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# Police and Society in Brazil

**Edited by**

**Vicente Riccio**

Graduate Program on Law and Innovation

Federal University of Juiz de Fora

Juiz de Fora, Brazil

**Wesley G. Skogan**

Institute for Policy Research

Northwestern University

Evanston, IL, USA

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## Series Editor's Preface

While the literature on police and allied subjects is growing exponentially, its impact upon day-to-day policing remains small. The two worlds of research and practice of policing remain disconnected even though cooperation between the two is growing. A major reason is that the two groups speak in different languages. The research work is published in hard-to-access journals and presented in a manner that is difficult to comprehend for a layperson. On the other hand, the police practitioners tend not to mix with researchers and remain secretive about their work. Consequently, there is little dialogue between the two and almost no attempt to learn from one another. Dialogue across the globe, among researchers and practitioners situated in different continents, are of course even more limited.

I attempted to address this problem by starting the IPES (International Police Executive Symposium), [www.ipes.info](http://www.ipes.info), where a common platform has brought the two together. IPES is now in its 17th year. The annual meetings, which are the major events of the organization, have been hosted in all parts of the world. Several publications have come out of these deliberations, and a new collaborative community of scholars and police officers has been created whose membership runs into the several hundreds.

Another attempt was to begin a new journal, aptly called *Police Practice and Research: An International Journal*, *PPR*, that has opened the gate to practitioners to share their work and experiences. The journal focuses on issues that help give scholars and police officers a single platform. *PPR* is completing its 18th year in 2017. It is certainly evidence of growing collaboration between police research and practice, given that *PPR* began with four issues a year, expanded into five issues in its fourth year and is now issued six times a year.

Clearly, these attempts, despite their success, remain limited. Conferences and journal publications do help create a body of knowledge and an association of police activists but cannot address substantial issues in depth. The limitations of time and space preclude larger discussions and more authoritative expositions that can provide stronger and broader linkages between the two worlds.

It is this realization of the increasing dialogue between police research and practice that has encouraged many of us—my close colleagues and I connected closely with IPES and *PPR* across the world—to conceive and implement a new attempt in this direction. This led to the idea of a book series, *Advances in Police Theory and Practice*, that seeks to attract writers from all parts of the world. Further, the attempt is to find practitioner contributors. The objective is to make the series a serious contribution to our knowledge of the police as



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## Police Reform in Brazil

### The Rise and Demise of PRONASCI<sup>1</sup>

Marco Aurélio Ruediger

# 12

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Brazil's National Program of Public Security with Citizenship (PRONASCI)—was launched in August 2007 during President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's second term, by the then Minister of Justice of Brazil, Tarso Genro. It had a planned budget of US\$3 billion, and its objective was to develop a range of new preventative and deterrent strategies for policing, including the expansion of effective citizenship to the lower reaches of society, enhancing the professional status of public security employees, and focusing new resources on areas with high levels of crime and low social cohesion.

Ninety-six specific projects were proposed under the program, which together formed a systematic effort to increase the operational capacity of state police forces, and—at the local level—to combine an increase in community-oriented policing with an expansion of activities focused on the historic low levels of civic participation and social development in poor areas. In particular, it was aimed at insulating socially vulnerable young people from the drug trade. In short, it was intended to move policing closer to the community, build citizenship and participation at that level, and attack and undermine crime networks. As a whole, these approaches would reduce levels of crime by undermining its foundations and co-opting its potential participants.

When it was created, this initiative represented an innovative, even radical new direction for the criminal justice system, and one that was extremely novel for Brazil's federal government. As in many federal systems, public



security in Brazil had been largely a prerogative of state governments. The federal government had previously avoided direct intervention in policing in the nation's large metropolitan centers. By participating more actively in this sector, it was seeking to respond to increasing demands of society for action, even though this necessarily—and not by chance—would expand federal influence and the possibility of intervention at the state and municipal levels through controlling the use of new federal funds. This had to be done very carefully, however, given Brazil's federal government structure.

