

POLICY PAPER 2

# BOTS, SOCIAL NETWORKS AND POLITICS IN BRAZIL

Interference of automated profiles and political actors in the Brazilian electoral debate

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**Policy Paper 2**

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# **Bots, social networks and politics in Brazil**

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Interference of automated profiles and political actors  
in the Brazilian electoral debate

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

**FGV DAPP**

2018

# SUMMARY

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# 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- Bot activity in social networks has affected Latin America political contexts on a regular basis for years, similarly to its already proven interference in other countries such as France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
- In Brazil, the activity of automated profiles on Twitter had already been found in post sharing during the electoral campaign of Aécio Neves, Marina Silva, and Dilma Rousseff, the main presidential candidates of 2014.
- Based on data collected from October to December 2017, this survey identified mentions published by Argentine and Venezuelan accounts – associated with left-aligned parties of their countries – interacting with the main Brazilian political actors’ official accounts, by retweeting, replying or mentioning their profiles. These accounts are active and can be used at any moment. Their last post is from December 18, 2017. In 2014, we investigated the presence of bots apparently from Russia acting with presidential candidates’ profiles.
- In the two moments of the Brazilian political debate we have already studied, we found different elements of evidence of foreign interferences, based on the configuration of bot networks organized according to specific standards. Therefore, independent methods were applied to map the origins and features of automated accounts in each period analyzed.
- The continuous presence of bot networks associated with different political positions from different countries and parties highlights the importance of continuously verifying external digital activities on the web on organic debates of each society. This verification is necessary especially in electoral contexts, in which the use of automated profiles may actively impact on the democratic process.
- The use of artificial networks to disseminate content also causes concerns due to its capacity to spread fake news and inaccurate or harmful information on candidates and political agendas.

## 2. GENERAL OVERVIEW

The use of bots and fake profiles to distort the political debate on social networks by spreading disinformation and fake news has already been identified in different countries around the world. In Brazil, it has impacted on the legitimacy of the electoral process since the 2014 elections, at least.

This phenomenon continuously affects the conduct of topics of interest to societies that stand out on the web, such as opinions about strongly impacting economic and political agendas. It also aims to affect the relationship between countries. The interference of foreign agents with debates through social networks has been broadly documented, particularly in the United States. During the 2016 US presidential campaigns, bots and profiles that spread fake news, which seemed to be from Russian, were identified.

In Brazil, FGV DAPP identified the presence of illegitimate interferences on the web in 2014. It identified Russian profiles that shared messages related to the presidential campaigns of the following candidates: Aécio Neves, Marina Silva, and Dilma Rousseff. This survey collected data from October to December 2017 and identified accounts (suspected to be) from Venezuela and Argentina. They were related to political profiles of the PT party within an interaction network that remained inactive during the months leading up to the beginning of the Brazilian electoral campaign.

During the 2018 Brazilian electoral campaign, the concerns about the flow of misinformation – either by the sharing of fake news or of news that harm candidates, or by the manipulation of agendas and organic debates on social networks – became again the center of the political attention. The results of the first round of the elections, for both Congress and Executive offices, show the current significant impact of open and private social networks on campaigns and on persuading voters. They were even more important than other traditional resources, such as the time of propaganda on TV and the party capillarity of tickets and alliances.

By placing themselves again in a central position concerning the articulation of political speeches, social networks – Twitter, YouTube, WhatsApp and Facebook – identified the intense use of non-verified information shared in an accelerated flow by other networks not directly linked to politics or their campaigns. Fake news and traditional sources of journalistic content dispute space, reach and voters' confidence. This new FGV DAPP document gives an updated

overview of evidence on how current strategies of misinformation on the web work. They are working as they have always been, and as influential as ever.

