aside from supply-sided electoral obstacles (i.e. access to campaign resources and level of political influence), one of the main explanations of this puzzle lies on the demand prism of the puzzle, precisely on the way nonwhite voters go about selecting their candidates. As to explore this side of the conundrum, I unite the effects of (i) a voter's race, (ii) a candidate's race and (iii) a candidate's support for affirmative action policies to a variable long used in Social Identity Theory; one's level of collective self-esteem. Also, I complement the interaction of these four variables by structuring it with the theoretical lens provided in two concepts posited in (Pitkin, 1967): descriptive and substantive representation.

In order to carry out this analysis, I employed a Choice-based Conjoint Analysis (CA)

survey experiment in which respondents were asked to choose candidates from pairwise comparisons of profiles designed to not only unravel voter's preferences over several attributes of a regular political candidate, including her race and policy stands, but also supply estimates which can be understood as the relative importance of these dimensions. In my results I found that even though a candidate's race does play a significant role in the overall electoral preference of a voter, it is not influenced by this voter's own racial identity. In other words, even though voters in general believe race is a relatively relevant feature of a candidate, white and nonwhite voters do not view this relative importance in meaningful divergent ways. Also, I found that the relative importance of race tends to benefit white candidates relatively more precisely when they face a dichotomous select-not-select decision, finding which might provide an interesting explanation for the consistent whiteness of Brazilian legislative bodies.

As for the impact of CSE on the linkage between one's race and that of a political candidate, the overall results show that CSE is more likely to influence an Afro-Brazilian voter's preference for substantive representation than her preference for descriptive representation, particularly when considering (i) how this person believes others evaluate members of her race, (ii) how important this racial identity is to herself and (iii) how well this person thinks she performs in comparison to other people of their same ethnic background.

There are certainly limitations to my study, specially in realms of external validity of the results. The sample gathered closely reflects the population in terms of race and gender, but does not represent it in terms of the educational level or interest in politics, both factors which engender a more comprehensive replication of this study with a more random sample. Nevertheless, the main point in the discussion I put forward with this study lies on the fact that perhaps, when faced with the choice between voting for someone who supports policies that benefit their in-group (substantive representation) and someone who solely physically resembles their ethnic identity (descriptive represen-

tation), nonwhite voters might actually prefer the former, a combination of both or even, when race arises as indeed relevant, a candidate on the opposite side of the racial spectrum. As one tries to enlighten the causes for the unbound whiteness of Brazilian politics, the very development of race in Brazil and its consequence to the mindset of the Brazilian population, in general, and of Afro-Brazilians, in particular, cannot be overlooked. The solution for the puzzle of racial representation in Brazilian politics certainly combines structural effects triggered by the evolution of race and its impact on how voter's select candidates and shape their preference for substantive and descriptive means of representation, being this interconnection in the latter an interesting and relatively unexplored agenda for future research on the scope of political representation in Brazil.

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7 Appendices

7.1 Appendix 1

Descriptive Representation of Afro-Brazilians by Region in 2014

Figure 9: Central-West Region




Figure 10: North Region




Figure 11: Northeast Region




Figure 12: Southeast Region





Figure 13: South Region



7.2 Appendix 2

The Racial Collective Self-Esteem Scale

The Racial Collective Self-Esteem Scale (CSES-R) is a variant of the Collective Self-Esteem Scale (CSES) and it brings each of the original items with their wording adapted to encompass issues of racial/ethnic identification. Each of the subscale constructs contains 4 items as divided bellow:

- 1) *Private CSE* which corresponds to how individuals privately evaluate their social group or groups: items 2, 6, 10 and 14;
- 2) *Public CSE* which corresponds to how individuals believe others evaluate their group or groups: items 3, 7, 11 and 15;
- 3) *Importance to Identity* which corresponds to The role of group membership to self-concept: items 4, 8, 12 and 16;
- 4) *Membership CSE* which corresponds to the individuals' sense of how well they function as members of their social groups: items 1, 5, 9 and 13.

