

# **June Journeys in Brazil**

## *From the Networks to the Streets*<sup>1</sup>

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### **Abstract**

This article seeks to analyse the mass protests that ecloded in the main cities in Brazil in June 2013 - the so-called June Journeys -, event which represented an inflection moment in the country's recent political history and inaugurated a new social mobilization cycle in the country. This analysis will begin with the presupposition that the strong digital inclusion that has been going on over recent years was a main element, but not the only one, responsible for the occurrence of protests. Still, although digital inclusion has been a central tool that allowed these demonstrations to happen in the first place, it was not the only responsible for leading over 1 million people to the streets. Factors such as frustrated expectations over the continuity of the social inclusion process that had been ongoing over the last decade, the rising educational level and a political representation crisis contributed to social mobilization, and were amplified due to widening internet access - and, therefore, access to information - across the population.

### **Introduction**

This article will be organized in two parts. On the first one, we will use data collected from a survey conducted by FGV/DAPP in March 2014 regarding Urban Mobility (RUEDIGER et alii., 2014), which was the service that triggered manifestations in 2013. From those, we will run regressions in order to test different hypotheses on the causes of manifestations. By

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doing so we wish to be able to find relations with the other above-mentioned causes for protesting in Brazil, thus being able to better determine what are the most influential factors. On the second part we will do a network analysis using Big Data aggregation tools in order to try and establish the profile of social demands articulated during manifestations. Organized this way, the article wishes to offer a wide panorama of recent network impact over the Political System in Brazil. On the one hand by developing an analysis of the main causes for the large-scale social mobilization that took place on 2013 throughout the country, and that most likely set the path for a series of other smaller mobilizations that have been going on until now. And, on the other, exploring this new Brazilian political agenda articulated by the networks. At the end of the article, we wish to be able to show the impact of the Internet over the enlargement of the Brazilian public space, channeling new social demands to the State - from the network, to the streets.

## **1. Social Mobilization in the Network Society**

### **1.1 Brazil and the Networked Public Sphere**

One year after the emergence of the June Journeys there are still many uncertainties revolving around what led over more than one million people to the streets to protest for more rights. However, there seems to be at least one consensus among academics, politicians, activists and observants: the fact that the protest represent an inflection moment in the recent political and social history of the country (NOBRE, 2013; DOMINGUES, 2013). Manifestations were initially triggered due to the rising of bus fared in the main cities of the countries, but soon enough began including other demands, especially for better quality in public services such as health, education, but also strong criticism against corruption and a vertical political system, keeping representatives distant from their population (ORTELLADO et alii., 2013). Only one week after protests had started, Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo's Mayors announced the revoking of fare raise, and on the next day the President Dilma Rousseff gave a nationwide speech announcing that initiatives would be taken to answer to the population's demands, and even proposed to instate a Constituent Assembly in order to do a political reform. This episode, on the one hand, shows the resumption of social mobilization as a channel of pressure over governments - which Brazil had not seen for over two decades - and, on the other, revealed the society's capacity to pressure governments, that were forced to review decisions in order to appease protests.

June 2013 manifestations were marked, however, by one other new element in the Brazilian context: internet's role as a channel for information diffusion and social mobilization. During protests, action would take place simultaneously on the streets and on the networks: demonstrations summoned on the internet reinforced the movement of the streets, which would also reverberate back to the networks as information and summoning new acts, thus inaugurating this cycle of social mobilization unparalleled and unprecedented in volume and intensity. Brazil saw itself, unexpectedly, thickening the list of countries that hosted large-scale mobilization provoked and/or intensified due to digital inclusion expansion.

Protests recorded after June 2013 are, therefore, indication that this episode represented the consolidation, in the Brazilian context, of Politics in the era of the Network Society (CASTELLS; 2001, 2006). They marked the encounter of the "Digital Revolution" with the social transformations that have been taking place in Brazil over the last two decades with the consolidated political scenario that was established by the Brazilian redemocratization process (AVRITZER & COSTA, 2004). Mass-protest eclosion was the first demonstration of a "networked public sphere" (BENKLER, 2006) in the Brazilian context, in which virtual space proved to be a continuum of the traditional public sphere (HABERMAS, 1984) established in the last three decades, period over which was consolidated the new Brazilian civil society. It is in this sense that the June Journeys represented, according to the assumed hypothesis of this article, an expansion of the public sphere: by inaugurating a new channel of pressure over the State, making the streets and the network converge in demanding public services and creating a new public agenda conducted by civil society.

