https://hdl.handle.net/10438/19322 Fri, 05 Nov 2021 20:47:48 GMT 2021-11-05T20:47:48Z https://hdl.handle.net/10438/27985 Building effective collaboration between health systems and the life sciences industry Fonseca, Elize Massard da; Teixeira, Mariana Ramos; Costa, Nilson do Rosario This viewpoint article reflects on the challenges of promoting affordable and innovative medicines whilst fostering a competitive environment for research and development in developing countries. We explore the life sciences industrial policies of Brazil and the United Kingdom in order to identify mechanisms and conditions that could serve as lessons to practitioners in other countries. We suggest three crucial design attributes: a strategic collaboration between a health system and the private sector, coordination and accountability mechanisms, and a network of support (that is, embeddedness). Fri, 30 Aug 2019 00:00:00 GMT https://hdl.handle.net/10438/27985 2019-08-30T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10438/27984 Teaching qualitative research methods in political science: does one size fits all? Fonseca, Elize Massard da; Segatto, Catarina Ianni Despite the relevance of qualitative methods in political science, the process of teaching qualitative research has received relatively little attention in the literature. What is it like to teach qualitative research in political science? This paper focuses on the teaching of qualitative research by exploring examples from Brazil. The country is home to some of the largest higher education providers of political science in Latin America; however, the teaching of appropriate research methods is still incomplete. This paper identifies challenges to qualitative methods education in the country and its evolution. It provides lessons about the teaching of qualitative methods that can be relevant to educators in less institutionalized political science departments, to non-English speaking learners, and to Global South scholars. Sun, 01 Sep 2019 00:00:00 GMT https://hdl.handle.net/10438/27984 2019-09-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10438/20157 A rotatividade dos servidores de confiança no Governo Federal Brasileiro, 2010-2011 Praça, Sérgio; Freitas, Andréa Marcondes de; Hoepers, Bruno What are the determinants of turnover among political appointees in the Brazilian federal government? This article shows that a change in minister does not necessarily entail change among political appointees, although this is true for higher‑level appointees with policymaking tasks. Contrary to initial expectations, we find that agencies affected by corruption scandals have lower turnover than other agencies. We argue that it is necessary to consider the policy expertise of appointees, measured as longevity in civil service, in order to understand bureaucratic turnover. Further research on political appointees and their relationships with politi‑ cal parties and ministers in Brazil will likely shedlight on important, yet neglected, aspects of the political system.; Quais fatores determinam a rotatividade dos servidores de confiança do governo federal brasileiro? Este artigo mostra que mudanças partidárias na direção dos ministérios não neces‑ sariamente se traduzem em mudanças na composição dos cargos de confiança. Funcionários de confiança com funções de policymaking são mais afetados pela mudança de ministro do que os demais. Além disso, órgãos afetados por escândalos de corrupção tiveram uma taxa de permanência de seus funcionários de confiança maior do que a dos demais órgãos. Fica evidente a necessidade de considerar a policy expertise dos funcionários, medida em tempo de serviço público, para entender a rotatividade. O artigo aponta para a pertinência de estudar as relações “Executivo‑Executivo” no Brasil. Thu, 01 Nov 2012 00:00:00 GMT https://hdl.handle.net/10438/20157 2012-11-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10438/20155 Hybrid political institutions and governability: the budgetary process in Brazil Pereira Filho, Carlos Eduardo Ferreira; Orellana, Salomon In this paper we take a close look at some of the particular pathways by which majoritarian and consensual institutions affect governability. We demonstrate that the mix of majoritarian and consensual institutions found within a country can influence these pathways quite dramatically, such that they produce rather different consequences for governability, even when these pathways are relatively similar in nature. Particularly, we focus on the rules governing the relationship between the President and the Legislature, especially the appropriation of amendments proposed by legislators. In some presidential countries, the President possesses a partial veto (or a line-item veto), which allows him/her to approve or strike appropriations, which legislators introduce