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dc.contributor.authorCavalcanti, Ricardo de Oliveira
dc.contributor.authorNosal, Ed
dc.date.accessioned2018-05-10T13:36:05Z
dc.date.available2018-05-10T13:36:05Z
dc.date.issued2011-10
dc.identifierhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1538-4616.2011.00456.x
dc.identifier.issn1531-426X / 1548-2456
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10438/23231
dc.descriptionConteúdo online de acesso restrito pelo editorpor
dc.description.abstractWe describe counterfeiting activity as the issuance of private money, one that is difficult to monitor. Our approach, which amends the basic random-matching model of money in mechanism design, allows a tractable welfare analysis of currency competition. We show that it is not efficient to eliminate counterfeiting activity completely. We do not appeal to lottery devices, and we argue that this is consistent with imperfect monitoring.eng
dc.format.extentp. 625-636
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherWiley-Blackwelleng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesJournal of money credit and bankingeng
dc.sourceWeb of Science
dc.subjectCounterfeitingeng
dc.subjectPrivate moneyeng
dc.subjectImperfect monitoringeng
dc.subjectMechanism designeng
dc.titleCounterfeiting as private money in mechanism designeng
dc.typeArticle (Journal/Review)eng
dc.subject.areaFinançaspor
dc.subject.bibliodataMoeda - Falsificaçãopor
dc.contributor.affiliationFGV
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1538-4616.2011.00456.x
dc.rights.accessRightsrestrictedAccesseng
dc.identifier.WoS000295209200022
dc.identifier.researcheridDiniz, Wagner/M-8410-2014


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