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dc.contributor.authorCavalcanti, Ricardo de Oliveira
dc.contributor.authorErosa, Andrés
dc.date.accessioned2018-05-10T13:35:42Z
dc.date.available2018-05-10T13:35:42Z
dc.date.issued2008-09
dc.identifierhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.10.002
dc.identifier.issn0147-5479 / 1471-6445
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10438/23103
dc.descriptionConteúdo online de acesso restrito pelo editorpor
dc.description.abstractWe study optimal allocations in an environment in which money is essential due to lack of commitment and anonymity of individuals. Because the economy features aggregate preference shocks, we apply a notion of implementability that allows for allocations with non-trivial business-cycle dynamics for the propagation of shocks. We show that history dependence is predicted by the theory of second best and becomes necessary for optimality when the degree of patience is neither too low nor too high. Our analysis concludes with a discussion of whether there is a role for the propagation of shocks in alternative economic environments. (C) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.eng
dc.format.extentp. 128-148
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherAcademic Press Inc Elsevier Scienceeng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesJournal of economic theoryeng
dc.sourceWeb of Science
dc.subjectSearcheng
dc.subjectMoneyeng
dc.subjectCycleseng
dc.subjectOptimaeng
dc.subjectPropagation of shockseng
dc.subjectMatching modeleng
dc.subjectExchangeeng
dc.titleEfficient propagation of shocks and the optimal return on moneyeng
dc.typeArticle (Journal/Review)eng
dc.subject.areaEconomiapor
dc.subject.bibliodataCapital (Economia)por
dc.contributor.affiliationFGV
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jet.2006.10.002
dc.rights.accessRightsrestrictedAccesseng
dc.identifier.WoS000259655800007
dc.identifier.orcidErosa, Andres/0000-0002-1594-4421
dc.identifier.researcheridErosa, Andres/H-8516-2015


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