Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorPage Junior, Frank H.
dc.contributor.authorMonteiro, P. K.
dc.contributor.authorSvaiter, Benar Fux
dc.date.accessioned2008-05-13T15:28:55Z
dc.date.available2008-05-13T15:28:55Z
dc.date.issued2004-03-01
dc.identifier.issn0104-8910
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10438/641
dc.description.abstractWithin the context of a single-unit, independent private values auction model, we show that if bidder types are multidimensional, then under the optimal auction exclusion of some bidder types will occur. A second contribution of the paper is methodological in nature. In particular, we identify conditions under which an auction model with multidimensional types can be reduced to a model with one dimensional types without loss of generality. Reduction results of this type have achieved the status of folklore in the mechanism design literature. Here, we provide a proof of the reduction result for auctions.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherEscola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGVpor
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEnsaios Econômicos;537por
dc.subjectOptimal auctionseng
dc.subjectType exclusioneng
dc.subjectMultidimensional typeseng
dc.titleOptimal auctions with multidimensional types and the desirability of exclusioneng
dc.typeWorking Papereng
dc.subject.areaEconomiapor
dc.contributor.unidadefgvEscolas::EPGEpor
dc.subject.bibliodataEconomiapor
dc.subject.bibliodataLeilões - Modelos econômicospor
dc.contributor.affiliationFGV


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record