Therefore, it was decided that this involvement in traditionally local functions should follow a "federative" approach, based on cooperation between the two levels of government that respected the tradition of local control of local affairs. This was of fundamental importance in the Brazilian case, because, as in the United States, the political structure assumes a high degree of regional independence, with layers of executive prerogative within subnational units. By developing a program in a policy area that was widely known to be within the scope of the states of the Brazilian federation, the control of significant federal funds threatened to undermine this autonomy, since it restricted the options open to states interested in obtaining funding. It was a mechanism for the national Ministry of Justice to exercise "soft power" at the local level.

### Evaluating Reform

In parallel to the program, the Ministry of Justice constructed a web-based system aimed at monitoring and assisting the evaluation of PRONASCI. This was not done only in regard to the use of the funds provided; in addition, qualitative and quantitative empirical research was also conducted to measure perceptions of the program among the social sectors it affected and participation in them. This management and measurement program was developed by Fundação Getúlio Vargas, in Rio de Janeiro. The construction of multiple evaluation strategies, despite being complex to implement, allowed us to monitor the development of PRONASCI and its impacts in a comparative and longitudinal manner. This provided an empirical basis for policy adjustments, as well as highlighting their results. This helped to hold the program accountable and facilitated external pressure toward action at the subnational level. The present chapter is largely based on this research.

As it turned out, there were serious flaws in the design of PRONASCI. The complexity of this program was not effectively managed by the technobureaucracy in the Ministry of Justice. Nor, at the same time, was PRONASCI initially designed to accommodate the traditional policy concepts of Brazilian state governments in terms of public security.

The program was designed to represent a change in the paradigm for public security by a sophisticated and daring faction of President Luiz Inácio

Lula da Silva's *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (Workers' Party, or PT). They proposed an experiment in the radical transformation of the Ministry of Justice and tightening a bureaucratic machine not accustomed to programs of such complexity and deep penetration into the affairs of the Brazilian states. Common wisdom in the Ministry of Justice's bureaucracy and in state security agencies was that the ministry would only expand the traditional scope of federal policy, which was to support the acquisition of equipment by the states and repressive actions by the federal police and the federal highway police, especially those directed at drug trafficking and border control.

However, what was new was the idea of a strategy promoting structural changes in the bureaucratic machinery, as well as of the substance of policies in this area, especially those aimed at promoting the welfare of segments of society such as women, young people, former members of the armed forces, and persons recently released from prison. Needless to say, the introduction of the concept of community policing, and new police training to support community-oriented work, also presented a shock to the system.

Although initially successful, PRONASCI faced continuous resistance from segments of the bureaucracy, and it was eventually impacted by a change in the set of actors who supported it and by changes in the policy implementation process. These had devastating effects on the continuity of the program. This drama came to a head in the 2012 Brazilian budget, when funds for the program were reduced practically to zero.

The aim of this chapter is this to examine the development, outcomes, contradictions, and eventual demise of PRONASCI. The first stage was positive, illustrating that under certain conditions, it was possible to develop and implement an innovative federal policy dealing with historically local public security issues in a strongly federal environment. The second stage turned negative. PRONASCI's progress slowed and the program was eventually dismantled due to a confluence of political factors linked to a bureaucratic struggle between those supporting the new model and forces favoring the old regime.

I also intend to call attention to the conditions under which this kind of innovative political design can be threatened, so policymakers and academics will be better attuned to how policy can be strategically insulated and avoid being dismantled. I will highlight the contradictions and conditions that eventually killed PRONASCI, emphasizing the importance of such factors as the ability of the bureaucratic machine to throttle and resist programs that were contrary to its culture and the survival of structures of power consolidated through more formal practices of policy management.