To compute the scores, first, reverse-score answers to items 2, 4, 5, 7, 10, 12, 13, and 15, such that (1 = 7), (2 = 6), (3 = 5), (4 = 4), (5 = 3), (6 = 2), (7 = 1). Then, sum the answers to the four items for each respective subscale score, and divide each by 4. Finally, although it is possible to create an overall or composite score for CSE, the literature strongly recommends against doing so because the subscales measure distinct constructs. For example, Crocker et al. (1994) found that for Black students, the public and private subscales were uncorrelated. Consequently, averaging across these two subscales could lead to misleading findings.

The application of the scale starts with the short instructions shown bellow followed by the scale survey:

INSTRUCTIONS

We are all members of different social groups or social categories. We would like you to consider your race or ethnicity (e.g., African-American, Latino/Latina, Asian, European-American) in responding to the following statements. There are no right or wrong answers to any of these statements; we are interested in your honest reactions and opinions. Please read each statement carefully, and respond by using the following scale from 1 to 7: Strongly Disagree (SD) = 1, Disagree (DI) = 2, Somewhat Disagree (SD) = 3, Neutral (NE)= 4, Somewhat Agree (SA) = 5, Agree (AG)= 6, Strongly Agree (SA) = 7.

ITEM	STATEMENTS	SD	DI	SD	NE	SA	AG	SA
1	I am a worthy member of my race/ethnic group.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2	I often regret that I belong to my racial/ethnic group.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3	Overall, my racial/ethnic group is considered good by others.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4	Overall, my race/ethnicity has very little to do with how I feel about myself.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5	I feel I don't have much to offer to my racial/ethnic group.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6	In general, I'm glad to be a member of my racial/ethnic group.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
7	Most people consider my racial/ethnic group, on the average, to be more ineffective than other groups.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	The racial/ethnic group I belong to is an important reflection of who I am.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9	I am a cooperative participant in the activities of my racial/ethnic group.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
10	Overall, I often feel that my racial/ethnic group is not worthwhile.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
11	In general, others respect my race/ethnicity.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
12	My race/ethnicity is unimportant to my sense of what kind of a person I am.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
13	I often feel I'm a useless member of my racial/ethnic group.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
14	I feel good about the race/ethnicity I belong to.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
15	In general, others think that my racial/ethnic group is unworthy.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
16	In general, belonging to my race/ethnicity is an important part of my self image.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

7.3 Appendix 3

Candidate Profiles in Conjoint Analysis Task

Candidate Pair A



Hélio José Silva é pedagogo.

Apoia a expansão das políticas de ação afirmativa

Não apoia o programa "Mais Médicos"

Apoia a expansão dos programa Bolsa Família.



Carlos André Pereira é engenheiro.

Condena a expansão de políticas de ação afirmativa.

Não apoia o programa "Mais Médicos".

Apoia a redução do programa Bolsa Família.

Candidate Pair B



Marcelo Barbosa Siqueira é corretor de imóveis.

Condena a expansão de políticas de ação afirmativa.

Não apoia o programa "Mais Médicos".

Apoia a expansão dos programa Bolsa Família.



Julio Neves dos Santos é médico.

Condena a expansão de políticas de ação afirmativa.

Apoia a expansão do programa "Mais Médicos".

Apoia a expansão dos programa Bolsa Família.

Candidate Pair C



Paulo Silveira Martins é psicólogo.

Apoia a expansão das políticas de ação afirmativa.

Apoia a expansão do programa "Mais Médicos".

Apoia a redução do programa Bolsa Família.



Luciano Monteiro da Rocha é representante de vendas de planos de saúde.

Condena a expansão de políticas de ação afirmativa.

Apoia a expansão do programa "Mais Médicos".

Apoia a redução do programa Bolsa Família.

Candidate Pair D



Lucio Costa da Silva é motorista de ônibus.

Apoia a expansão das políticas de ação afirmativa

Apoia a expansão do programa "Mais Médicos".

Apoia a expansão dos programa Bolsa Família.



Cristiano Ferreira Cunha é vendedor de carros.

Apoia a expansão das políticas de ação afirmativa.

Não apoia o programa "Mais Médicos".

Apoia a redução do programa Bolsa Família.