Now showing items 1-9 of 9

    • The consistency of welfare judgements with a representative consumer 

      Dow, James; Werlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa (Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV, 1986)
      This paper is about economies with a representative consumer. In general a representative consumer need not exist, although there are several well known sets of sufficient conditions under which Qne will. It is common ...
    • The ex-Ante non-optimality of the Dempster-Schafer updating rule for ambiguous beliefs 

      Dow, James; Werlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa (Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV, 1992-02)
      The most widely used updating rule for non-additive probalities is the Dempster-Schafer rule. Schmeidles and Gilboa have developed a model of decision making under uncertainty based on non-additive probabilities, and in ...
    • Excess volatility of stock prices and knightian uncertainty 

      Dow, James; Werlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa (Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV, 1991)
    • Homothetic preferences 

      Dow, James; Werlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa (Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV, 1991-04)
      This paper describes properties of upper semi-continuous homothetic preferences. First we give conditions for the existence of an upper semi-continuous representation which is homogeneous of degree one. Then we show that ...
    • Laws of large numbers for non-additive probabilities 

      Dow, James; Werlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa (Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV, 1993-12)
      We apply the concept of exchangeable random variables to the case of non-additive robability distributions exhibiting ncertainty aversion, and in the lass generated bya convex core convex non-additive probabilities, ith a ...
    • Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty: breaking down backward induction (extensively revised version) 

      Dow, James; Werlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa (Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV, 1993-04)
      We define Nash equilibrium for two-person normal form games in the presence of uncertainty, in the sense of Knight(1921). We use the fonna1iution of uncertainty due to Schmeidler and Gilboa. We show tbat there exist Nash ...
    • Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty: breaking-down backward induction 

      Dow, James; Werlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa (Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV, 1992-02)
      We present two alternative definitions of Nash equilibrium for two person games in the presence af uncertainty, in the sense of Knight. We use the formalization of uncertainty due to Schmeidler and Gilboa. We show that, ...
    • Preferences, common knowledge and speculative trade 

      Dow, James; Werlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa; Madrigal, Vicente (Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV, 1990-01)
      We study the proposition that if it is common knowledge that en allocation of assets is ex-ante pareto efficient, there is no further trade generated by new information. The key to this result is that the information ...
    • Uncertainty aversion and the optmal choice of portfolio 

      Dow, James; Werlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa (Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV, 1988)
      In this paper we apply the theory of declsion making with expected utility and non-additive priors to the choice of optimal portfolio. This theory describes the behavior of a rational agent who i5 averse to pure 'uncertainty' ...