Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorAraújo, Aloísio Pessoa de
dc.contributor.authorBerriel, Tiago Couto
dc.contributor.authorSantos, Rafael Chaves
dc.date.accessioned2018-05-10T13:37:02Z
dc.date.available2018-05-10T13:37:02Z
dc.date.issued2016-02
dc.identifierhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/iere.12155
dc.identifier.issn0020-6598
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10438/23555
dc.descriptionConteúdo online de acesso restrito pelo editorpor
dc.description.abstractIn a global games setup with imperfect commitment technology, we show that low targetsthe ones close to the optimal inflation under perfect commitmentare unattainable, leading to a trade-off between low and credible targets. Moreover, since noisy public information helps to coordinate expectations around the announced target, our article supports unconventional policy prescriptions. First, weaker countries need to impose higher targets. Second, less transparency helps to make the announced target credible and then reduces the optimally announced target. Results are based on a general central bank loss function encompassing models traditionally used to discuss central bank decisions.eng
dc.description.sponsorshipFAPERJ; CNPQpor
dc.format.extentp. 255-270
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherWiley-Blackwelleng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesInternational economic revieweng
dc.sourceWeb of Science
dc.subjectPublic informationeng
dc.subjectSocial valueeng
dc.subjectCriseseng
dc.subjectPolicyeng
dc.titleInflation targeting with imperfect informationeng
dc.typeArticle (Journal/Review)eng
dc.subject.areaEconomiapor
dc.subject.bibliodataInflaçãopor
dc.contributor.affiliationFGV
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/iere.12155
dc.rights.accessRightsrestrictedAccesseng
dc.identifier.WoS000370172700010


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record