Browsing by Author "Melo, Marcus André B. C. de"
Now showing items 1-16 of 16
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Brazil in transition: beliefs, leadership, and institutional change
2016-05Brazil is the world’s sixth-largest economy, and for the first three-quarters of the twentieth century was one of the fastest-growing countries in the world. While the country underwent two decades of unrelenting decline ... -
Changing social contracts: beliefs and Brazil
2013-02Alston, Lee J., Melo, Marcus Andre, Mueller, Bernardo, and Pereira, Carlos-Changing social contracts: Beliefs and dissipative inclusion in Brazil We link a model of inequality and redistribution where multiple steady states ... -
Changing social contracts: Beliefs and dissipative inclusion in Brazil
2013We link a model of inequality and redistribution where multiple steady states can emerge, to the recent literature on beliefs, and argue that changes in beliefs may shift the equilibrium over time. We present evidence that ... -
Coalition management under divided/unified government
2016If the opposite of pro is con, then the opposite of progress must be the Congress,' says a popular joke about the divided government in the US two-party presidential regime. Divided government occurs when different political ... -
The corruption-enhancing role of re-election incentives? Counterintuitive evidence from Brazil's audit reports
2009-12Traditional wisdom on the effect of re-election on incumbent performance is that first-term politicians refrain from rent extraction because they want to be re-elected. The authors find no evidence to support this belief. ... -
Delegation dilemmas: coalition size, electoral risk, and regulatory design in new democracies
2009This paper investigates determinants of regulatory agency design in multiparty coalition governments. Current research has mainly focused on US institutions and its findings are therefore context specific. We find electoral ... -
Delegation dilemmas: coalition size, electoral risk, and regulatory governance in new democracies
2010-02This article addresses the determinants of regulatory agency design in multiparty-coalition governments. Previous research has mainly focused on U.S. institutions, producing context-specific findings. We found electoral ... -
Las elecciones que hacen los gobernadores: los roles de los “checks and balances” y la competencia política
2009States usually differ markedly in terms of public goods provision and corruption. Why are some state governments able to provide adequate health and education services, but others tend to specialize in the provision of ... -
Political and institutional checks on corruption explaining the performance of Brazilian audit institutions
2009-09This article investigates the performance determinants of accountability institutions in new democracies. Current scholarship on accountability has identified a distinct mechanism through which the introduction of political ... -
The political economy of fiscal reform in Brazil: the rationale for the suboptimal equilibrium
2009-03This project examines fiscal reforms in Brazil since the 90s, focusing on the varying reform outcomes in the area of taxation, budgeting, and fiscal federalism. While there has been an extensive reorganization of fiscal ... -
The political economy of productivity in Brazil
2010-03This paper explores the link between Brazil’s political institutions and its disappointing productivity and growth in recent decades. Although political institutions provide the president with incentives and the instruments ... -
The predatory or virtuous choices governors make: the roles of checks and balances and political competition
2008States usually differ markedly in terms of public goods provision and corruption. Why are some state governments able to provide adequate health and education services, but others tend to specialize in the provision of ... -
Reelecting corrupt incumbents in exchange for public goods: rouba mas faz in Brazil
2015This article addresses the paradox of unpopular corruption and popular corrupt politicians. It explores why corrupt politicians are reelected, paying particular attention to incumbent provision of public goods and voter ... -
Why countries transition? The case of Brazil, 1964-2016
2016-06Economic and political development are contextual. Nevertheless, there are some general elements in the process of institutional persistence and change. We present a framework that goes beyond the standard institutional ... -
Why do some governments resort to 'creative accounting' but not others? Fiscal governance in the Brazilian federation
2014-11This paper investigates the determinants of compliance with fiscal rules. Using information from 27 Brazilian state governments, the paper shows that the level of political competition and the degree of political autonomy ...
