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dc.contributor.authorBraido, Luís Henrique Bertolino
dc.date.accessioned2018-05-10T13:35:33Z
dc.date.available2018-05-10T13:35:33Z
dc.date.issued2005-07
dc.identifierhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0492-6
dc.identifier.issn1092-7026 / 1099-1743
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10438/23055
dc.descriptionConteúdo online de acesso restrito pelo editorpor
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies a class of general equilibrium economies in which the individuals' endowments depend on privately observed effort choices and the financial markets are endogenous. The environment is modeled as a two-stage game. Individuals first make strategic financial-innovation decisions. They then act in a Radner-type economy with the previously designed securities. Consumption goods, portfolios, and effort levels are chosen competitively (i.e., taking prices as given). An equilibrium concept is adapted for these moral hazard economies and its existence is proven. It is shown through an example how incentive motives might lead to the endogenous emergence of financial incompleteness.eng
dc.format.extentp. 85-101
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherSpringereng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEconomic theoryeng
dc.sourceWeb of Science
dc.subjectGeneral equilibriumeng
dc.subjectMoral hazardeng
dc.subjectEndogenous incomplete marketseng
dc.subjectNon-exclusive securitieseng
dc.subjectImproving financial innovationeng
dc.subjectIncomplete marketseng
dc.subjectAsymmetric informationeng
dc.subjectCompetitive equilibriaeng
dc.subjectEconomieseng
dc.titleGeneral equilibrium with endogenous securities and moral hazardeng
dc.typeArticle (Journal/Review)eng
dc.subject.areaEconomiapor
dc.subject.bibliodataRisco moralpor
dc.subject.bibliodataEquilíbrio econômicopor
dc.contributor.affiliationFGV
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00199-004-0492-6
dc.rights.accessRightsrestrictedAccesseng
dc.identifier.WoS000225523500003


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