But while it is correct that PRONASCI encountered difficulties and did not survive more than four years, it is important to highlight that it spawned a number of enduring and successful (thus far) spin-off projects, such as the UPPs in Rio de Janeiro State.<sup>2</sup> Those projects, in turn, were successful in placing the concept of community policing on top of the public agenda, and community



policing was one of the centerpiece elements of PRONASCI. This not only created important policy results—as in the case of the police in Rio de Janeiro State—but also helped this state and its capital—Rio de Janeiro city—to win international competitions to host such important events as the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics. These in turn are calling forth significant new federal and international investment in different economic sectors in the region.

In the case of Rio de Janeiro, the concept of community policing, as well as the social actions of the state and city governments, became paradigmatic of a new approach to public security. Although less daring than what was proposed in the failed federal PRONASCI project, the UPPs have been a relatively successful experiment that have gained a high degree of public support.

As a methodological synthesis, I adopt here an approach based on the analysis of key events and pivotal changes in the political process that determine the construction of policy during a brief historical period and, which, at least potentially, provided an opportunity to construct new policy agendas. The analysis of this process involves specifying the context and key actors, identifying the activities that unite them and the events that develop along the way, as well as modeling the decision-making process in a systematic manner. This approach is centered on strategic political actors and pivotal moments for changing policy processes (Barzelay and Gallego 2010).

We examine them in the course of dynamic processes: dealing with one another, with resources that rise and fall, with events, and within the contexts in which they operate. These together create a menu of policy possibilities and potential windows of opportunity, including perhaps fairly dramatic alterations of the status quo. As we will see, PRONASCI was created and then dismantled as a result of the political forces emerging to fill two windows of opportunity produced by the political process and operated by gifted policy entrepreneurs. We thus structure this discussion around those two pivotal moments, within a temporal grid of events and the influence of actors in interaction. Secondly, we also considered the Toquevillean perspective expressed by Evans, Rueschmeyer and Skocpol (1985), in terms of the intended and unintended effects of public policies, in this case of the spin-off effects of PRONASCI.

What can be seen from this conceptual and empirical policy effort is that a very complex program was necessary to address solutions to problems in contexts that are also complex and involve multiple causalities. Nevertheless, the success of any program is not only found in its design or in the effectiveness of its implementation and funds disposed, but also in its acceptance by the bureaucracy. At this point, there were political errors in PRONASCI. A vision of this program as the solution for public security in Brazil did not come up as a key issue on the agenda contested during the 2006 presidential campaign, which led to President Lula's second term, although public security as an issue was debated. It was designed and implemented only during 2007–2010. It also did not gain enough traction among key members of the

bureaucracy who were responsible for its sustainable implementation. Finally, it had no relevance for the next presidential election in 2010.

To the contrary, the program threatened innovation, which the Ministry of Justice and its bureaucratic agents were incapable of absorbing, and as a result they did not want to insert it into the agenda for debate during the presidential campaign and in policy discussions after the election of a new president.

In this chapter, I first look in more detail to the political genesis of PRONASCI. Then, I will explain the policy that emerged and then describe its demise, a circumstance that is not frequently discussed by students of policy-making. As a conclusion, I will consider PRONASCI as a case for reference, in both positive and negative ways, for studies of policy implementation.

### The Political Genesis of PRONASCI

After resolving to a certain degree historical problems related to economic development and social justice that had been prevalent for many decades, Brazilian society has been undergoing an apparently sustainable process of economic growth and low inflation. It needs to be taken into account that, during its history, Brazil built an effective state apparatus linked to the promotion of development along many dimensions. A basic social welfare system has existed in Brazil since the 1930s, and this had the impact of strengthening state structures and a professional bureaucracy. As noted by Amsden (2001) in her analysis of later-developing nations, countries that rose toward the top achieved this because they were able to articulate development policies in which a strong national state was the central actor. Included on her list of rising nations is Brazil. In addition, Brazil was also (somewhat episodically) a democratic country, aligned with Western nations.

Nevertheless, despite the existence of a state apparatus that strengthened over time and the nation's general path toward development, Brazil underwent repeated cycles of development and stagnation until the middle of the 1990s, with resulting serious social asymmetries, even though some of these have recently been somewhat mitigated.

