Now showing items 1-11 of 11

    • Banning information as a redistributive device 

      Gottlieb, Daniel; Maestri, Lucas Jóver
      2004-07-01
      In this paper we analyze the optimality of allowing firms to observe signals of workers’ characteristics in an optimal taxation framework. We show that it is always optimal to prohibit signals that disclose information ...
    • Dynamic contracting under adverse selection and renegotiation 

      Maestri, Lucas Jóver
      2017
      We study the effects of renegotiation in an infinitely-repeated screening model with long-term contracts. We propose a simple and tractable recursive formulation to study equilibria in which the monopolist's profit is ...
    • The efficiency of bonus-or-terminate incentive schemes under subjective evaluations 

      Maestri, Lucas Jóver
      2014-09
      We study a repeated principal agent model with subjective evaluations. We construct simple bonus-or-terminate incentive schemes. In these schemes, the principal evaluates the agent every T periods. The principal pays a ...
    • Experimentation and project selection: screening and learning 

      Gomes, Renato; Gottlieb, Daniel; Maestri, Lucas Jóver
      2016-03
      Firms must strike a delicate balance between the exploitation of well-known business models and the exploration of risky, untested approaches. In this paper, we study financial contracting between an investor and a firm ...
    • The interaction between unemployment insurance and human capital policies 

      Costa, Carlos Eugênio da; Maestri, Lucas Jóver
      2005-07-01
    • Optimal Mirrleesian taxation in non-competitive labor markets 

      Costa, Carlos Eugênio da; Maestri, Lucas Jóver
      2015-12
      We study optimal labor income taxation in non-competitive labor markets. Firms offer screening contracts to workers who have private information about their productivity. A planner endowed with a Paretian social welfare ...
    • Redistribution with labor market frictions 

      Costa, Carlos Eugênio da; Maestri, Lucas Jóver; Santos, Marcelo Rodrigues dos
      How should search frictions in the labor market affect distributive policies? Can we assess current real-world policies? After building a framework for answering these questions we show that any constrained efficient ...
    • Redistribution with labor markets frictions 

      Costa, Carlos Eugênio da; Maestri, Lucas Jóver; Santos, Marcelo Rodrigues dos
      2017
      How does the presence of labor market frictions change optimal redistributive policies? Embedding an otherwise standard Mirrlees’ (1971) economy in a directed search environment we show that optimal Utilitarian (and Rawlsian) ...
    • The risk-properties of human capital and the design of government policies 

      Costa, Carlos Eugênio da; Maestri, Lucas Jóver
      2004-07-01
      Whether human capital increases or decreases wage uncertainty is an open question from an empirical standpoint. Yet, most policy prescriptions regarding human capital formation are based on models that impose riskiness on ...
    • The role of commitment in bilateral trade 

      Gerardi, Dino; Hörner, Johannes; Maestri, Lucas Jóver
      2014
      This paper characterizes the set of equilibrium payoffs in bargaining with interdependent values when the informed party makes all offers, as discounting vanishes. The seller of a good is informed of its quality, which ...
    • Two essays on education and governament policies 

      Maestri, Lucas Jóver
      2005-06-01
      Whether human capital increases or decreases wage uncertainty is an open ques- tion from an empirical standpoint. Yet, most policy prescriptions regarding human capital formation are based on models that impose riskiness ...