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ESTRUTURA ESTRATÉGICA DE UM SIMPLES MERCADO DE COMPRA E VENDA

Marilda Sotomayor

Abstract


We consider the cooperative market game studied in Sotomayor (1999-a), where identical and indivisible items are to be sold by only one seller to potential buyers. Agents' preferences are described by a reservation value and all buyers can buy up to their quota of objects. The buying and selling mechanism is a sealed bid auction. Suhmitted bids determine an interval (...) from where a market-c1earing price can be selected. The price (...), where each choice of (...) and of a matching rule define a different mechanism. Each of these mechanisms induces a non-cooperative game whose strategic structure is then analysed. Under reasonable assumptions we show that these non-cooperative games can be regarded as a competitive process for achieving a cooperative outcome: every equilibrium payoff is a competitive equilibrium for the cooperative market game. Precise answers can be given to the strategic questions raised.

Keywords


Mechanism; auction; competitive price.

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.12660/bre.v19n21999.2781

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