## 2.1 ANALYSIS RESULTS OF THE INFLUENCE OF AUTOMATED PROFILES ON THE 2014 ELECTIONS<sup>1</sup>

- A study on the main Brazilian presidential candidates in 2014 identified a botnet of 699 automated profiles (a “subnet” of all bots identified by FGV DAPP in the period) that shared content from the campaigns of Aécio Neves (PSDB) and Marina Silva (former PSB) in 2014.
- In the same database of the 2014 elections, we also evaluated the automated accounts interacting with the campaign of the former president Dilma Rousseff (PT). The analysis identified a botnet of 430 accounts (another “subnet”) that shared the link for the website “Muda Mais” and 79 accounts that shared the link of Dilma’s website ([www.dilma.com.br](http://www.dilma.com.br)).
- The analysis revealed, in summary, links between (1) companies that provided services to the candidacy and campaign of Aécio, Marina, and Dilma and (2) campaign websites, whose content was shared by botnets in the campaigns of Aécio Neves, Marina Silva, and Dilma Rousseff.
- The analysis of patterns of images, texts, and locations listed in the bots of Aécio Neves’s campaign indicates that services were potentially purchased and/or produced abroad, especially in Russia. With the public funding planned for 2018, the use of bots to disseminate fake news can affect the democratic process considering the Brazilian Union’s resources.

## 2.2 ANALYSIS RESULTS OF THE INFLUENCE OF AUTOMATED PROFILES ON THE 2018 ELECTIONS

- We evaluated posts on Twitter about the 2018 presidential hopefuls based on data collected from October to September 2018.

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<sup>1</sup>RUEDIGER, M. A. et al. Bots, Networks, and Politics in Brazil: an analysis on the interference of automated profiles in the 2014 elections. Policy Paper. Rio de Janeiro: FGV DAPP, 2018. <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1BluJ1Yej27Y1zFqFfLnz9dBBV0IGckRmhrL4HWe2244/edit>

- After analyzing the database, we identified the use of the generator Pktweet, which published 108 tweets by means of seven accounts. These seven profiles were identified as suspects because their characteristics prove their Venezuelan origin. In fact, these profiles retweeted publications from former president Lula's official account on Twitter (@lulaoficial).
- We also identified the use of the generator "Seesmic for Blueberry", which published 79 tweets by means of 79 accounts. These accounts generated a total of 15,890 interactions: 11,043 retweets, 3,609 replies, and 1,238 tweets. After analyzing these 79 profiles, we identified that most of them publish the same messages, creating networks of automated accounts (botnets). Due to the characteristics of the accounts, it is possible to affirm that they operate in Argentina.
- Based on the results obtained with the activity of profiles outside Brazil retweeting or mentioning Brazilian presidential hopefuls, we compared automated profiles that mentioned South American political actors.
- This study highlights two types of activity of these suspect external profiles that influence the Brazilian political debate:
  - Automated profiles that retweet an external political actor that talks about some Brazilian political actor;
  - External automated profiles that directly influence the Brazilian political debate.

### 3. ANALYSIS OF THE INFLUENCE OF BOTNETS ON THE 2018 ELECTIONS PUBLIC DEBATE

According to the bot detection methodology of *Bots, Social Networks and Politics in Brazil* (RUEDIGER, 2017), two criteria may be used to identify automated profiles on Twitter: accounts that publish consecutive tweets in less than one second, at least two times, and accounts that use automation platforms to produce publications on social networks.

Every post published on Twitter and collected by FGV DAPP have several metadata. These metadata are information on the data collected and on the context in which the tweet was created. Bot identification is partially based on metadata related to the software used to create the tweets. This metadata, technically called generator, is available in the database about tweets collected using the Gnip interface, which is the official Twitter data provider. Gnip files show that it is possible to identify the name of the generator used to create posts and the website where information about the generator is available.

By verifying the website of each generator within a database of 894,180 tweets, we identified the generators that allow the activity of automated accounts on Twitter. Thus, they were identified as automation platforms. This verification pointed out clues on the origin of the platforms: who has developed them and for what purpose. Some of these platforms, such as *dlvr.it*<sup>2</sup> and *IFTTT*<sup>3</sup>, resemble generic or commercial solutions for automated publication on Twitter through triggers and can be used by several political fields.

However, during the verification process, some platforms called our attention because they were used only by one group of profiles and seemed to be personalized solutions created especially for this group. In this study, in order to detect automated profiles and activities, we analyzed the information and use of two generators in particular: *Pktweet* and *Seesmic for Blueberry*.


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<sup>2</sup> Available at "<https://dlvrit.com/>", access on June 28, 2018.

