Now showing items 1-6 of 6

    • Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions 

      Carrasco, Vinicius; Luz, Vitor Farinha; Kos, Nenad; Messner, Matthias; Monteiro, P. K.; Moreira, Humberto Ataíde
      2017-04-08
      We study the revenue maximization problem of a seller who is partially informed about the distribution of buyer's valuations, only knowing its first N moments. The seller chooses the mechanism generating the best revenue ...
    • The private memory of aggregate shocks 

      Costa, Carlos Eugênio da; Luz, Vitor Farinha
      2010-07-10
      We study constrained efficient aggregate risk sharing and its consequence for the behavior of macro-aggregates in a dynamic Mirrlees’s (1971) setting. Privately observed idiosyncratic productivity shocks are assumed to be ...
    • The private memory of aggregate shocks 

      Luz, Vitor Farinha
      2009-08-07
      In economies characterized by both aggregate and privately observed idiosyn- cratic risks we show that constrained e¢cient allocations may display non-trivial dependence on aggregate shocks. Using two period versions of ...
    • The private memory of aggregate uncertainty 

      Costa, Carlos Eugênio da; Luz, Vitor Farinha
      2011-05
      Apresentação do palestrante Carlos Eugênio da Costa - FGV EPGE no contexto do evento "Advances in Macroeconomics". Mais informações em: https://eventosepge.fgv.br/pt/evento/105/epge-promove-encontro-internacional-para-deb ...
    • The private memory of aggregate uncertainty 

      Costa, Carlos Eugênio da; Luz, Vitor Farinha
      2012-04-16
      We investigate social insurance in a dynamic Mirrlees' (1971) economy for which each agent's labor market productivity is the product of her stochastic and privately observed ability and an aggregate, publicly observed, ...
    • Robust mechanisms: the curvature case 

      Carrasco, Vinicius; Luz, Vitor Farinha; Monteiro, Paulo K.; Moreira, Humberto
      2018
      This paper considers the problem of a Principal who faces a privately informed Agent and only knows one moment of the type’s distribution. Preferences are nonlinear in the allocation, and the Principal maximizes her ...