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dc.contributor.advisorMoreira, Humberto Ataíde
dc.contributor.authorGottlieb, Daniel
dc.date.accessioned2008-05-13T13:44:17Z
dc.date.available2008-05-13T13:44:17Z
dc.date.issued2004-04-29
dc.date.submitted2004-04-29
dc.identifier.citationGOTTLIEB, Daniel. Two Essays on the economics of Education. Dissertação (Mestrado em Economia) - FGV - Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, 2004.
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10438/268
dc.description.abstractWe develop a job-market signaling model where signals may convey two pieces of information. This model is employed to study the GED exam and countersignaling (signals non-monotonic in ability). A result of the model is that countersignaling is more expected to occur in jobs that require a combination of skills that differs from the combination used in the schooling process. The model also produces testable implications consistent with evidence on the GED: (i) it signals both high cognitive and low non-cognitive skills and (ii) it does not affect wages. Additionally, it suggests modifications that would make the GED a more effective signal.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.titleTwo Essays on the economics of Educationeng
dc.typeDissertationeng
dc.subject.areaEconomiapor
dc.contributor.unidadefgvEscolas::EPGEpor
dc.subject.bibliodataEducação - Aspectos econômicospor
dc.subject.bibliodataEducação - Finançaspor
dc.contributor.affiliationFGV


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