<sup>3</sup> Available at "<https://ifttt.com/>", access on June 28, 2018.



# Analysis of Bots during Elections




Analysis period: oct to dec/2017

Source: Twitter | Credit: FGV DAPP

### 3.1 PKTWEET GENERATOR

- After analyzing the database, we identified the generator Pktweet, which published 108 tweets by means of seven accounts. These profiles retweeted publications from former president Lula's official account on Twitter (@lulaoficial).
- **These seven accounts are**
  - [@mujerpsuvcobo](#);
  - [@FeministasMujer](#);
  - [@FEPSUV\\_CARABOBO](#);
  - [@alexchirino14](#);
  - [@LaRedMAC](#);
  - [@CPMujerCarabobo](#);
  - [@RojoVasquez23](#).
- In the metadata, the generator Pktweet has the website address <http://www.pktweet.com>. Until the conclusion of this report, the search engine could not find the IP address of the server.



- To get more information about the page, the URL was evaluated through the Web Archive service<sup>4</sup>. According to the wayback machine, the website domain “pktweet.com” is related to “Proyecto Kamila” (in English, “Kamila Project”).




[https://web.archive.org/web/\\*/http://account.proyektokamila.com/p/relogin.php?callback=http://pktweet.com/](https://web.archive.org/web/*/http://account.proyektokamila.com/p/relogin.php?callback=http://pktweet.com/)

- The website “Proyecto Kamila” is currently active and identifies itself as an agency of creation and development of technology.



<http://proyektokamila.com/>

<sup>4</sup> Available at “<https://web.archive.org/>”, access on June 28, 2018.



### 3.1.1 Analysis of the profiles

- The seven accounts are
  - @mujerpsuvcbobo;



Profile name in Spanish

PSUV is the Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela, founded by Hugo Chávez.

Carabobo is one of the states of Venezuela.



- @FeministasMujer;



Profile name  
in Spanish

PSUV: Partido  
Socialista Unido  
de Venezuela

Location:  
Carabobo, Venezuela

- @FEPSUV\_CARABOBO;



Profile name  
in Spanish

PSUV: Partido  
Socialista Unido  
de Venezuela

Location:  
Carabobo, Venezuela

○ @alexchirino14;




Nicolás Maduro's campaign logo

Profile name in Spanish

Retweets in Spanish

○ @LaRedMAC;



Cover picture of Hugo Chávez

Profile name in Spanish

Location: Venezuela



- @CPMujerCarabobo;




Cover photo:  
Hugo Chávez and  
Nicolás Maduro

Profile name  
in Spanish

Location:  
Valencia, Venezuela

- @RojoVasquez23.



Profile name  
in Spanish

The profile describes  
itself as "chavista"

Location:  
Valencia, Venezuela

- It is worth mentioning that the seven profiles are **Venezuelan accounts**. Their origin is identified by the following characteristics, for example:
  - the language of the accounts is Spanish;
  - six profiles established their location in Venezuela;
  - every account shows a trend to support Nicolás Maduro and Chávez.
- By analyzing the pattern of the account names, we identified that the profiles “@mujerpsuvcobo” and “@FEPSUV\_CARABOBO” have the acronym “PSUV” inside the user name. The acronym PSUV means *Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela* (United Socialist Party of Venezuela), which is the official party of the president Nicolás Maduro.
- In total, 49 profiles in the database have the acronym PSUV. They interacted 93 times during the period analyzed: 88 retweets, 3 tweets, and 2 replies.
- By analyzing the patterns, we also identified that three profiles mentioned Carabobo, one of the 23 states that formed, together with the Capital District and the Dependencias Federales, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

### 3.1.2 Pktweet in diffusion chains


A deep assessment shows how these seven accounts acted in the database.

In the following images, each circle represents one account on Twitter. The accounts that used the generator pktweet are in red. Each link between two accounts shows a retweet. The position of each account on the x-axis (horizontal) is defined according to time: the further to the left, the smaller the time difference between the publication of the original tweet and the retweet/ the further to the right, the greater the time difference between the publication of the original tweet and the retweet by the account. The position on the vertical axis is defined by the degree of separation between the account that created the original tweet and the account that retweeted it. If user B retweets user A and follows user A, there is no intermediary, and B is one degree away from user A. If user C retweets user A, but does not follow user A, but follows user B, there is an



intermediary, and they are two degrees away from each other. Thus, the higher the user, the shorter the distance; the lower the user, the greater the degree of separation.