Following this, most notably during Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's two administrations (2003–2010), a strategy of encouraging development with greater social inclusion of the poor was pursued. Above all, this was aimed at strengthening low-income groups, with a consequent increase in their well-being and an expansion of the domestic Brazilian market. These policies raised the consumption levels of 30 million Brazilians considered as poor, altering Brazil's political and economic equation and moving a large part of the population into the lower middle class (Neri 2011).

Together, these social and economic advances were converted into votes that elected President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva twice, but they also created



increasing social demands, both in terms of policies of economic progress and increasingly effective citizenship rights among the poor, who were his strongest supporters. Public security issues inserted themselves in this process in a critical manner, due to increases in crime and negative externalities created by crime in the economy during the 1980s and 1990s.

In general terms, public security in Brazil has been especially challenging in its large urban areas. This has had serious repercussions on the credibility of institutional effectiveness in Brazilian states, in addition to their obvious impact on local attractiveness and the questions that they raise about the effectiveness and honesty of public officials. It has thus hindered the federal strategy of promoting the country as an actor with a rising presence in the international political scene, as well as corroding the foundations of the credibility of state institutions. As noted by Santos (2005), Brazil is potentially risking a movement contrary to that of institution building, with the co-option of young people by the drug trade and the weakening of state credibility, since the web linking the drug trade extends dangerously close to the highest levels of the state. This could not be allowed, and the federal government decided to take a further step.

Although this concern was expressed by the country's political elite on various occasions, it was given an unprecedented central role by the Brazilian president in 2007. This was the first pivotal moment in the policy process, a very public recognition by the popular president of the importance of crime and policing issues on the Brazilian political agenda. In his second inaugural speech, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva stated,

During the campaign I stated that my second government would be a government of development, with income distribution and high quality education. . . . Other vital areas for the population—and something that is constantly demanded—are health and public security. . . . I think that in relation to the question of public security—a real national scourge—the conditions for effective cooperation between the Federal Union and the states of the Federation are increasing, without which it will be very difficult to resolve this crucial problem.

(President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva,  
Inauguration Speech, 2007; author's translation)

There followed a confluence between this public recognition of the problem, the beginning of a new second presidential term, and a change in ministerial leadership that brought to office a new Minister for Justice, Tarso Genro. He recognized not only the opportunity created by the situation but also the need to implement a vigorous and innovative public security agenda. In an interview with another of the strategic actors involved in the process, Ferreira and Britto (2010) recorded:

Then, when Tarso went to the Ministry of Justice, this problem already existed. There was the question of Rio de Janeiro, which was getting worse, there was

the crisis of Alagoas, there were the alarming levels of violence in Pernambuco [these are other Brazilian cities]. This meant that the question of public security gained a new centrality in the second mandate of President Lula [Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva], due to the notoriety which this question was acquiring.

(Interview with Vicente Trevas, Assistant Secretary for  
Federative Affairs of the Office of the  
Presidency of the Republic; author's translation)

The opportunity recognized by Tarso Genro when he was named Minister of Justice to develop a new federal policy concerning this traditionally local issue was taken up quickly. Four aspects of the problem were widely discussed: (a) the need for a reduction in levels of violence through effective security actions linked to social development in poorer areas; (b) the development of a federative pact recognizing the co-responsibility of states and municipalities in the issue; (c) the need to adapt federal state structures so that they could deal with local issues and authorities; and (d) the political conflict related to this question. In another interview by Ferreira and Britto (2010), the minister himself stated,

Insecurity has become a central category in politics, in the crisis of modernity. In other words, what is called post-modernity—a great fragmentation, the destruction of utopias, the hysterical sublimation of the present, the absence of perspectives, totalizing in the last instance what is social desegregation, the insecurity which is transformed into a central question of politics. I argue, thus, that whoever cannot answer these questions, cannot answer anything politically.

(Interview with Tarso Genro, Minister of Justice; author's translation)

This discussion was expanded to encompass local political elites, the media, and the population in general, especially the various targets of the program. A complex process of negotiation was developed within the Ministry of Planning to allocate US\$3.35 billion for the program.