in amendments. Concentrating on the case of Brazil, we argue and demonstrate that whether or not the President can use this tool to sustain governing majorities (i.e., to increase governability) depends on the kind of amendment to the budget introduced by legislators. One kind, individual amendment, is linked to the majoritarian institution of a powerful presidency and therefore helps to increase governability. A second kind, collective amendment, is linked to consensual institutions and actually does not enhance legislative support for the Executive.; Nesse artigo é dedicada especial atenção às trajetórias pelas quais instituições majoritárias e consensuais afetam governabilidade. É demonstrado que distintas combinações de instituições majoritárias e consensuais afetam diferentemente as estruturas de governabilidade de um determinado país, mesmo quando essas instituições têm naturezas similares. São analisadas as regras que regulam as relações entre o executivo e o legislativo, em especial a execução das emendas orçamentárias dos parlamentares. Em alguns regimes presidencialistas, o Presidente dispõe de veto parcial, o que lhe permite a aprovação ou bloqueio da execução de emendas introduzidas pelos legisladores. Através da análise do caso brasileiro, é argumentado que a habilidade do Presidente de se utilizar da execução de emendas como uma ferramenta de formação de maiorias depende da natureza da própria emenda: individual ou coletiva. É demonstrado que emendas individuais servem como uma ferramenta fundamental para construção de maiorias, o que propicia maior governabilidade. Por outro lado, emendas coletivas, por terem uma natureza consensual, não propiciam aumento de suporte legislativo em favor do executivo. Thu, 01 Jan 2009 00:00:00 GMT https://hdl.handle.net/10438/20155 2009-01-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10438/20154 Vertical transfers and the appropriation of resources by the bureaucracy: the case of Brazilian state governments Moura Neto, João Silva; Marconi, Nelson; Palombo, Paulo Eduardo Moledo; Arvate, Paulo Roberto The Brazilian grant system was built by the federal government aiming to reduce economic and social inequalities in the federation, by transferring income from rich states to poor states. However, due to the lack of control and mechanisms for assessing the use of this public resource, these transfers may be appropriated by the bureaucracy as wage increases, for example. In order to observe this appropriation, we use the wage differential between the public and private sector in the states as a proxy, which is calculated using the technique developed by Oaxaca (1973). We do not use the ratio between wage expenses and total current expenses as proxy, because the results of this measure show no significant differences between rich and poor states. Our initial estimation was made with yearly panel data from 1995 to 2004, using the least squares dummy variables method (LSDV).; O sistema de transferências estruturado pelo governo federal visa reduzir as disparidades econômicas e sociais na federação através da transferência de renda dos estados mais ricos para os mais pobres. Entretanto, dada a ausência de controles e mecanismos que permitam a identificação do uso destes recursos públicos, estas transferências podem ser apropriadas pela burocracia na forma de aumentos salariais, por exemplo. Com o intuito de analisar esta apropriação, adotamos os diferenciais de salário entre o setor público e privado nos estados como uma proxy, os quais foram calculados usando a técnica desenvolvida por Oaxaca (1973). Nós não adotamos a relação entre gastos com pessoal e despesas correntes porque os resultados deste cálculo não indicaram diferenças significativas entre estados pobres e ricos. Nossa estimativa inicial foi feita a partir de dados de painel anuais, para o período entre 1995 e 2004, usando o método de mínimos quadrados com variáveis dummy. Sun, 01 Jan 2006 00:00:00 GMT https://hdl.handle.net/10438/20154 2006-01-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10438/20152 On the marginal social cost of cash-cum-in-kind transfers Duarte, Lucas Monteiro; Mattos, Enlinson; Serillo, Juliana Aranha This paper investigates the marginal social cost of cash-cum-in-kind transfers (MSCKT). Based on a generalization of Wildasin (1984), we characterize that the marginal social cost of public funds depends on the relation between labor supply and the cash-cum-in-kind transfers. To estimate the response of labor supply to these publicly provided goods, and simulate the MSCKT for Brazil, we use the Brazilian household data survey in 2004. Our simulations suggest that MSCKT can increases up to 14% if compared to cases in which cash-cum-in-kind transfers have their effects ignored on labor supply response on the part of individuals. Tue, 01 Jan 2008 