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dc.contributor.authorMaestri, Lucas Jóver
dc.date.accessioned2018-05-10T13:36:39Z
dc.date.available2018-05-10T13:36:39Z
dc.date.issued2014-09
dc.identifierhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.015
dc.identifier.issn0952-1895 / 1468-0491
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10438/23421
dc.descriptionConteúdo online de acesso restrito pelo editorpor
dc.description.abstractWe study a repeated principal agent model with subjective evaluations. We construct simple bonus-or-terminate incentive schemes. In these schemes, the principal evaluates the agent every T periods. The principal pays a bonus and asks the agent to work for T more periods if the evaluation is positive. The relationship is terminated if the evaluation is negative. The inefficiencies in these schemes vanish as the agent can be more frequently evaluated. This result holds generally under objective or subjective evaluations. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.eng
dc.format.extentp. 412-418
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherAcademic Press Inc Elsevier Scienceeng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesGames and economic behavioreng
dc.sourceWeb of Science
dc.subjectPrincipal-agent modeleng
dc.subjectSubjective evaluationseng
dc.titleThe efficiency of bonus-or-terminate incentive schemes under subjective evaluationseng
dc.typeArticle (Journal/Review)eng
dc.subject.areaEconomiapor
dc.subject.bibliodataIncentivos na administração de pessoalpor
dc.contributor.affiliationFGV
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.015
dc.rights.accessRightsrestrictedAccesseng
dc.identifier.WoS000343391800025


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