FGV Digital Repository
    • português (Brasil)
    • English
    • español
      Visit:
    • FGV Digital Library
    • FGV Scientific Journals
  • English 
    • português (Brasil)
    • English
    • español
  • Login
View Item 
  •   DSpace Home
  • Produção Intelectual em Bases Externas
  • Documentos Indexados pela Web of Science
  • View Item
  •   DSpace Home
  • Produção Intelectual em Bases Externas
  • Documentos Indexados pela Web of Science
  • View Item
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

Browse

All of DSpaceFGV Communities & CollectionsAuthorsAdvisorSubjectTitlesBy Issue DateKeywordsThis CollectionAuthorsAdvisorSubjectTitlesBy Issue DateKeywords

My Account

LoginRegister

Statistics

View Usage Statistics

Regulatory dualism as a development strategy: corporate reform in Brazil, the United States, and the European Union

Thumbnail
View/Open
000288883900001.PDF (9.295Mb)
Date
2011-03
Author
Gilson, Ronald J.
Hansmann, Henry
Pargendler, Mariana
Metadata
Show full item record
Abstract
Countries pursuing economic development confront a fundamental obstacle. Reforms that increase the size of the overall pie are blocked by powerful interests that are threatened by the growth-inducing changes. This problem is conspicuous in efforts to create effective capital markets to support economic development. Controlling owners and managers of established firms successfully oppose corporate governance reforms that would improve investor protection and promote capital market growth. In this Article, we examine the promise of regulatory dualism as a strategy to defuse the tension between future growth and the current distribution of wealth and power. Regulatory dualism seeks to mitigate political opposition to reforms by permitting the existing business elite to be governed by the old regime, while allowing other firms to be regulated by a new parallel regime that is more efficient. Regulatory dualism goes beyond similar but simpler strategies, such as grandfathering and statutory menus, by incorporating a dynamic element that is key to its effectiveness, hut that requires a sophisticated approach to implementation. A paradigmatic example of regulatory dualism is offered by Brazil's Novo Mercado (New Market). a voluntary premium segment within the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange that allows companies to commit credibly to significant protection of minority shareholders without imposing reform on companies controlled by the established elite. Yet regulatory dualism as a strategy for capital market reform is not Unique to Brazil, nor is it suited just to developing countries. The long-standing U.S. approach to state-level corporate chartering is arguably better understood as incorporating a form of regulatory dualism than as is the custom as an example of regulatory competition. and the same can be said of EU corporate law post-Centros. The dramatic failure of Germany's Neuer Markt illustrates some oldie pitfalls of regulatory dualism. thoughtfully deployed however. regulatory dualism holds promise in overcoming political barriers to reform, not just of corporate governance and capital markets, but of other economic institutions as well.
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10438/23208
Collections
  • Documentos Indexados pela Web of Science [875]
Knowledge Areas
Direito
Subject
Desenvolvimento econômico
Keyword
Mandatory bid rule
Investor protection
Takeover statutes
Political-economy
Stock-market
Law
Governance

DSpace software copyright © 2002-2016  DuraSpace
Contact Us | Send Feedback
Theme by 
@mire NV
 

 


DSpace software copyright © 2002-2016  DuraSpace
Contact Us | Send Feedback
Theme by 
@mire NV
 

 

Import Metadata