## **1.2 Collective Action and Social Conflict**

Social movement theories developed from the 1970s onwards have sought to understand collective action and social conflict from two basic analysis axis: (I) resource mobilization (McCARTHY and ZALD, 1977) and (II) political opportunity (TILLY, 1978). The first one takes into account the capacity of access and mobilization of material, symbolic and informational resources as the main condition for organization and collective action aiming at a specific end. According to this perspective, social conflict would emerge due to the availability of resources rather than in face of the scarcity of them, which means that it would tend to occur in contexts with some level of prosperity, and not privation. The second analysis axis pays closer attention to the situational dimension of collective action, in which actors would find – or not – the opportunity to mobilize themselves and to contest. For these authors, collective action needs to find favorable external conditions to happen, especially when dealing with a repressive system, which is linked to the effective political

system. Opportunity must be understood here as an incentive to social mobilization and its lack as a constraint to it.


More recently there were attempts to conciliate in a same model aspects from both dimensions. The perspective of “contentious politics” (TARROW, 1998; TARROW, TILLY e McADAM, 2001) suggests that the understanding of social conflict comes from the *momentum* of collective action rather than from the social movement as an actor. Therefore, it is a theory of interaction between individuals that, faced with a political opportunity on a specific instant, mobilize material, symbolic and informational resources in order to engage in contestation. Here, the single event of contestation matters less than the cycle of collective mobilization and social conflict.

An analysis attempt of the June Journeys from the mobilization of resources perspective was done by the “Americas Barometer Insights: 2013 – N. 93” (Moseley e Layton), in which the authors seek to understand the different causes of manifestations based on diffuse social dissatisfactions and on the increase of available resources for action, such as higher educational level, higher income, political interest and access to the internet. For Moseley and Layton (2013), between the “seeds of discontent” there would be the dissatisfaction with public services, corruption perception and low trust on the current political system.

## **2. Analysis Model**

Between March and April 2014, the survey “Urban Mobility and Citizenship” sought to establish the main factors related to the emergence of the June Journeys. In order to do so, the theories of collective action and the Predictive Model elaborated by Moseley and Layton were used as references to achieve a new analysis model. Thus, the objective was to test, by running a logistic regression, a series of hypothesis about the different possible motivation citizens would have to engage in protesting. The survey tried to capture the different perceptions and emotions of the users of public transportation regarding the life conditions in six of the main metropolitan regions in Brazil. The survey sought, in this sense, to relate the social conflicts that arose from the rise of transport fares and the feeling of the user of public transportation. The analysis model (Figure 1) was based on four main hypotheses: (I) frustrated expectations over the continuity of the social inclusion process that had been ongoing over the last decade; (II) a political representation crisis, in which the political system lacks trust and legitimacy and, thus, cannot process growing social demands; (III) spreading insatisfaction with the quality of public services, with an emphasis

on public transportation; and (IV) social discontent in these three dimensions catalyzed by the information diffusion process, result of a wider Internet and social media access.



## 2.1 Frustrated Expectations

The frustrated expectation thesis is based on the fact that, after an economic cycle of intense growth, Brazil has been dealing with a reduction of its economic expansion rhythm since 2011, while relative prices have been rising especially in sectors that affect middle and lower-income parts of the population, such as food and services, as well as public transportation fares. It is not a crisis per se, but effective worsening of improvements that had been going on in levels of income, consumption and employment verified especially in the second half of the last decade. According to IBGE, the last three years registered an average growth of 2%, about half of what had been verified in the eight years prior to that and, especially, of the 7,5% in 2010. Official inflation measured by IPCA was kept stable at a 6% level over the last three years, but with more pressure over the food and services sectors. The 2013 Latinobarometro report showed a drop of 19 points (from 52% to 33%) in Brazilian's perception of progress compared to 2011 - biggest variation in Latin America.

The hypothesis brings up a current debate in the theory of social movements during the 60s, in which authors sought to understand the intensification of social conflict in Third World countries, but also in developed societies. One of the most renowned thesis pointed to the growing gap between post-war development on the one hand, and political institutions and social demands on the other. The political gap of this phenomenon (gap between institutions and development) was explored in the classical work of Samuel P. Huntington "Political Order in Changing Societies" (1968), in which the author relates the political instability to the modernization of economies in underdeveloped countries. The gap between social dissatisfaction and development was analyzed, for instance, by James C. Davies (1962), who formulated the J-Curve Model. According to this model, instability and social conflict would rise from frustrated expectations over social demands after a cycle of development and bettering of populations' life conditions. Conflict would be, thus, the result of a *perception* of condition worsening, not necessarily verifiable, but due to a *relative* worsening of conditions in comparison to the expected tendency of growth. Although Huntington-based thesis could be tested, the Brazilian institutional stability does not seem to offer the necessary elements to do so. Thus, the second hypothesis was the one explored as a possible factor of explanation of the June Journeys.