### The Political Process and PRONASCI

PRONASCI thus became defined as a progressive response to crime. It recognized that crime was strongly linked to economic distress, and traditional policing practices in Brazil were at the same time repressive and ineffective. Casting community safety as among the expanded rights that the Lula administration was promoting could simultaneously respond to the fears of the urban middle classes and to residents of poor areas routinely subject to violent repression by both criminals and the police. PRONASCI aimed at replacing fear with trust between a reformed security apparatus and the population.

This is in line with Bendix (1996), who noted that authority depends on and is rebuilt through cumulative acts of trust, that a fluidity exists between



administrative effectiveness and public cooperation. In this case, police reform and the adoption of a community policing model could facilitate the development of trust and cooperation, becoming a central part of a systemic and culturally sophisticated approach to public security.

Another author, Silver (2004), follows a similar line, observing that the penetration of the police in the context of civil society does not only reside in the crime-fighting activities of the police, but also in their central presence in daily life. Nevertheless, presence in itself does not necessarily unleash an effective transformation process in the relationship of the police with the community. For this, PRONASCI had to reform the practices and culture of its various security forces, in order to achieve an effective paradigm for social change. As observed by Janet Chan (2004) in relation to constructs developed by Bourdieu, a change in the habitus of the police, as proposed by PRONASCI, would achieve results if, and only if, it was also dependent on a change in the field in which it was inserted. In this case, field is the historical reality of relations between police and the community, which are structured on relations of power. PRONASCI sought to shift this agenda, understanding the community as a politically legitimate entity demanding greater citizenship rights. These included recognition of the right of the excluded to better living conditions and personal security, as well as a range of expanded opportunities in relation to Marshall's citizenship (1964). But this vision of a reciprocal relationship between communities and the public security apparatus that would together expand citizens' rights could only be effective if it changed the system.

In this way, the perspective of criminality rooted exclusively in socially and economically depressed regions is altered. In part this is true, since the poorest areas—called favelas—have been a locus for gangs notorious for their connection with the drug trade. However, as observed in the case of Rio de Janeiro by Perlman (1976), favelas are mainly composed of workers and their families seeking to be close to work. Many have been there for decades, creating linkages with their more affluent neighbors and extensive networks of solidarity within their communities, despite their developing in a distinct manner, isolated from inclusion in the mainstream city. So taking these favelas to be homogenous worlds situated alongside the mainstream city is an error that extends the stigma of marginality to the entire community. Many different economic activities take place in them, and they are actually included in an agglomeration of social segments and distinct standards of affluence, though with low levels of social development as a whole. These areas have a logic similar to the economic dynamics of American ghettos, as described by Fusfeld and Bates (1984). Their accumulation processes are not sufficiently strong to alter their economic relevance or even their social status, even though their linkages and networks are intense.

In Rio de Janeiro, continuous efforts have been made to address these issues. The general growth of the country has translated into improvements

in living standards in the favelas. However, effective, responsive, and professional policing has been critically lacking, contributing to the emergence in these communities of alternative structures under the control of crime cartels with economic linkages that go beyond their own territoriality.

Therefore, reforming the police could only become effective if linked to a change in their cultural and organizational orientation toward providing police services in the favelas, and their efforts to restore order under law in these areas could only be effective if they were combined with a broad range of new opportunities for residents there. Under PRONASCI, police reform focused on stimulating social mobility and the protection of highly vulnerable groups, such as youths lacking social or familial cohesion, individuals leaving the armed forces, the unemployed, and those returning from prison.

