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dc.contributor.authorGomes, Renato
dc.contributor.authorGottlieb, Daniel
dc.contributor.authorMaestri, Lucas Jóver
dc.date.accessioned2018-05-10T13:37:07Z
dc.date.available2018-05-10T13:37:07Z
dc.date.issued2016-03
dc.identifierhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.02.001
dc.identifier.issn0899-8256
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10438/23584
dc.descriptionConteúdo online de acesso restrito pelo editorpor
dc.description.abstractFirms must strike a delicate balance between the exploitation of well-known business models and the exploration of risky, untested approaches. In this paper, we study financial contracting between an investor and a firm with private information about its returns from exploration and exploitation. The investor-optimal mechanism offers contracts with different tolerance for failures to screen returns from exploitation, and with different exposure to the project's revenues to screen returns from exploration. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for private information about returns from exploration to have zero value to the firm. When these conditions fail, private information about exploration may even decrease the firm's payoff. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.eng
dc.description.sponsorshipMack Center for Technological Innovation at the Wharton School; Dorinda and Mark Winkelman Distinguished Scholar Awardeng
dc.format.extentp. 145-169
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherAcademic Press Inc Elsevier Scienceeng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesGames and economic behavioreng
dc.sourceWeb of Science
dc.subjectAdverse selectioneng
dc.subjectExperimentationeng
dc.subjectBandit problemeng
dc.subjectMulti-dimensional screeningeng
dc.subjectEntrepreneurshipeng
dc.titleExperimentation and project selection: screening and learningeng
dc.typeArticle (Journal/Review)eng
dc.subject.areaEconomiapor
dc.subject.bibliodataEmpreendedorismopor
dc.subject.bibliodataProjetos - Seleçãopor
dc.contributor.affiliationFGV
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.geb.2016.02.001
dc.rights.accessRightsrestrictedAccesseng
dc.identifier.WoS000374621100010


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