## **2.2 Representation Crisis**

The representation crisis has been one of the most frequent themes of reflection in the social sciences over the last three decades. Symptoms of this phenomenon can be found in: the rise of political discontent indexes which measure citizens' satisfaction with representative institutions; weakening of political parties and decreasing levels of engagement in social movements; diminishing indexes of electoral participation and of volatility in political preferences. Vast literature has been dedicated to analyze causes and effects of this tendency. In this field, recent papers try to explain how this type of phenomenon is able to coexist with stable trust indexes regarding democracy and its values, such as respect for civil and political rights (Norris, 2011; Dalton, 2007). These works have been pointing towards the explanation that institutions have a hard time responding to citizens' expectations. In other words, the citizens have higher expectations over democratic regimes than their institutions have been able to return to them. According to this work, data also indicates that this is most likely the reality in Brazil.

Data gathered by the Latinobarometro showed important evidences regarding trust levels in Brazil. When asked if democracy is the best model despite its problems, in the period of 2002 to 2011, 74% agreed (or agreed strongly) with the statement. In a question regarding

support for a military government, in 2005, 57% would not do it under any circumstances. In 2011, 67% answered the same way. Still, such indexes do not follow the same trend when the subject is institutions and democracy functioning: between 2002 and 2011, only 6% of Brazilians evaluated their trust level in the National Congress as strong, 3% on political parties and 6% on public administration (for the period of 2005 to 2011). Simply put, citizens seem to trust democracy as the best political model, but distrust its institutions.

The goal of this research is not to explain the causal elements of this dissatisfaction, or to explain how high levels of distrust in institutions manage to coexist with reasonable support indexes for democracy. What interests us is, in the first place, to present the crisis scenario of citizen distrust in traditional democratic instruments and, in second place, to propose these elements as a hypothesis for the emergence of the June Journeys. In other words, the disconnection between citizens high expectations on democratic regimes and its effectiveness via institutions and political agents.

### **2.3 Dissatisfaction with Public Services**

The third hypothesis regards the bad evaluation of public services in general, but especially public transportation, area in which inefficiencies of the Brazilian State are concentrated and towards which pressures from social change in the last years have converged. Health, Education and Security are sectors traditionally badly evaluated in Brazil. According to the 2013 Latinobarometro Report, for 35% of Brazilians, health is the most important issue in the country. Security and Education - and corruption - come afterwards, considered to be the worst problem by 10% of the interviewed. In the Americas Barometer 2012, Brazil appears as having the third worse evaluation of public services. However, it was in public transportation that Brazilian dissatisfaction concentrated over the last years by the look of the June Journeys, which had as a trigger the raise in bus fares in Sao Paulo. According to a research conducted by Datafolha during the first protests, public transportation received its worse evaluation since 1987. It is in this public services disapproval scenario, especially regarding transportation, that is based our third hypothesis for the model.

### **2.4 Information Access and Social Media**

The fourth and last hypothesis considered is the one regarding information access expansion thanks to widening Internet access (and, thus, Social Media), allied with the rising educational level of the average Brazilian. Information and Knowledge access tend to potentialize the dissatisfactions discussed in the three prior sections and to catalyze

contestation movements. According to the Brazilian Media Research of 2014, 47% of Brazilians have home-based Internet access. If we consider young people from 16 to 35 years old, this number goes up to 50%, reaching 60% of people with a high school degree, with house income between two and five minimum wages, and from cities with over 500 thousand inhabitants. Also, according to IBGE, based on the PNAD (National Research by Domicile) 2011, in the period of 6 years the proportion of Brazilians with Internet access grew impressively, from 20.9% to 46,5%. This means that 45,8 million Brazilians were not connected 6 years ago, and would, therefore, not take part in the network diffusion process. Furthermore, in 2005 only 24.1% of students in the public schooling system used the Internet. In 2011, this number grew to 65.8% of them. Unfortunately, a little less than half of the Brazilian population still has no access to Internet, computers or mobile phones, meaning there is still a long way in becoming fully connected.

Thus, this hypothesis presupposes that a rapid increase in Internet access and, above all, social media, was an essential element to translate, via social mobilization, the pessimism regarding politics, economics and other services provided by the State. The person to person information diffusion must have been indeed responsible to raise interest quickly, as people opened up to the protests critiques due to their network proximity with protesters. "The transition from individual indignation to collective action needs to go through a communication process" (TERRA and RUEDIGER, 2013), which is facilitated by social media, where people can see posts from people whose opinions they trust and value.