In order to achieve these objectives, PRONASCI fielded a number of programs, ranging from re-equipping security forces to providing new officer training, instituting community policing models, and providing assistance and promoting access to justice and social services to the most vulnerable groups. Community policing and the introduction of non-lethal weapons were probably the most visibly successful PRONASCI initiatives. Brazil's version of community policing involved reaching out to the community with the support of integrated services management offices and local community security councils. It attempted to incorporate central elements of the program observed by Skogan and Hartnett (1997) and Skogan (2006), such as community involvement, restructuring of patrol units and the stable assignment of officers to their patrol areas, problem solving, and the provision of services, among other objectives. Finally, outside of poorer urban areas, PRONASCI supported greater professionalism among highway and border control police, following the strategy of maintaining close relations with other federal programs.

This complex construction of policies was created by the federal government not only with the aim of overcoming the pressure arising out of the increasing demands of civil society for more effective action on the part of the state, but also to invert it, so that the states could—or had to—work within a new agenda. This political engineering of state-national relationships mobilized significant actors at the national level around public security issues, and modified the rules of resource allocation through a complex process of political negotiation.

Figure 12.1 summarizes the processes being described here, focusing on the pivotal points in policy formulation. It is a process-based perspective on the interaction of key actors embedded within macroeconomic and political trends, such as decisions that were impending on the location of World Cup and Olympic events (Barzelay, Gaetani, Cortázar and Cejudo 2003; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001). In this case, however, the development of policy over time did not follow the predicted path, and explaining the demise of PRONASCI becomes the central issue requiring explanation.






Figure 12.1 The PRONASCI policy process 2007–2009

The foundational moment depicted in Figure 12.1 arose out of the presidential initiative (E1) described above, announced in his second inaugural address. This was followed by ministerial changes common to a new government, changes made to accommodate political forces and to support changes in the upper echelons of state bureaucracy in order to support the strategic direction chosen by the president. Added to this process are pressures arising out of civil society and the political class related to concern about rising crime. All of this resulted in the nomination of a new Minister of Justice (EC1) who reviewed the strategic direction of the ministry (EC2) and announced plans to move in the direction that eventually led to PRONASCI.

To turn this strategic policy direction into a program required two complementary processes. Initially, it was necessary to overcome obstacles arising from the nation's federal structure (E2, in Figure 12.1). The route to doing so was found in the new minister's experience in CDES (*Conselho de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social*, or Economic and Social Development Council), another agency that negotiated federal agreements relating to policy and interministerial collaboration. Second, a great deal of consensus building had to be done around this new plan. After being conceptually structured, the program was sent to the president for official approval. Following this came the implementation stage (E3).

Notwithstanding approval for PRONASCI at the highest levels within the administration, it was also necessary to negotiate for support within


“technocratic” levels of various bureaucracies, with a special focus on those involved in movement and accountability for funds. This also involved repeated negotiations with multiple bureaucratic actors, both horizontally and vertically. One problem was that, when it was created, PRONASCI had not been considered in the preparation of the budget. Furthermore, the volume and decentralized nature of the fund flows, which were of an extraordinary nature, added to the necessity of creating procedures for monitoring and evaluating the various activities that they were intended to support. This required the development of procedures for controlling the project and analytic tools for monitoring and evaluating its implementation, both from an administrative perspective and in the eyes of the target populations of the programs (E4 and ER1 in Figure 12.1).

The key objective of implementation monitoring was, as noted by Wholey (1991), to gather systematic and continuous information about effectiveness of the various elements of PRONASCI, in order to improve its performance. In addition, surveys were conducted among two targets of the program: residents of the “territories of peace” (as targeted favelas were dubbed) and police, fire service, and other public security employees. These enabled adjustments to be made in the program “on the fly.” Shadish, Cook and Leviton’s (1991) observation about evaluation was especially useful in understanding that public programs can change from incremental changes to large alterations in their scope and sets of rules. We sought an evaluation monitoring that allowed complex changes to be monitored. This proved particularly important early in the life of the program, when the relevant ministries were unexpectedly slow to implement the program. The Justice Minister was able to challenge the ministry, and he used the media to create pressure on the national government to press the program forward.

