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dc.contributor.authorAngeli, Deivis
dc.date.accessioned2018-08-15T14:06:29Z
dc.date.available2018-08-15T14:06:29Z
dc.date.issued2018-08
dc.identifier.siciTD 481
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10438/24574
dc.description.abstractI analyze a dynamic coordination model under quasi-hyperbolic discounting. The main result is that present bias can induce a society to coordinate efficiently. When considering a transition from network A to B, higher present bias induces individuals to ask for higher relative quality of B, which is also what the central planner dictates, but for different reasons. A present biased agent overvalues relative quality because, when considering whether to initiate a transition, her momentary loss of network externalities is overvalued by myopic discounting. The planner’s motives are the negative externalities inflicted on agents 'stuck' in A during a transition.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEESP - Textos para Discussão; TD 481
dc.subjectDynamic coordinationeng
dc.subjectHyperbolic discountingeng
dc.titleDynamic coordination with network externalites: procrastination can be efficienteng
dc.typeWorking Papereng
dc.subject.areaEconomiapor
dc.contributor.unidadefgvEscolas::EESPpor
dc.subject.bibliodataComportamento humanopor
dc.subject.bibliodataEconomia - Aspectos psicológicospor
dc.subject.bibliodataRedes sociais - Aspectos sociaispor
dc.rights.accessRightsopenAccesseng


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