### **3 Applying the Analysis Model**

#### **3.1 Urban Mobility and Citizenship Research**

Wishing to analyze the impact of the four above-mentioned hypotheses, we used data from the survey "Urban Mobility and Citizenship Research". The Survey was conducted by FGV/DAPP in 2014 between the days of March 25th and April 7th, during which 3600 people were interviewed in six different metropolitan regions of Brazil (São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, Recife and Brasilia). The questions englobed both the evaluation of public services, especially transportation - trigger for the June Journeys -, and the opinion about manifestations and democracy's workings.

In order to verify the impact of the hypotheses proposed by our analysis model, 10 logistical regressions were constructed in two settings - 5 regression models for each one of the two dependent variables that this work planned to investigate. In the first setting of variables - I to V - we sought to identify which elements possess a predictive potential for



the *participation in protests* variable. The dependent variable was represented by the question "Have you participated in any street manifestations during the last year?". The second setting of variables - VI to X - was constructed in order to measure elements that might impact the variable *supports protests*. For this dependent variable, we asked interviewees "Do you support street manifestations?". Both settings of independent variables were organized based on the four hypotheses constructed in the Analysis Model:

a) **Quality of Public Services.** Four of the questions of the survey were used to test this hypothesis. They sought to determine evaluation of interviewees in four main public services: *education, security, transports and health*. We only included in the model interviewees who answered *highly dissatisfied* with each of the services. In this manner, we managed to measure whether a high dissatisfaction level can explain either *participation or support* in manifestations;

b) **Frustrated Expectations.** Two of the variables of the survey were used to measure this hypothesis. The first was a question regarding improvement or worsening of the interviewee's economic situation over the last five years. The second one asked if the interviewee believed their economic situation would improve or deteriorate in the next five years. In both cases we were looking for negative answers to this questions in order to make it to the model. These variables were structured to identify a positive or negative expectation regarding the future, which would contrast with the improvements in income, job opportunity and consumption verified over the last 10 years in Brazil. Answers that accounted for a worsening situation were included in both the cases.

c) **Representation Crisis.** Three questions were used in order to test this third hypothesis. The first one asked interviewees regarding the commitment of politicians with its citizens problems, the second one about whether they thought votes were an effective instrument of social transformation and the third regarding satisfaction with the functioning of democracy. This hypothesis sought to identify the trust level on the political system, identified by votes and politicians, and the democratic regime in a larger sense. All negative answers were included in the model;

d) **Information and Social Media Access.** Two variables were used to test the fourth and last hypothesis of the Analysis Model. The first one wished to identify how informed people feel regarding the problems of the country, and positive answers (well or very well) were accounted. The second one wished to establish the way through which interviewees keep themselves informed. In this case, included answers

were "internet and social media". This hypothesis wished to identify the role of the web as an information diffuser and as an important factor to define the tendency towards support and participation in street demonstrations.

In order to verify the isolated potential of hypothesis as well as the potential of the set, and also to account for possible multicollinearity effects in its predictive impact, hypothesis were distributed in 10 logistic models. Models I and VI analyzed the "public services quality" hypothesis; models II and VII the hypothesis regarding "frustrated expectations"; models III and VIII used variables related to "democracy crisis"; models IV and IX accounted for "information and social media access"; and, lastly, models V and X account for all the hypotheses. Other than that were included in all models variables accounting for income, gender, age and educational level as control variables, in order to neutralize variables related to profile.

### **3.2 Setting #1: Models I to V**

The first part of this analysis sought to identify which factors influenced people to *participate* in the June Journeys. Regressions of the five models might point or not to a relation between each of the four constructed hypothesis and participation in demonstrations and, at the end, the importance of each one of them when significance of all factors is analyzed together. Control Variables include questions regarding gender, age, educational level and income, and were kept in all the models in order to neutralize variables related to the profile of interviewees.

*Model I:* Indicated the existence of relation between the variables Education and Transportation (interviewees who were "very dissatisfied") and participation in demonstrations. Relation is much higher for Education. Health and Security, on the other hand, did not prove to be determinants. Thus, model I confirms partially the hypothesis of dissatisfaction with public services.