00:00:00 GMT https://hdl.handle.net/10438/20152 2008-01-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10438/20150 Poverty, informality and the optimal general income tax policy Arbex, Marcelo Aarestru; Mattos, Enlinson; Trudeau, Christian This paper investigates the optimal general income tax and audit policies when poverty is considered a public bad in an economy with two types of individuals whose income may not be observed. Our results depend on whether poverty is measured in absolute or in relative terms. For a relative poverty measure, it is possible to characterize conditions under which both rich and poor agents face either positive, negative or zero marginal tax rates. There is distortion at the top as long as the rich can ináuence the welfare of the whole society through a measure of poverty and a distortion might be optimum to reduce aggregate poverty. Those that declare to be rich can be audited randomly, similar to their counterpart poor ones. Lastly, honesty may be punished as well as rewarded. With an absolute poverty measure, we replicate the results in the optimum tax literature, i.e., "no distortion and no auditing at the top". Sun, 01 Jan 2012 00:00:00 GMT https://hdl.handle.net/10438/20150 2012-01-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10438/20149 Distribuição regional do crédito bancário e convergência no crescimento estadual brasileiro Alexandre, Michel; Biderman, Ciro; Lima, Gilberto Tadeu The aim of this paper is to analyze the convergence in the growth rates among Brazilian States in the period 1988-2001. In addition to the traditional variables used in the studies about convergence, Brazilian States credit indicators were included, which is the very innovation of this study. The results show that, in general, credit increases the speed of convergence, although some kinds of directed credit generate the inverse effect. This suggests that credit has a positive impact in the growth of Brazilian States. Furthermore, the credit variable that was more effective in the convergence analysis is loans and bonds discounted in relation to the State income. As it turns out, this variable is likely to be a suitable proxy for the level of financial development of a State.; O objetivo deste trabalho é analisar a convergência no crescimento entre os Estados brasileiros de 1988-2001. Além das variáveis tradicionalmente utilizadas em trabalhos de convergência, foram incluídos indicadores de oferta de crédito nos Estados, o que se constituiu na inovação deste artigo. Os resultados mostram que, em geral, o crédito aumenta a velocidade de convergência, ainda que alguns tipos de crédito direcionado gerem o efeito inverso. Isso sugere que alguns tipos de crédito tem um impacto positivo sobre o crescimento estadual. Em particular, a variável de crédito que se mostrou mais relevante na análise de convergência foi a proporção dos empréstimos e títulos descontados em relação à renda Estadual. Assim, esta variável pode vir a ser uma proxy adequada para o grau de desenvolvimento financeiro de um Estado. Thu, 01 Jan 2004 00:00:00 GMT https://hdl.handle.net/10438/20149 2004-01-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10438/20148 Dry law and homicides: evidence from the São Paulo metropolitan area Biderman, Ciro; Mello, João Manoel Pinho de; Schneider, Alexandre Alves We use time-series and cross-section variation in adoption of dry laws in the São Paulo Metropolitan Area (SPMA) to measure the impact of recreational consumption of alcohol on violent behavior. Adoption of dry laws causes a 10% reduction in homicides. As auxiliary evidence, we show a similar reduction in battery and deaths by car accidents. Thu, 01 Jan 2009 00:00:00 GMT https://hdl.handle.net/10438/20148 2009-01-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10438/20147 Delegation dilemmas: coalition size, electoral risk, and regulatory design in new democracies Pereira Filho, Carlos Eduardo Ferreira; Melo, Marcus André B. C. de; Werneck, Heitor Franco This paper investigates determinants of regulatory agency design in multiparty coalition governments. Current research has mainly focused on US institutions and its findings are therefore context specific. We find electoral uncertainty, government turnover, and coalition size are key to explaining the bureaucratic autonomy with reference to the 31 state regulatory agencies that have been recently created at the subnational level in Brazil. Legislative support enjoyed by chief executives only acquires explanatory power when interacted with government turnover. Because governors have great ability in building oversized majority coalition, coalition strength influences the governor’s choice when he/she faces credible threats from rival elite groups. Thu, 01 Jan 2009 00:00:00 GMT https://hdl.handle.net/10438/20147 2009-01-01T00:00:00Z