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A note on auctions with compulsory partnership

Paulo K. Monteiro, Aloisio Araujo, Otávio Damé, Clara Costellini

Resumo


We study a symmetric, profitt share, common value auction with
a twist: One (fixed) Bidder, if not winning the auction, has to enter
a partnership with the winner, sharing both expenses and revenue at
rate (say) 0 < r < 1. We show that it doesn't have an equilibrium in
pure strategies.

Palavras-chave


pre-salt auction; equilibrium existence

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