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dc.contributor.authorPitchford, Rohan
dc.date.accessioned2014-10-31T11:06:54Z
dc.date.available2014-10-31T11:06:54Z
dc.date.issued2000-08-24
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10438/12300
dc.description.abstractWe construct a model in which a first mover decides on its location before it knows the identity of the second mover; joint location results in a negative extemality. Contracts are inherently incomplete since the first mover's initial decision cannot be specified. We analyze several kinds of rights, including damages, injunctions, and rights to exclude (arising from covenants or land ownership). There are cases in which allocating any of these basic rights to the first mover-i.e., first-party rights-is dominated by second-party rights, and cases in which the reverse is true. A Coasian result (efficiency regardless of the rights allocation) only holds under a limited set of conditions. As corollaries of a theorem ranking the basic rights regimes, a number of results emerge contradicting conventional wisdom, including the relative inefficiency of concentrated land ownership and the relevance of the generator's identity. We conclude with a mechanism and a new rights regime that each yield the first best in all cases.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherEscola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGVpor
dc.relation.ispartofseriesSeminários de pesquisa econômica da EPGEpor
dc.rightsTodo cuidado foi dispensado para respeitar os direitos autorais deste trabalho. Entretanto, caso esta obra aqui depositada seja protegida por direitos autorais externos a esta instituição, contamos com a compreensão do autor e solicitamos que o mesmo faça contato através do Fale Conosco para que possamos tomar as providências cabíveispor
dc.titleIncomplete contracts and the problem of social harmeng
dc.typeWorking Papereng
dc.subject.areaEconomiapor
dc.contributor.unidadefgvEscolas::EPGEpor
dc.subject.bibliodataExternalidades (Economia)por
dc.subject.bibliodataOrganização industrial (Teoria econômica)por
dc.contributor.affiliationFGV


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