*Model II:* Indicated the existence of relation between the variables "functioning of democracy" and participation in demonstrations. In this case, interviewees who were very dissatisfied with Brazilian democracy have more chances of having participated in demonstrations, confirming partially the Representation Crisis hypothesis. The variables of trust in "votes" and "politicians" did not show any relation;

Hypotheses	Dependent Variable: "Participated at the Protests"	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model V
		Odds Ratio	Odds Ratio	Odds Ratio	Odds Ratio	Odds Ratio
Control Variables	Man	1.60***	1.54***	1.51***	1.48***	1.60***
	25-45 years	0.46***	0.50***	0.50***	0.53***	0.48***
	41-54 years	0.31***	0.33***	0.34***	0.37***	0.33***
	55-64 years	0.20***	0.21***	0.22***	0.23***	0.21***
	65+ years	0.14***	0.16***	0.16***	0.17***	0.16***
Dissatisfaction with Public Services	Basic Education and Incomplete High School	1.17	1.16	1.18	1.12	1.12
	Complete High School and Incomplete Undergraduate	1.51**	1.54**	1.57***	1.46***	1.38*
	Complete Undergraduate	2.72***	2.90***	2.96***	12.65***	2.43***
	Income Log	1.31***	1.31***	1.33***	1.29***	1.27
	Education	1.49**	-	-	-	1.48**
Representation Crisis	Health	1.03	-	-	-	1.02
	Transportation	1.26*	-	-	-	1.23
	Security	1.12	-	-	-	1.23
	Confidence on voting	-	0.97	-	-	0.94
	Functioning of Democracy	-	1.42**	-	-	1.30*
Frustrated Expectations	Confidence on Politicians	-	0.98	-	-	0.92
	Improvements in last 5 years	-	-	0.87	-	0.80
Social Network and Access to Information	Expectations for next 5 years	-	-	1.15	-	1.14
	Access to Information	-	-	-	1.37**	1.36**
	Social Network	-	-	-	1.31*	1.24*

*Model III:* Did not present evidences of relation between participation in demonstrations and variables accounting for "improvement of economic conditions over the last five years" and "expectation over the next five years". Thus, we don't confirm the hypothesis of frustrated expectation among Brazilians related to participation. On the contrary, the research shows that pessimism regarding the future does not influence people to participate;

*Model IV:* Revealed the existence of relation between both variables (if the interviewee considers himself well-informed & if they get informed via Internet and social media) and participation in manifestations. This result allows us to stress even more the importance of Information and Internet access to social mobilization in the Brazilian context, confirming up to now our fourth hypothesis;

*Model V:* The last model of this first setting, as previously explained, tested all variables, including the four hypotheses simultaneously in order to test the relation with *participation*. The result, in this case, was essentially the same as demonstrated individually by each of the models: dissatisfaction with public services (without the Transportation variable, which loses its significance) and representation crisis were partially confirmed; access to information was accepted and frustrated expectations was rejected.

The five tested models allow us to confirm the validity of the analysis model for three of the four explanatory hypotheses suggested for this dependent variable. It is possible to point out as determinants in this specific context (that motivated the mobilization): the dissatisfaction with the basic public services - even more regarding education than transportation-, confidence crisis in the political system and/or in the functioning of democracy, and growing access of information via Internet and social media that has been verified during the last ten years in Brazil. Results, however, lead to the rejection of the frustrated expectations hypothesis as an explanatory factor for participation.

### **3.3 Setting #2: Models VI to X**

The second part of the analysis wished to test constructed hypothesis in a larger group: interviewees who *supported* street demonstrations. Thus, these last five regressions wish to test the existence or not of relation between the same hypotheses explored in the first part and support for protests. Just like on Setting #1, this last model also tested the four hypotheses together in order to identify the existence of relation for each one according to the assumed analysis model. Control variables are, once more, included in all models variables, in order to control the effect of the variables related to profile.

Hypotheses	Dependent Variable: "Support the Protests"	Model VI	Model VII	Model VIII	Model IX	Model X
		Odds Ratio	Odds Ratio	Odds Ratio	Odds Ratio	Odds Ratio
Control Variables	Man	1.38***	1.33***	1.30***	1.30***	1.40***
	25-45 years	0.52***	0.55***	0.56***	0.59***	0.53***
	41-54 years	0.36***	0.39***	0.39***	0.43***	0.38***
	55-64 years	0.38***	0.40***	0.40***	0.44***	0.40***
	65+ years	0.25***	0.27***	0.27***	0.29***	0.27***
Dissatisfaction with Public Services	Basic Education and Incomplete High School	1.42***	1.40***	1.44***	1.41**	1.39**
	Complete High School and Incomplete Undergraduate	1.82***	1.84***	1.87***	1.80***	1.75***
	Complete Undergraduate	2.43***	2.52***	2.59***	2.47***	2.28***
	Income Log	1.14	1.14*	1.18**	1.14*	1.12
	Education	1.40**	-	-	-	1.40**
Representation Crisis	Health	1.05	-	-	-	1.03
	Transportation	1.25*	-	-	-	1.23*
	Security	1.14	-	-	-	1.11
	Confidence on voting	-	0.84*	-	-	0.81*
	Functioning of Democracy	-	1.34***	-	-	1.25**
Frustrated Expectations	Confidence on Politicians	-	1.68***	-	-	1.57**
	Improvements in last 5 years	-	-	0.91	-	0.81
	Expectations for next 5 years	-	-	1.27*	-	1.25*
Social Network and Access to Information	Access to Information	-	-	-	1.11	1.20
	Social Network	-	-	-	1.23*	1.14

