Information acquisition design
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In this study, we unwrap information design in two stages, one of information acquisition design and another of communication. We present a framework where one is able to commit to an endogenously designed information acquisition mechanism in the first stage, but not to a communication rule in the second one. For comparison, Bayesian Persuasion contains commitment in both (or only in the second one), and Cheap Talk in none. We provide partial characterizations of equilibria, show how Cheap Talk equilibria can be more simply characterized under our framework, and show how Cheap Talk differs qualitatively from Information Acquisition Design, as we call it. We also ask when we attain the same outcomes as Bayesian Persuasion, and show that whenever Cheap Talk does not achieve that, then neither does Information Acquisition Design. This shows that Bayesian Persuasion envelope results are not robust to a lack of commitment during the communication stage.