Browsing by Author "Maestri, Lucas Jóver"
Now showing items 1-11 of 11
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Banning information as a redistributive device
2004-07-01In this paper we analyze the optimality of allowing firms to observe signals of workers’ characteristics in an optimal taxation framework. We show that it is always optimal to prohibit signals that disclose information ... -
Dynamic contracting under adverse selection and renegotiation
2017We study the effects of renegotiation in an infinitely-repeated screening model with long-term contracts. We propose a simple and tractable recursive formulation to study equilibria in which the monopolist's profit is ... -
The efficiency of bonus-or-terminate incentive schemes under subjective evaluations
2014-09We study a repeated principal agent model with subjective evaluations. We construct simple bonus-or-terminate incentive schemes. In these schemes, the principal evaluates the agent every T periods. The principal pays a ... -
Experimentation and project selection: screening and learning
2016-03Firms must strike a delicate balance between the exploitation of well-known business models and the exploration of risky, untested approaches. In this paper, we study financial contracting between an investor and a firm ... -
Optimal Mirrleesian taxation in non-competitive labor markets
2015-12We study optimal labor income taxation in non-competitive labor markets. Firms offer screening contracts to workers who have private information about their productivity. A planner endowed with a Paretian social welfare ... -
Redistribution with labor market frictions
How should search frictions in the labor market affect distributive policies? Can we assess current real-world policies? After building a framework for answering these questions we show that any constrained efficient ... -
Redistribution with labor markets frictions
2017How does the presence of labor market frictions change optimal redistributive policies? Embedding an otherwise standard Mirrlees’ (1971) economy in a directed search environment we show that optimal Utilitarian (and Rawlsian) ... -
The risk-properties of human capital and the design of government policies
2004-07-01Whether human capital increases or decreases wage uncertainty is an open question from an empirical standpoint. Yet, most policy prescriptions regarding human capital formation are based on models that impose riskiness on ... -
The role of commitment in bilateral trade
2014This paper characterizes the set of equilibrium payoffs in bargaining with interdependent values when the informed party makes all offers, as discounting vanishes. The seller of a good is informed of its quality, which ... -
Two essays on education and governament policies
2005-06-01Whether human capital increases or decreases wage uncertainty is an open ques- tion from an empirical standpoint. Yet, most policy prescriptions regarding human capital formation are based on models that impose riskiness ...