*Model VI:* Showed once again relation between Education and Transport dissatisfaction with support for protests. The relation is, again, stronger for education. Once more, Health and Security did not prove to be determinant factors in explaining the dependent variable. Model VI confirms partially the hypothesis of dissatisfaction with public services;

*Model VII:* Showed relation between the three tested variables (trust in (i) votes (ii) politicians and (iii) functioning of democracy) and the existence of support for protests. In this scenario, those who trusted votes, but not politicians or the functioning of democracy, were more likely to support protests. Thus, the model confirms our hypothesis of a Representation Crisis. It is also important to note that the combination of trust in the voting system, distrust in politicians and disapproval of the functioning of democracy seems to indicate distrust in the political system, but not in democracy as a regime model;

*Model VIII:* Indicated - differently than in model III - relation between one of the tested factors, pessimism regarding future economic, with support for demonstrations. It didn't indicate, in the other hand, a relation with the variable of the "last five years". This result can be interpreted as a partial validity of the Frustrated Expectations hypothesis, since interviewees that expressed pessimism regarding the future were more likely to support manifestations;

*Model IX:* Showed positive relation for the "support for protests" variable with the "access to Social Media". This result indicated a partial importance of the Internet as an influencing factor for people to support protests, differently than from the model testing participation, in which both independent variables were significant;

*Model X:* The last model of this second setting, just as in the first setting, tested all variables of the four different hypotheses simultaneously in order to verify the relation with the variable "support protests". The result, this time, showed significant differences when compared with the one before: (1) among public services, dissatisfaction with transports maintains its significance, just as education does; (2) the representation crisis is confirmed in the three tested variables - confidence in voting, politicians and functioning of democracy; (3) the frustrated expectations hypothesis maintains its importance considering the second variable (pessimistic expectations regarding personal economics situation over the next five years); (4) access to information and social media lose entirely its significance, in contrast with the final result - model V- from the first part.

Tested models in this second part indicate, thus, that the three first variables of the analysis model - dissatisfaction with public services, representation crisis and frustrated expectations-, were either partially or entirely confirmed as relevant factors in explaining support for the June Journeys. However, the fourth hypothesis, regarding the role of the

Internet, that had showed most importance in explaining participation in demonstrations, was not confirmed. This result is the one that deserves more attention given the hereby proposed analysis, since it shows strong indication that the access to information via Internet and social media was the determinant factor in allowing support for manifestations to evolve to actual participation in the manifestations of June 2013. In other words, networks were the ones that permitted a pessimistic scenario regarding the political system, the economy and public services to translate themselves into social mobilization in all major Brazilian cities. In this sense, the networks fulfilled their role as catalyzers of a larger social process, resulting in strong impact over the Brazilian political system in the form of social pressure and publicization of new demands, as we will see in the next section.

For now, at least two other aspects relative to the application of the analysis model are worth mentioning. The first one is the existence of a pessimistic scenario disseminated throughout the Brazilian Society which regards three main aspects: politics, economics and the (lack of) quality of basic public services. All these factors converged to a latent discontentment that turned into support and participation in street demonstrations, transforming an initially restrictive manifestation into protests with inedit scale in the history of the country - in which Networks proved to fulfill a central role.

The second one, not less important than the first one, is the relationship between trust in vote and dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy, verified in models VII and X. The probability ratio found in these cases indicate that people who trust the voting system as a transformation path, as well as people who are dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy demonstrate higher probability of supporting protests. The relationship between trusting the voting system and the dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy indicates that the crisis of representation is a crisis of trust in the political system that, however, does not translate to disbelief regarding the democratic regime, since the main channel of representation of a democracy - the vote - is still identified as a legitimate and efficient mean of transformation, especially for those who endorse protests. Social mobilization would be, in this sense, a mean to complement the pressure over the State and the political system, through which demands generally ignored by formal channels of democracy become public and are put at the center of the political agenda by the civil society.