### Diffusion chains




Source: Elaborated by FGV/DAPP



Source: Twitter

### Diffusion chains



Source: Elaborated by FGV/DAPP




Source: Twitter

In this particular case, the accounts that used the generator Pktweet are a few degrees of separation far from each other and retweeted shortly after the publication of the tweet. Also, the chain does not continue after those accounts. These accounts did not focus on just one publication: they often retweeted posts made by Lula's account, suggesting being automatic, without human intervention.

### 3.1.2 Gran Polo Patriotico: another suspect generator

- The users @TropaDePaz and @redtuiteros used the generator Gran Polo Patriótico, generating 10 retweets from the account @tuiteros\_vzla.
- According to Wikipedia, the Great Patriotic Pole Simon Bolivar, often known as the Great Patriotic Pole (GPP), is a Venezuelan political group that supports the Bolivarian Revolution. It was created on the eve of the 2012 presidential elections in Venezuela for the group of political and social forces that supported the re-election of Hugo Chávez as president of Venezuela.
- The generator link is <http://www.granpolopatriotico.org.ve>. According to WHOIS, the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) is the owner of the domain.






<http://whois.domaintools.com/granpolopatriotico.org.ve>

### 3.2. GENERATOR SEESMIC FOR BLUEBERRY


- By analyzing the database, we identified the generator Seesmic for Blueberry and its link "<http://tecniaageek.com/>".
- The generator was used to publish 79 tweets by 79 different accounts. These accounts generated a total of 15,890 interactions: 11,043 retweets, 3,609 replies and 1,238 tweets.



### 3.2.1 Analysis of profiles

- After analyzing these 79 profiles, we identified that most of them publish the same messages, creating networks of automated accounts (botnets).
- Due to the characteristics of the accounts, it is possible to affirm that they operate in Argentina.
- The language of the accounts is Spanish, and they show an anti-Macri political tendency.

○ @TrinidadUnzu;



Profile name  
in Spanish

RT @laspornografas

Profile describes itself  
as located in the  
province of  
Salta, Argentina.

○ @Dalecampeon;




Profile name  
in Spanish

RT @laspornografas

Location:  
Buenos Aires, AR



○ @parisprismic;




Profile name  
cites Buenos Aires

RT @laspornografas

Location:  
Palermo, Argentina

○ @GonzalitoLede;



Profile name  
in Spanish

RT @laspornografas

RT @LulapeloBrasil

○ @MacriCoRruptor;

Profile picture of the Argentine president Mauricio Macri

Profile name in Spanish

RT @laspornografas


○ @DMdeNoCoger;

Profile name in Spanish

RT @laspornografas

- After analyzing these accounts, we found out that the accounts often retweet publications from the account **@laspornografas**.

- **@laspornografas**;



- All the 79 accounts retweeted publications from Lula's official account. RT@LulapeloBrasil: "I express my solidarity to President Cristina Kirchner and her collaborators, who worked hard for the Argentine people and the South American integration. This real judicial and media hunt for my comrade, who I both admire and appreciate, is alarming."





<https://twitter.com/LulapeloBrasil/status/939090278694178816>

- The 79 accounts had a synchronized behavior, that is, they made the same publications at the same time. After this analysis, we also identified a retweet from the account [@laspornografas](#), which was retweeted 169 times.



<https://twitter.com/search?q=from%3Alaspornografas%20since%3A2017-12-22%20until%3A2017-12-26&src=typd&lang=es>

- Using Twitter API, we accessed the last 200 posts of these 169 accounts. The platform provided the information of 99 accounts. According to Twitter, the remaining 70 accounts were suspended or restricted for analysis at the time of the search. This status is set by Twitter when accounts violate its Terms and Conditions.<sup>5</sup>
- From the total of 99 accounts, 39 profiles had not been previously identified by researchers. They made a total of 57 posts in the database.