Figure 12.2 illustrates the progress of the program, once funds started to flow. It charts the progress of federal transfers to the Brazilian states of training grants to prepare police officers for community policing. Training funds were supplemented with salary money for officers while they were being trained, to encourage states to adopt PRONASCI and promptly spend the money. It can be seen that through 2009, there was great success in budgeting and moving the money that was required; problems were to come later.


Figure 12.3 illustrates the results of monitoring public satisfaction with PRONASCI projects among various targeted populations. These included citizen reservists (*reservista cidadão*), former soldiers looking for employment in the formal economy; PROTEJO (*Proteção a Jovens em Vulnerabilidade Social*, or Protection of Socially Vulnerable Youths), which aimed at assisting young people at risk of entering the drug trade to instead stay in school; and preparatory courses for ENEM (the university entrance exam), which provided preparatory assistance for low-income youth to ready them for their university exams (this project was carried out in partnership with the Ministry of Education). All of these are programs were concerned with stimulating upward





**Figure 12.2** Training grants awarded and expended 2008–2009

Source: PRONASCI evaluation



**Figure 12.3** Participant evaluation of PRONASCI programs

Source: PRONASCI evaluation

social mobility among residents of poor communities. Figure 12.3 briefly summarizes the findings of a host of target-population surveys conducted as part of monitoring the implementation of PRONASCI, and illustrates the high levels of approval registered by those targeted by the program. Typically, about 30% of program participants gave the highest rating, and almost all the remainder gave ratings that were in the very positive range.

Together, Figures 12.2 and 12.3 highlight the success of PRONASCI as a program and its implementation in the adopting states. PRONASCI linked support for a new policing paradigm to the development of opportunities of social inclusion, combined with implementation monitoring and control of policy feedback (Pierson 1993). A great deal of money was successfully delivered to support key programs, and there was a high degree of satisfaction among program participants. And then it died.


### Dismantling PRONASCI

After a great deal of progress following its creation by an October 2007 statute, beginning in 2011 the actual budget for PRONASCI was reduced practically to zero. This concluding section considers the political and policy processes that shifted, leading to this unforeseen and pivotal change.

Figure 12.4 charts the progress of PRONASCI's budgeted and actual expenditures. We first can see a very close match between authorized funds and those actually allocated in 2008 and 2009; the federal ministries transferred over 90% of allocated funds to the states during this period. But in 2010, that figure slipped to 77%, and in 2011 to 38%. Further, this shortfall was largely confined to PRONASCI; it did not reflect some larger bureaucratic failure. Figure 12.5 contrasts comparable figures for the implementation of PRONASCI and for other programs supported by the Ministry of Justice. For each year, it presents the percentage of planned program funds that were actually dispersed. This chart extends only through 2011, the last year for which full-year data is available. As the chart illustrates, the ministry's success at funding its other programs matched the PRONASCI rate during 2008–2010, but then police reform fell off the implementation agenda.


What led to the collapse in fiscal support for such an energetic program? PRONASCI had been created to transform not only operational policies, but also to promote social development and, indirectly, the institutional cultural of the Ministry of Justice and federal-state relationships in this policy domain. In the analytic approach presented by Skocpol (1985), states matter not just in terms of their policies, but because their policies affect governmental processes and standards, alter the political culture, strengthen different political groups, and create opportunities and changes (or externalities) that are sometimes unforeseen. The discussion of the contextual and political origins of the





**Figure 12.4** Funds authorized and earmarked or expended 2008–2009 (US dollars)

Source: PRONASCI evaluation.



**Figure 12.5** Implementation of PRONASCI and other justice ministry programs

Source: PRONASCI evaluation

program, which were summarized in Figure 12.1, predicted a much more successful life course for the policy. This leads us to consider the multiple possible causes of the program's demise, all of which took place contemporaneously and converged to seal the fate of PRONASCI.

First, resistance by bureaucratic structures to the paradigmatic change called for by PRONASCI contributed to weakening support for the program in the budgeting process. Further, the program received a mixed reaction at the state level. The states were anxious to secure federal funds, but they resisted the new state-federal relationship imposed by the program, with its rules for local spending and persistent monitoring of program implementation. However, it was the juxtaposition of this resistance and the next pivotal moment in Brazilian politics, the 2010 presidential election, that explains the program's disappearance.