## **4. Network Analysis**

### **4.1 An analysis using Big Data**

According to the results obtained using the analytical model in the first part of the article, the internet and social networks were the primary means for disseminating of information on the June Journeys and also for mobilization among those who claimed to have participated in the protests. A closer look at event developments and the cries on the streets might make the scenario clearer and will help us delimitate better our hypothesis and analysis. It is hard to determine the beginning of the protests. In the beginning of 2013, protests regarding public transportation fare were held in Porto Alegre. However, the series of protests that gathered national attention in the first place started in Sao Paulo. The movement began protesting against the announcement, on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of June, of a R\$ 0.20 raise in bus fares. With the precarious conditions of transportation, such a raise could not be taken lightly by social movements. Thus, the *Movimento do Passe Livre (Free Pass Movement – MPL)* started organizing daily protests that quickly gained popular adhesion and ended up spreading all over the country. But was this raise the reason why more and more people started joining and replicating protests through the country? The answer is hard to determine, but one thing is certain: the streets were demanding much more than the first organizers intended to. One of the echoes, on the streets and internet, made sure to answer: “No, it is not about the 20 cents”.

### **4.2 Mining and analyzing Big Data**

Using the aggregation tools of Brandwatch Social Media monitoring, it was possible to gather posts on the Internet that made reference to the protests. Although data mining does not work perfectly retroactively, we managed to gather one million mentions just for the month of June 2013. Posts containing words with the root *protest-* or *manifest-* were all gathered, as they were referring to the protests. After scanning the posts and refining the search, we were able to take a step back and look at how information regarding the protests spread nationwide. Taking a look at protest mention evolution (Figure 2), we can see there was a huge spike on the 18<sup>th</sup> of June, with an ascending moment since the 16<sup>th</sup> of June. We will take a closer look into this ascent later.






Figure 2: Volume over time of posts mentioning protests for June 2013

Firstly, we should try to look at the aggregated data statistics. Looking at the type of website from where the posts come, we notice that the majority of them are from twitter (Figure 3). Since twitter has vast personal use, this is an interesting fact to be emphasized, for it means that information spread must have depended mainly on the 21st century version of mouth to mouth information diffusion: social media. This means that regular people, as citizens and individuals, felt the need to share information regarding the protests. If it was intended for other citizens to read and to join in on protesting, or if it was on the hopes of being heard by the government remains to be seen – if that is even possible.




Figure 3: Type of pages where posts came from

Taking a closer look at the gathered tweets (Figure 4):

> 775.177 total tweets found in the month of June 2013, of which we managed to classify:

>> 355.780 as coming from individual accounts

>> 15.771 as coming from organizational accounts

The number of tweets coming directly from the people is clearly much higher than the posts articulated by media, corporations or institutions. Once more, data indicates that information spreading must have come from a sort of *spontaneous* kind of manifestation.




Figure 4: Tweets in the month of June mentioning protests and classified by account type:

### 4.3 The Brazilian Network Society

If we take a look at June protests posts evolution in Brazil, broken down by State (Figure 5), we notice that within a space of two days (June 16th-18th) tweets talking about protests could be found all over Brazilian territory. In order to be informed or engaged or simply connected to others, one only has to have access to computer – or phone – and Internet.




Figure 5: Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Piauí concentrate the mentions

At this point, it is important to stress that post spreading proportions might not have become as massive if a considerable part of Brazilians had not managed to gain access to the so-called ICT. The rise of the network society is also responsible for changing the sociability, by reinforcing the emergence of networked individualism (Castells, 2000). This, again, is something that was verified during protests, and is most likely one of the reasons it took such massive proportions.

#### 4.4 Diversity of Demands

It is important to notice that although MPL started organizing protests, since they were not officially affiliated to any party, a regular citizen would not refrain from attending a protest because of a prior political affiliation they might have. This might have to do with another tendency observable during protests, namely the diversity of the demands. People joined in and managed to press for their own agenda, independent of what the protest was originally organized for. This horizontal tendency, reflection of the networked individualism Castells talks about, made it impossible for the protests to have a leader, which is most likely what permitted vast civil society engagement. Amongst the most popular demands were the questioning of World Cup expenses, demanding of more transparency, political reform, proposals for constitutional amendments, such as PEC 37<sup>4</sup>, better quality in health and education (later this would evolve to cries for FIFA pattern hospitals and schools).




Figure 6: Posts categorized by demands.

<sup>4</sup> PEC 37 would keep investigatory powers exclusively with the police, taking it off from the Public Ministry.

In an effort to understand this diversity of demands, and to try to better understand what made Brazilians suddenly interested in engaging, we took some of the most commented demands by the media and by protests and started to classify the gathered posts according to them. The result is shown in Figure 6. We can see that, although transportation is the main discussed demand, other demands start gaining space and attention over time. Education, health, transparency, democracy, and Constitutional Amendments (PEC) are, in this order, the most commented demands. The peak is reached on the 18th of June.