<sup>5</sup> <https://twitter.com/pt/tos>


### 3.2.2 Other Argentine generators

- The generator **MasterBotCiudadanoK** was used by the user @alejandro\_fpv to retweet 5 publications; the generator **politibotarg** was used by the user @alejandro\_fpv to retweet 5 publications; the generator **MasterBotRafa** was used by the user @caye\_tano1935 to retweet 4 publications; the generator **MasterBotFrenteCiudadano** was used by the user @MovPopNac2017 to retweet 3 publications; the generator **MasterBotVideoteK** was used by the user @Videote\_K to retweet 2 publications.
- We would like to highlight the user name @alejandro\_fpv. The acronym FPV (Frente para la Victoria), usually used in Argentina, refers to Kirchner's political party. The database has 10 users with the acronym FPV in their user name. These users generated 59 publications, of which 53 are retweets.


### 3.2.3 Seismic for Blueberry in the diffusion chains

A deep assessment showed how the activities of publications that used the generator Seismic for Blueberry in the database were made.

#### Diffusion chains



Source: Elaborated by FGV/DAPP



Source: Twitter

In this case, the accounts that used the generator Seismic for Blueberry appeared mostly in one diffusion chain only. They spread in several degrees and focused on the first moments. There is no evident trigger for their activity, since they did not connect to only one actor to generate retweets. This result suggests that this original publication was chosen to be amplified by bots, and there is no systematic use of these accounts in retweeting Lula's posts.


## 4. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

- Based on the results obtained in the analysis of foreign profiles that mention Brazilian presidential candidates, we analyzed and compared automated profiles that mentioned South American political actors.
- Following the bot detection methodology of the study *Bots, Social Networks and politics in Brazil*, published by FGV DAPP (RUEDIGER, 2017), we identified 732 accounts in the database that published consecutive tweets in less than one second (a characteristic that indicates botnets, since a human is unable to publish more than one message in less than one second), suspect generators and correlation between the time features of each account.

- From the total of 732 accounts, we identified those that mention South American political actors:
  - 26 profiles mentioned @CFKArgentina and @dilmabr;
  - 30 profiles mentioned @CFKArgentina and @LulapeloBrasil;
  - 3 profiles mentioned @CFKArgentina and @evoespueblo;
  - 4 profiles mentioned @CFKArgentina and @MashiRafael;
  - 11 profiles mentioned @CFKArgentina and @NicolasMaduro;
  - 2 profiles mentioned @dilmabr and @MashiRafael;
  - 4 profiles mentioned @evoespueblo and @LulapeloBrasil;
  - 3 profiles mentioned @evoespueblo and @MashiRafael;
  - 6 profiles mentioned @LulapeloBrasil and @NicolasMaduro;
  - 6 profiles mentioned @LulapeloBrasil and @MashiRafael;
  - 7 profiles mentioned @NicolasMaduro and @MashiRafael.
  
- These profiles generated the following publications:
  - 3 publications mentioning @CFKArgentina and @evoespueblo;
  - 46 publications mentioning @CFKArgentina and @LulapeloBrasil;
  - 39 publications mentioning @CFKArgentina and @dilmabr;
  - 15 publications mentioning @CFKArgentina and @NicolasMaduro;
  - 7 publications mentioning @CFKArgentina and @MashiRafael;
  - 1 publication mentioning @CFKArgentina and @RaulCastroR;
  - 14 publications mentioning @evoespueblo and @LulapeloBrasil 14
  - 1 publication mentioning @evoespueblo and @NicolasMaduro; 1
  - 3 publications mentioning @evoespueblo and @MashiRafael;
  - 1 publication mentioning @evoespueblo and @RaulCastroR;
  - 13 publications mentioning @LulapeloBrasil and @NicolasMaduro; 13
  - 9 publications mentioning @LulapeloBrasil and @MashiRafael;
  - 1 publication mentioning @LulapeloBrasil and @RaulCastroR;
  - 2 publications mentioning @dilmabr and @MashiRafael;
  - 11 publications mentioning @NicolasMaduro and @MashiRafael;
  - 1 publication mentioning @NicolasMaduro and @RaulCastroR;
  - 1 publication mentioning @MashiRafael and @RaulCastroR;

- The graph below presents the relation between bots and political actors. Each node of the graph represents a profile (except for the node “LulapeloBrasil|dilmabr”, which gathers Lula’s and Dilma’s profiles); named nodes are political actors; and unnamed nodes are automated profiles. Each directed edge connects a bot to a political actor, which means that the bot mentioned the actor one or more times. The bigger the node of the automated profiles, the higher the number of mentions to political actors he published.