In 2010, the minister responsible for the original design of PRONASCI left office to run for office in one of the Brazilian states. He was elected governor of Rio de Janeiro state and left the national stage. At the same time, the party of outgoing president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva chose as its presidential candidate his chief of staff, Dilma Rousseff, who was also victorious. During the presidential campaign, the question of security in large cities was a subject of debate. Rousseff's campaign reiterated the importance of PRONASCI's conceptual framework. She spoke of the importance of raising the status of police officers, who needed proper training and higher salaries. The candidate also spoke in favor of new policies and expenditures for modernizing prisons and dealing with highly dangerous prisoners. And in her view, the new UPPs inaugurated in Rio de Janeiro had the potential to be an important element in defeating crime.<sup>3</sup> However, she barely referred to PRONASCI directly. This was in response to mixed views of the program among her campaign managers, who reflected some of the bureaucratic resistance and state-federal tension that the program generated. As a result, there was little public emphasis on PRONASCI as such, which would have committed her politically to the program.

Instead, what happened was in line with Weir and Skocpol's (1985) concept of "policy results." In the case of Brazil, state structures, which are home to bureaucratic careers and have some autonomy of action, do not necessarily bend to the influence of elected administrators, who are more permeable to political forces or ideological agendas. Elite bureaucrats also are not insulated from pressure groups or from the chain of command that begins with elected representatives, but in practice they can postpone, distort, or provide counter advice about the direction of a policy and its administration. Habitus and their own survival instinct lead them toward their zones of comfort and arrangements more optimal for their career and their network of alliances, even though this can be suboptimal for political decision makers faced with contrary interests or legacies of polices in which they



participated. PRONASCI's budget disappeared into this maze of state and federal bureaucracies, not having won an explicit seal of approval from the new president during her campaign and no longer protected by its inaugural Minister of Justice.

## Conclusion

Policy processes and public administration are continually interconnected. In addition, they increasingly are in dialogue with civil and development possibilities, whether individual or collective, in the public sphere. PRONASCI aimed at promoting both security and social development. It originated out of the capacity of a few high-placed actors to perceive social and political changes that could support this two-pronged definition of the problem, and it was a policy formula that reflected the political stance of the president of the moment. It spoke to social problems on the citizen side of the program, and it promoted police reforms that could rebound to further support progressive social developments. Further, it spoke to one of the most notable shortcomings of Brazilian democracy, the traditions and practices of its police. The program was positive in terms of its results, in spite of its short life. Most especially, its spin-offs included the UPP policing teams that remain effective in Rio de Janeiro.

As a lesson in public administration, policymakers must be careful to take into account the distinct interests of the bureaucracy, the key role played by the media in defining the situation, and the political opportunities that open and close as elite actors come and go. Elites across generations—which can be short in modern political life—need to buy into policies in order to guarantee their sustainability. Finally, in its short life, PRONASCI did not generate enough mass support demanding its continuation. It was from the beginning a top-down program. In the face of all of this, the modern monitoring and evaluation systems designed to promote program implementation did not play a significant role in protecting PRONASCI, despite the many positive signals they gathered.

## Notes

1. A revised version of Marco Aurélio Ruediger. 2013. The Rise and Fall of Brazil's Public Security Program: PRONASCI. *Police Practice and Research: An International Journal* 14: 280–294.
2. UPP means *Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora* (Pacifying Police Unit). These units seem to be responsible for an increase in trust in police and declining fear of crime in Rio de Janeiro city. The UPPs operate in a manner that is distinct from traditional, repressive policing, employing a community policing style instead.

3. Source: blog of Dilma (Dilma 13) during the presidential campaign ([www.dilma13.com.br/entry/dilma-discute-propostas-para-seguranca-publica/](http://www.dilma13.com.br/entry/dilma-discute-propostas-para-seguranca-publica/)).

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