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Um Simples Mercado de Compra e Venda

Marilda Sotomayor

Abstract


We model a buying and selling market as a market game in which (a) all goods except money are identic and inclivisible, (b) agents' preferences can be described by a reservation value, and (c) all buyers are price-takers and can buy up to their quota of goods. We prove that equilibrium prices exist and support efficient allocations of the goods to the buyers. Furthermore, every such allocation is supported by any equilibrium price. Results of comparative statics are also obtained. We reformulate a dinamic mechanism of auction existent in the literature and show that this mechanism yields the minimum competitive equilibrium in a finite number of steps. We obtain sufficient conditions under which this mechanism is individually non-manipulable by the buyers.

Keywords


Matching; equilíbrio de Nash; mecanismo.

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.12660/bre.v18n21998.2835

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