#### 4.5 Police Force Abuses

We still have no clear indication of what might have made people identify themselves with the movement. But there were still other controversies revolving around the protests, such as abuses from the part of the police in trying to repress them. In São Paulo, before spreading to other cities, police started using rubber bullets and teargas to disperse protesters, but also used it against members of the media, which, at that point, was still not giving much emphasis on manifestations. Still, even without much media coverage, news of police abuse started spreading over social media networks. In order to verify this in case of the June Journeys, we tried to classify the posts once more, this time in regards of what might have revolted people during the protests, i.e. on the streets while protesting. Looking at Figure 6, we see some aggregated themes relevant to protesting and we notice that, before the peak of total posts in the 18th of June, there is a peak of posts mentioning 'Police' on the 17<sup>th</sup>, which is almost as big as the one on the 18th of June. This peak on the 17th is followed by an ascent of posts mentioning violence. Looking at the most repeated expressions on the posts of the 17th that mentioned 'Police', it is possible to classify the majority of the expressions as criticism of the indiscriminate use of police force. 'Rubber bullet' and 'teargas' were words that were also repeated very often.




Figure 7: Posts categorized by major polemics that took place during protests

## Conclusion

This article aimed at analyzing the June Journeys in Brazil using the element of digital inclusion as a central explanatory variable for triggering social mobilization. Although Internet and Social Media access was not the isolated factor that caused protests in June 2013, it fulfilled a crucial role in terms of information diffusion and network articulation that led over a million people to the streets. In order to test this presupposition, we developed an analysis model based on four main hypothesis: (1) frustrated expectations over the ongoing and future improvements of the country; (2) a representation and trust crisis towards the Brazilian political system; (3) dissatisfaction with basic public services; and, finally, (4) raise in Internet and social media access as a catalyzing factor of mobilizations in a pessimistic social scenario. These four factors would, therefore, be responsible for the social mobilization that took place in Brazil during June of 2013.

The application of the analysis model to the results of the survey "Social Mobility and Citizenship" revealed that indeed the web, and especially social networks, played a central role in articulating mobilization. Among the group of interviewees that said they had supported protests, the three first hypotheses of the analysis model were confirmed, which configured a pessimistic context regarding the political system, the future of the economy and the basic services offered by the Brazilian State. The fourth hypothesis, however, was not found significant by the regression running all hypotheses simultaneously, suggesting that internet access was not a determinant factor for support. However, among the interviewees who effectively participated in protests, it was the frustrated expectations hypothesis that lost its relevance, while many variables related to the role of the internet were relevant. Therefore, we can conclude this result indicates that the interconnected social networks were the determinant factor in permitting that support for protests would turn into actual social mobilization.

A second result obtained from the analysis model and deserves attention regards Brazilians trust in democracy. It was verified that trust in voting and dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy are, at the same time, relevant factors in supporting protests. The competition of these factors with significant variables for the support of manifestations suggests that the trust crisis in the political system does not extend itself to democracy as a regime model, which has its main political action instrument centralized in the voting system. On the contrary, those who affirmed to trust the voting system as means of social transformation were more likely to endorse protests, which makes social mobilization an additional channel of political action - but not a substitute to the ballot boxes.

The last part of the article sought to analyse, via network analysis and big data, in which way the web transformed itself in a big *locus* of public debate *during* protests. The fact that the majority of interactions were coming from Twitter suggests a multiplicity of voices that made themselves heard at that point in time, beyond major communication media and traditional civil society institutions, such as political parties, non-governmental organizations, syndicates and social movements. Although concentrated in States like Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, interactions were registered all over Brazilian territory, revealing the potential of information access and social articulation offered by social media. The analysis of the emerging demands during protests revealed that the main revendications were in the area of public transportation - trigger of manifestations -, health, education and security. In this last case, the majority of the mentions were referring to the State police force abuses and their strong repression tactics. The agenda of public services was, in this sense, the main demand manifested by the Brazilian society at that time. Another issue worthy of attention was the fight against corruption, indicating once again a scenario of distrust regarding the political system, viewed as corrupt and distant from society.

Main results of this analysis indicate, therefore, an affirmative response to the central hypothesis of the article: digital inclusion over the last few years consolidated the virtual environment as a new public space in Brazil. The internet and social networks constitute themselves as a *continuum* of the traditional public sphere, following Habermasian models, that was established in the country during the democratization process, and represented, as the scenario seems to indicate, a new political cycle on the recent history of the country. The encounter of the networked society with the significant social advancements registered over the last decades, as well as the maturity of a fully established democratic institutionality and a consolidated civil society seem to confirm an interconnected public sphere in the Brazilian context. Its première night was concomitant with the rise of the June Journeys. In other words, the protests that took place in Brazil in June 2013 marked the moment that the networks went to the streets and, the streets expressed themselves through the (social) networks, leading the path for the new Brazilian public agenda.

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