### Relation between bots and political actors




Source: Elaborated by FGV/DAPP. Data from Twitter.

Bots, social networks and politics in Brazil

- The relation between each group of bots and political actors is presented below. In order to visualize the degree of proximity of political actors, only those groups of automated profiles that mentioned more than one politician are highlighted.

## The relation between each group of bots and political actors



- Without considering the profiles @LulapeloBrasil e @dilmabr, the other political actors were mentioned 243 times by automated accounts.
- This study highlights two types of activity of these suspect foreign profiles that influence the Brazilian political debate:
  - **Automated profiles that retweet an external political actor that supports a left-wing Brazilian political actor;** For example, in the database, a tweet posted by the former president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner on Twitter was retweeted 10 times by 10 different automated accounts:



RT @CFKArgentina: "Ahora @DilmaBr compartió en sus redes este video que explica muy bien qué es el #Lawfare y muestra algunos ejemplos, como el caso de @LulaPeloBrasil. Las similitudes con lo que estamos viviendo en Argentina son evidentes." <https://t.co/TWsFhlm5qh>



<https://twitter.com/CFKArgentina/status/940924761131151360>

- In the database, the user of the profile @CFKArgentina was retweeted by automated accounts 67 times.
  - **External automated profiles that directly influence the Brazilian political debate in favor of the left-wing group** For example, in the database, the three Venezuelan automated profiles @mujerpsovcobo, @FeministasMujer and @LaRedMAC retweeted publications of the profile @LulaPeloBrasil. The publications did not mention Venezuela, Nicolas Maduro or Hugo Chávez.



The original posts that were retweeted are the following:



<https://twitter.com/LulaOficial/status/9229993425>  
[95756032](https://twitter.com/LulaOficial/status/9229993425)



<https://twitter.com/LulaOficial/status/92195206594079539>  
[206594079539](https://twitter.com/LulaOficial/status/92195206594079539)



<https://twitter.com/LulaOficial/status/932721766056767489>

## 5. CONCLUSION

The continuous presence of automated accounts and international networks to disseminate political content demonstrates how, in the past four years in Brazil, an organized structure to conduct debates in the social networks has been active. Although it is not possible to establish the authorship and assign to candidates or parties the initiative of these activities, it is important to understand that geopolitical arrangements in Latin America are also designed in virtual environments, with strategic goals.

When articulating publications by Brazilian political groups and actors from other countries of the continent, the data analyzed showed the use of bots to expand the reach of messages and to strengthen misinformation flows. The help of allegedly foreign profiles affects the organic debate of the Brazilian society on the web, stimulating the discussion of specific opinions and agendas. They are not spontaneous activities. If so, the use of generators for automatic publications on Twitter would not make it so notable.

In the current scenario of intense political activity in fragmented groups of social networks, any indication of foreign presence in the organization of the poles and discourses of Brazilian politics must be carefully observed and studied in order to measure the electoral impact that misinformation flows have on the democratic process of Brazil. It is also an alert to institutions concerning the importance of monitoring and restraining similar interference from both sides of the political spectrum.

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The Digital Democracy Room#observa2018 is an initiative without any political or party bond. It is conducted by the Department of Public Policy Analysis of Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV DAPP), which aims to provide an analysis of the Brazilian political scene based on the public debate on social networks.

The analyses of the Digital Democracy Room do not intend to represent an election poll; they assess the social perception in the digital environment regarding the themes of the public agenda, such as political actors and public policies. Therefore, we do not authorize the use of our analysis for political or party purposes or to endorse particular positions. Further information regarding this work can be accessed at [dapp.fgv.br/observa2018/metodologia](http://dapp.fgv.br/observa2018/metodologia).

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